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GEORGE S. MORRIS.

HEGEL'S LOGIC.

A BOOK ON THE GENESIS OF THE CATEGORIES
OF THE MIND.

GRIGGS'S
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UNDER THE EDITORIAL SUPERVISION OF PROF. G. S. MORRIS.

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HEGEL'S LOGIC.

A BOOK ON THE

GENESIS OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE MIND.

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION.

BY WILLIAM T. HARRIS, LL.D.,

U. S. COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION.

*Ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη πορεύεται τὰς
υποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα
βεβαιώσῃται καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα ἡρέμα
ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω.*

PLATO'S REPUBLIC, 533—D.

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TO

HENRY C. BROCKMEYER,

WITH GRATEFUL RECOLLECTIONS OF ASSISTANCE FROM HIM IN THE
STUDY OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHY,

THIS BOOK IS WITH HIS PERMISSION DEDICATED.

PREFACE.

WHEN I promised Professor Morris to write this book (in 1883), I intended to throw together some of my previous studies on Hegel's *Logic*, with the addition of more or less new matter in the form of commentary and connecting introductions. I had worked pretty constantly on the subject of this logic—though mostly using the expositions of it which I found in histories of philosophy, rather than Hegel's own exposition—as a sort of center of all my thinking since the year 1860, making, it is true, very slow progress. I had always cherished the project of writing some sort of commentary to the work, but did not think that I could prepare a worthy book for twenty years.

I soon discovered that if I were to place before the public an immature work on this subject I should find myself embarrassed at any time afterwards to obtain a hearing for the ripened views which I hoped to reach. I began, accordingly, to prepare a more thorough treatise, and to this end I set about a study of the entire scope and plan of the Hegelian Logic, and especially of its relations to other branches

of knowledge and to preceding philosophic systems as well. I struggled for a long time with the preliminary question: how to convey to a neophyte an idea of the province of such a system of "pure thought"—how, in short, to demonstrate the necessary existence of pure thought and show its significance in solving all problems. Such pure thought, could one demonstrate its existence as an element in all concrete problems, would furnish the formulæ for the solution of all questions.

But these new investigations consumed much time. I gradually felt myself turning around from my attitude of faith in the Hegelian exposition, to an attitude of criticism. Formerly I had trusted where I did not see—trusted that I *should* see when I had gained more power of apprehension. Now I attacked what I could not verify with my present insight, and insisted on its falsity until it should demonstrate its truth. In this frame of mind I discovered many passages wherein it was evident that Hegel had introduced what he should call "external reflections," and many more wherein the "dialectic thread" was supposititious. For example, in the first chapter of *The Phenomenology*, his assumption of the Here and Now as the forms of immediate sense-perception would be seen to be necessary and exhaustive, had he called attention to the fact that time and space are the necessary forms of all sense-perception, as well as the logical conditions of

the existence of the sense-world. The immediately present objects of time and space are necessarily Now and Here. Such omission leaves the exposition apparently without exhaustive universality. It seems an accident that Hegel takes the now and here as the two forms. This is, of course, a defect only of the exposition, and not of the underlying insight of Hegel himself. We can see that he saw this exhaustiveness, but we can see also that he ought to have expounded it, but was held back by his desire to avoid "external reflection," a desire that amounts to a "phobia" with Hegel. He strives always to make the object "unfold itself" (*sich entwickeln*), and shrinks from expressing any idea until it comes obviously before us in consequence of objective dialectic.

This "objective dialectic" is the exhibition of the inadequateness and imperfection of a thought when it is assumed to be universally valid and true. Such a thought, if assumed in each of the forms of the absolute, namely, (a) as by itself and independent; (b) as in negative relation to itself as its own other, (c) in identity with itself in its other, will show up its imperfection and lead to a deeper thought which contains *explicitly* what the former thought has held only implicitly and has had to show dialectically as its contradiction.

This process, with the pure forms of experience—that is to say, with the categories underlying experience—gives us a sort of organon, or

logic of ontology, containing in general formulæ all the solutions to be found in experience.

Just as in the case of mathematics, the analytical solution given in the algebraic formulæ is a general one and furnishes the pure form for all concrete or applied solutions; so the "pure-thought" solution, according to this logic, develops what is essential in all solutions of particular cases; for these particular cases are only applications of the pure-thought elements to limited spheres of conditions. Once master of the general solution, one can solve the practical questions that fall under it.

I must ask the reader to indulge me in further autobiographical reminiscences with the purpose of explaining what I have set forth as strictures on the Hegelian system.

As early as 1858 I obtained my first insight into this philosophy, in studying Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. I saw that time and space presuppose reason as their logical condition and that they are themselves the logical condition of what is in the world. Man, in so far as he is conscious reason, therefore transcends the world of time and space and is an immortal being, and possesses transcendental freedom also inasmuch as he is not conditioned essentially by the world—not essentially, but only in the expression or manifestation of his will, which expression he may altogether withhold. I saw also the necessity of the logical inference that the unity of time and space presupposes one absolute Reason. God, freedom, and immortality

have therefore seemed to me to be demonstrable ever since the December evening in 1858 when I obtained my insight into the true inference from Kant's *Transcendental Aesthetic*. In 1859 I worked out my refutation of Sir William Hamilton's *Law of the Conditioned*, by proving the infinitude of space and showing that the supposed antinomy rests on confounding mental pictures with pure thought. The unpicturability of infinite space does not contradict its infinitude, but confirms it. In 1863 I arrived at the insight which Hegel has expressed in his *Für-sich-seyn* or Being-for-itself, which I called, and still call "independent being." I did not obtain this insight by study of Hegel's logic, however, but rather by following out the lines of thought begun in 1858. This insight I supposed at the time to be specially that of Hegel, though I had not as yet read one-tenth of his logic. But I discovered afterwards that it is the most important insight of Plato, and that Aristotle uses it as the foundation of his philosophy. It has in one form or another furnished the light for all philosophy worthy of the name since Plato first saw it. St. Thomas Aquinas presents it in the beginning of his *Summa Theologica*. Leibnitz states it as the basis of his *Monadology*. But each thinker may claim originality, not only for his statement of it but also for the insight itself. For it cannot be borrowed from another, it is itself an original insight, because it is and must be a seeing at first hand of the necessity of all existence of

whatever character to be grounded in self-determined being. All dependent being is a part of independent being; and all independent being is self-determined being.

The absolute is not, therefore, an empty absolute, an indeterminate being, but it is determined. It is not determined through another, but through itself. If there is no independent being there is no dependent being. If there is not self-determined being there is no being whatever.

It was a year or two later that I came upon a distinction between the true actual as totality, and the changeable real, which is partly actual and partly potential—in the process of change I saw that the full actuality is involved, partly affirmative as giving what reality there is to the phenomena, and partly negative as producing the change which negates the present real and actualizes in its place a new phase of potentiality.

It was in 1864 that I obtained an insight into the logical subordination of fate to freedom—the totality of conditions cannot have a fate outside it, but must be spontaneous in itself, and self-determined—hence all fate and all changes not spontaneous must be secondary and derivative from a higher source that is free. In 1866 I arrived at the first insight that is distinctively Hegelian and the most important aperçu of Hegel's logic. I wrote this out in a letter to my friend Adolph E. Kroeger, an ardent Fichtean, whom I had discovered and was endeavoring to proselyte for Hegel. I called it the distinction between comprehension

(or Begriff), and Idea (Idee). It should really be the distinction that Hegel makes between negative unity or substantiality and Begriff or Idee. It is undoubtedly Hegel's highest thought. It is the insight into the nature of true being to be altruistic and to exist in the self-activity of others. It is the thought that lies at the basis of the doctrine of the trinity, though rather as a logical implication than as a conscious idea. It is also the highest goal of the Platonic-Aristotelian system—indicated in the assertion that God is without envy (*The Timaeus* and *The Metaphysics*), also in the doctrine of the Good as the highest category.

This thought is not reached in its pure form by Plato or Aristotle, but rather in its ethical form—as it is the very fountain source of Ethics. Hegel's originality consists in seeing for the first time the pure-thought form of this doctrine. He names it *Idee*, to honor Plato as its first discoverer. For doubtless Hegel read into the Platonic doctrine of Ideas this pure thought. It must certainly be admitted that the attribution of the thought to Plato is correct, though with him it is not to be found stated adequately in its pure-thought form.

In 1866 I for the first time read through Hegel's larger logic, reading it in the English translation that had been made for myself and two other friends (George Stedman and J. H. Watters), by Henry C. Brockmeyer, in 1859 and 1860. I copied the work entire from the manuscript and am sure I read every word of it. But I am equally sure that I did not understand at the most any-

thing beyond the first part of the first volume and could not follow any of the discussions in the second and third volumes, or even remember the words from one page to another. It was all over my head, so to speak. I had of course made myself acquainted with the categories and sub-categories of the work years before through histories of philosophy, and was gradually learning to think something into them; but I could make little of Hegel's deductions or discussions of them. This experience of my own, which lasted for years, is I presume the experience of other students of Hegel and also of students of any other system of deep philosophy. One has first to seize its general thought, its trend as a whole, and gradually descend to its details.

The translation which I copied out still exists, but has never been printed, any portion of it. Mr. Brockmeyer, whose acquaintance I had made in 1858, is, and was even at that time, a thinker of the same order of mind as Hegel, and before reading Hegel, except the few pages in Hedge's *German Prose Writers*, had divined Hegel's chief ideas and the position of his system, and informed me on my first acquaintance with him in 1858 that Hegel was the great man among modern philosophers, and that his large logic was the work to get. I sent immediately to Germany for it and it arrived late in the year. Mr. Brockmeyer's deep insights and his poetic power of setting them forth with symbols and imagery furnished me and my friends of those early years all of our outside

stimulus in the study of German philosophy. He impressed us with the practicality of philosophy, inasmuch as he could flash into the questions of the day, or even into the questions of the moment, the highest insight of philosophy and solve their problems. Even the hunting of wild turkeys or squirrels was the occasion for the use of philosophy. Philosophy came to mean with us, therefore, the most practical of all species of knowledge. We used it to solve all problems connected with school-teaching and school management. We studied the "dialectic" of politics and political parties and understood how measures and men might be combined by its light. But our chief application of philosophy was to literature and art. Mr. Denton J. Snider, who entered our circle in 1866, has published his studies on Shakespeare, Goethe and Homer, and Mr. Brockmeyer has printed in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* his *Letters on Goethe's Faust*, and these will show sufficiently the spirit and methods of our studies in literature.

In 1873 I discovered the substantial identity of all East Indian doctrines. As early as 1856 I had begun to read oriental literature, but had not seized its essential spirit. I had looked for the same diversity of points of view that I was accustomed to in modern philosophy. Cousin's analysis of the oriental systems, as well as other histories of philosophy, had confirmed me in this mistaken path. But I undertook a thorough study of the *Bhagavad Gita* in 1872 and for the first time saw

that the differences of systems were superficial, and that the First Principle pre-supposed and even explicitly stated by the Sanscrit writers was everywhere the same, and that this is the principle of Pure Being as the negative unity of all things. In this I came to see Hegel's deep discernment which early in this century, in the dawn of oriental study, had enabled him to penetrate the true essence of Hindoo thought even in the Western wrappings in which the European first discoverers had brought it away. Hegel could perceive the genuine oriental thinking through the English and French translations which interpreted the same into modern ways of philosophizing. Hegel's greatest aperçu is the difference between the oriental and occidental spirit of thinking and doing.

It was in 1879 that I came to my final and present standpoint in regard to the true outcome of the Hegelian system, but it was six years later that I began to see that Hegel himself has not deduced the logical consequences of his system in the matter of the relation of Nature to the Absolute Idea. I have explained in the following work in many places this divergence of his system from the true doctrine of the Absolute Idea. But the wrong explanation of the use of Nature, strange to say, does not vitiate Hegel's theory of human life and of the Christian church. His doctrine of the Trinity makes the Second Person, or Logos, to be Nature, whereas it should make the Logos to be eternally a Person like the First,

and Nature should be the *Processio* of the Holy Spirit. But he rightly interprets the doctrine of the invisible Church as the body whose spirit is the Holy Spirit.

This defect in interpreting the Absolute Idea gives rise to a species of pantheism which says that the Absolute is real only in the process of Nature, and his personality actual only in historical persons. This is not Hegel's precise doctrine but it may be inferred from that part of it which makes Nature to be the Second Person of the Trinity.

This criticism on the system of Hegel, so far as I am aware, is a new one, and I am confident of its truth.

I will only add here that the interpretation of the doctrine of reflection, which I have discussed at length in treating of the second book of this Logic, is the result of many years' study, beginning with a series of expositions undertaken before the Kant Club, of St. Louis, in 1877-79, and continuing at intervals until 1887. In 1878-1881, I translated, with the assistance of Mr. James S. Garland, the entire second volume of the Logic and published it, with a commentary to some portions of it.

This doctrine of reflection, I think, is the key to Hegel's dialectic, if anything may be called a "key" to it. It is the exposition also of what he calls the Universal (*Das Allgemeine*), and the notion or idea (*Der Begriff*). As such I respectfully invite the attention of all

students of the philosophy of Hegel to it, and venture to express the hope that a new and fruitful road to Hegel's deeper thoughts may be opened by studying that portion of the Logic which expounds the relation of "determining reflection" to "external reflection."

W. T. HARRIS.

WASHINGTON, D. C., August, 1890.

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THE CATEGORIES OF HEGEL'S LARGE LOGIC.

BEING.

QUALITY: (1) BEING, naught, Becoming, *Beginning, ceasing, (reflection-into-itself, form of being.)* (2) DETERMINATE BEING, *reality, negation*, somewhat, other, FINITUDE, *destination, present condition, limit, ought, restraint*, INFINITUDE, *infinite progress, ideality*, (3) BEING-FOR-ITSELF, *being-for-one, oneness*, one and many, (*atom and the void*), repulsion and attraction. **QUANTITY:** (1) PURE QUANTITY, continuous and discrete quantity, (2) LIMITED QUANTITY, number, (*arithmetical processes*), extensive and intensive quantity, quantitative infinitude, *quantitative progression*, (3) QUANTITATIVE RATIO, direct ratio, inverse ratio, ratio of powers. **MEASURE:** (1) SPECIFIC QUANTITY, specifying measure, *the rule*, (2) REAL MEASURE, ratio of independent measures, *series of measure-ratios, elective affinity*, nodal line of measure-ratios, (*no leap in nature*), the measureless, (3) BECOMING OF ESSENCE, absolute indifference, (*centripetal and centrifugal forces*).

ESSENCE.

REFLECTION-INTO-SELF: (1) APPEARANCE, *essential and unessential*, positing reflection, external reflection, determining reflection, (2) DETERMINATIONS OF REFLECTION, identity, distinction, *difference, antithesis of contraries, (positive and negative quantities)*, contradiction, (*principles of contradiction and excluded middle*), (3) GROUND, absolute ground, *form and essence, form and matter, form and content*, definite ground, *formal ground, (tautological explanations)*, real ground, *perfect ground*, condition, *relatively unconditioned, absolutely unconditioned, entrance into existence*. **PHENOMENON:** (1) EXISTENCE, thing and properties, *thing-in-itself, properties, reciprocal influence of things*, composition of things out of matters, dissolution of things, (2) PHENOMENON, law, phenomenal and noumenal worlds, dissolution of the phenomenon, (3) ESSENTIAL RELATION, whole and parts, (*infinite divisibility*), force and manifestation, *force conditioned by soliciting force, infinitude of force*, external and internal. **ACTUALITY:** (1) THE ABSOLUTE, attributes, modes, (*Spinoza and Leibnitz*), (2) THE ACTUALITY, contingency, *possibility, reality and necessity*, relative necessity, absolute necessity, (3) ABSOLUTE RELATION, substantiality, causality, *action and reaction*, reciprocal action.

THE NOTION.

SUBJECTIVITY: (1) NOTION, the universal notion, the particular notion, the singular notion. (2) JUDGMENTS, (a) of determinate being, *positive, negative and infinite judgments*, (b) of reflection, *singular, particular and universal judgments*, (c) of necessity, *categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments*, (d) of the notion, *assertorical, problematic and apodictic judgments*. (3) SYLLOGISMS, (a) of determinate being, the *first, second, third and fourth figures*, (b) of reflection, *allness, induction, analogy*, (c) of necessity, *categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive*.

OBJECTIVITY: (1) MECHANISM, (a) mechanical object, (b) mechanical process, *formal process, real process, product*, (c) absolute mechanism, *the center, the law, transition*, (2) CHEMISM, (a) the chemical object, (b) the chemical process, (c) the transition, (3) TELEOLOGY, (a) the subjective purpose, (b) the means, (c) the realized aim. **THE IDEA:** (1) LIFE, (a) living individual, (b) life process, (c) the species, (2) INTELLIGENCE, (a) the true, *analysis, synthesis, (definition, classification, theorem.)* (b) the good, (3) the ABSOLUTE IDEA.

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HEGEL'S LOGIC.

CHAPTER I.

PHILOSOPHY AND ITS PROBLEM.

PHILOSOPHY attempts to explain the facts and events in the world by referring them all to one first principle. In this respect it is easy to distinguish philosophy from any of the sciences as well as from literature and religion. A particular science undertakes to combine facts and events by the aid of a subordinate principle into a system, in such a manner that each fact or event throws light on all the rest and is itself in turn explained by every other fact or event. Observation, investigation, reflection, discover principles and construct scientific systems. In respect to the function of explaining each by all through a principle, the sciences agree with philosophy. But although they have this important function in common with it, still they are not philosophy, nor even parts or divisions of it. But when the scientific man stops at some one principle, which he has discovered or generalized, and undertakes to explain all things by means of this principle, he becomes a philosopher. The philosopher, however, is not

the only one who deals with first principles. Literary art and religion both have to do with the survey of the world as a whole. They deal with the convictions of men that relate to the origin and destiny of man and nature, especially as regulative of the affairs of human life.

Poetry and the drama, especially, in offering to man their pictures of human life, find their chief function in delineating the collisions of the individual with the system of the universe and his consequent discomfiture. Thus in a negative way a revelation of the true first principle is made. The strivings and endeavors of human beings in accordance with their natural appetites and desires are proved to be futile unless regulated by the laws that govern the universe and unless subordinated into harmony with it.

The revelation of man's nature in art and literature, in so far as it shows its relation to this supreme principle, is thus akin to philosophy.

Religion occupies itself especially with the revelation of the absolute principle, and unfolds the purpose of the world and the ideal goal of man primarily with the practical end in view of guiding and directing human life. Art and literature do not betray a practical aim or purpose, but conceal it under the æsthetic form addressed to man's sense-perception. Human nature loves to celebrate the deepest experiences of its life in the forms of art and literature. These experiences concern the relation of its deeds to the ethical ideal and in a work of art man beholds his own

possibilities for good or evil realized in ideal personages, and rejoices in reaping the results of experience without the penalties of acting out his problems in his own person.

While religion reveals in a more direct and serious manner the nature of the infinite principle and its relation to man, yet it does not respect the personal freedom of men so much as art or philosophy does. It insists on devotion and sacrifice, both real and ceremonial. It presents dogmatically the conviction to which the aggregate experience of the race or people has arrived and insists on its unconditional adoption by the individual as supreme authority. The immature soul—and what soul is not immature?—shall be aided and strengthened by the experience of the race; such is the positive significance of religion. The individual shall be helped to see the world as nearly as possible through the theoretical view elaborated by the wisest of all ages, and he shall have his course marked out for him so that he may walk in harmony with the revealed highest principle of the universe. So much stress is laid on the necessity of obedience to this authoritative form that religion does not in the most direct way develop the self-activity of the individual.

In art and literature the spectator is left free. The application of ethical principles is made upon some one else and not on himself. Moreover, that person is an ideal one and not one's neighbor. Here is no personal limitation and no unpleasant application demanding obedience and self-sacrifice.

Again, in philosophy an appeal is made to the intellect. The view of the world shall justify itself to the free individual thinking. There shall be no imposition of doctrine by weight of external authority, but each shall find in his own reason the necessary ground of the universe and the justification for practical doctrines based on his knowledge of it.

With substantial grounds of agreement like these, and equally important differences of form, philosophy, art and religion perform their several functions in the life of man. Each age, each nation has its problems peculiar to itself. Supposing the first principle of the world, invoked to explain the contradictory elements of a nation's life, to be the same identical principle discovered by all nations and times, it follows that there still would result different systems of philosophy owing to the difference in the conditions of the problems needing solution. And yet the common element in all human nature makes it possible to announce in a general way the permanent conditions of the problem that philosophy is called upon to solve.

The enigma of the world is the existence of evil or imperfection. Objects reveal ideals which they do not attain. Moreover, to the deeper glance even the relative perfection of finite things is imperfection. If good in their kind, yet their kind is bad.

And yet the world is one whole and obviously under the sway of one principle: time and space impose one system of constitutive laws

on the whole. If that principle is perfect, how can it originate or suffer to exist that which does not correspond to its perfection? How can the perfect bring into being and sustain the imperfect?

There is one solution that suggests itself to the first reflection of man. All this imperfection, all this evil, is an illusion; it does not really exist, but only seems to exist. Here the primary question is solved, but by shifting it to a new ground. What is the reason that the world seems to us to be full of imperfection? This is the next problem. To this human thought has answered: the imperfection of human faculty; man does not see reality, but only a dream, fabricated by his own constitution.

But this solution changes the problem back again to its pristine form. The first solution said that imperfection was not real, but only seeming. Now it is said that this seeming imperfection is caused by real imperfection in human faculty. There can be no illusion except as it exists for a real being. An illusion cannot exist for what is itself already an illusion. This second solution, which is that of the East Indian thought, has another form: it is suggested, namely, that evil does not really exist, but only seems to exist to us because we see the world in parts only, and do not have a vision of it as a whole. This is rather a further specification of the former solution than a new one. It is still admitted that there is imperfection, namely, immaturity on the part of the

souls who are contemplating the world. It is intimated, however, that a development or growth of these souls, so as to perfect their vision of the whole, would remove both the seeming and the real imperfection.

This hope of a growth out of imperfection by means of spiritual development of some kind is a great advance over the first form of the solution. It held that evil was an illusion (Maya), but one inherent in conscious beings like men. Consciousness, or self-knowledge, being a radical dualism in the self, not only made the universe seem full of dualism or multiplicity, but also made the self imperfect by destroying its oneness, and thereby alienating it from true being. Only the loss of all consciousness and the loss of all individuality is the true salvation of the soul, according to that view.

The salvation by growth in insight seems to the European mind to be a far higher solution than the salvation by lapse out of consciousness proposed by the Hindoo* mind.

There can be no growth or development of the soul, that can solve its problems, if the very existence of the soul itself, its consciousness, is radically evil. But the Hindoo solution, radical as it is, does not solve its own problem. How did the one undivided, unconscious, pure being give existence to souls, which attain to consciousness and

*Even Kapila's intellectual solution carried the thinking of principles up to the "conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge, that neither I am nor is aught mine nor do I exist."

thus acquire the disease of individuality? The problem which stimulated the mind to its solution is left at the end entire as at the beginning. For how can there arise and be sustained any imperfect beings in a world which is created and ruled by a perfect being? Granting that there is illusion, the Hindoo sage comes to the stubborn fact that the source of illusion is a reality; he traces it to consciousness in which being is divided into subject which knows and an object which is known; thus consciousness introduces difference or distinction into a being that should be one, without distinctions. With this result, imperfection is traced back to its lowest terms, and remains there, coupled with the religious duty of seeking self-annihilation. Thus the solution of the theory of illusion proves itself an illusion.

Turning to the other form of solution through growth, we see that the problem has not been disposed of, but only postponed. That the world seems imperfect because of the imperfection of the vision of the immature souls, but that growth in insight will remove the seeming imperfection of the world, and likewise remove the real imperfection of the seeing souls—this places our problem on a new ground. We have now to explain how there can be a world of imperfect souls who are endowed with the capacity to develop towards perfection. How can a perfect being originate and sustain a world of imperfect beings endowed with capacity to develop towards perfection, and likewise with the capacity to resist such development?

In this statement of the problem we may recognize its general outlines as presented by the thought of Western Asia. The Aryan Persian undertakes the first solution of this problem. There are two antagonistic might in the first principle of the Universe ; two substantial beings which divide the allegiance of the finite creatures of the world. Here finitude is explained by presupposing finitude in the first principle. Good is reciprocally limited by Evil. This gives substantiality to difference and distinction, and, consequently, responsibility to finite human beings. The conception of choice becomes very clear, and man, as a choosing being, is at the height of his reality. In consciousness alone he attains clearness of discrimination of the good from the evil, and hence consciousness is essential to true being. The Persian principle makes man's attributes of will and intellect radically real and conducive to reality and perfection. Once let him become perfect will and perfect intellect, and man shall become divine, and yet preserve his individuality.

But all this is obtained in theory for man only by destroying the perfection of the first principle and making it dual and in perpetual conflict with itself. Neither element of the first principle is independent ; each is determined in his activity by the existence and actions of his adversary. Each is dependent. But such a thought of mutual dependence implies and demands again a higher unity which is indifferent to the limits of the two mutually dependent principles and with

such higher unity the Persian theory would go back to the basis of the Hindoo pantheism.

In Egypt this solution conceives that the good principle Osiris is overcome and killed by the evil principle Typhon, just as man is overcome by death. But the good survives and rules supreme in the next world. A way is provided for his human followers to purify their lives and dwell with Osiris after death. This is a further development of the Persian view and in it the divine is made more human.

The solution of this problem of accounting for a world of imperfect beings takes another shape with the Greeks. There the personal element of the divinity is intensified still more. Beauty is conceived as the supreme principle of the world. Immortality in the body renders this possible. The circle of Olympic deities is a reflection of the earthly life with its limitations of old age, disease, and death removed. Men are taught to become divine by training their bodies into gracefulness and perfect form. In this there is a still further departure from the conception of abstract being as the first principle. On this standpoint philosophy becomes possible. Plato conceives an absolute divine Goodness who wishes, "because he is without envy," to share his blessedness with others and hence creates a world and endows it with perfection as a whole, but permits finite beings to "participate" in the divine and to increase or diminish in this power. His doctrine wavers between the oriental doctrine of lapse from

the divine perfect into the imperfect by sin, and the new doctrine inherent in his idea of the absolute good which would favor the development from the particular and partial into the universal and total. Aristotle conceives the first principle as reason (*Noûs*), and finds the world to be a movement from the less perfect towards the more perfect, all being directed towards an end, namely, perfect being or reason. Nature, moved by the principle of final cause, develops towards an ever increasing subjection of matter (*i. e.* undeveloped possibility) to form (*i. e.* completely realized possibility—perfect form being pure self-activity or Reason). According to this solution of the problem of the world the divine reason is self-knowing and creative. It creates a world of developing beings, rising in a scale out of the imperfect towards the perfect and thus it sees its own energy reflected in the world. The making valid of the good or the perfect requires as condition of its manifestations the not-good, the imperfect, which is changed into a progressive realization of the good by the inflowing of the divine energy. The Divine contemplates in this triumph of its principle over its opposite the spectacle of its own perfection thus actively making itself valid. In the world it beholds a continual increase of substantial beings (self-conscious rational souls) arising out of pure chaos (*ἔλη* or matter is the entirely unformed, the merely possible, and hence nothing real), coming from nothing into being, and ascending into perfect rational beings. In this spectacle of the world-process

of creating innumerable souls out of nothing (or mere possibility) and endowing them with growing capacity for his own divine nature, Aristotle finds an object worthy of the first principle of the universe and thus solves the sphinx enigma of the existence of the imperfect. It does not exist absolutely, but is in a process of becoming perfect.

Christian thought explored this problem and its solutions more profoundly. Greek philosophy is certainly on the right track. But it has not unfolded all of its insights and grasped them together. There lingers about it still the oriental conception of a lapse or fall from perfection as the origin of all imperfection, both of conscious and unconscious nature. At this period the Greek and Roman nationalities have extended themselves over western Asia and have taken up the oriental views of the world as problems to be explained by western philosophy. Particular attention is given by the thinkers at Alexandria to the doctrine of the formlessness of the first principle. It is involved in the Greek principle and especially in Aristotle's conception of the divine Reason (*Noûs*) that the latter as self-knowing is both subject and object, and hence that it contains distinction and determinateness within itself, while the East Indian Brahma is pure empty identity. The self-consciousness of the divine being involves his distinction into subject and object. He exists for himself as object. Here, apparently, we have found the divine Logos that Platonism called "only-begotten." But is this the cosmos? Is this Aristotle's world that reflects

the divine perfection in an eternal process—the victory of perfection over the imperfect? By degrees the thinkers of that epoch see that a negative answer must be given to this question. There is a new problem here. How can the divine self-conscious Reason know himself as a progressive development of the imperfect? Impossible. The All-Perfect must know himself as perfect, and if this perfect object is the Logos or “Word,” then it must be perfect and have been perfect from all eternity. But still, though eternally perfect it must have been “begotten,” or derived from the activity of the divine self-consciousness which has always known itself or been self-conscious.

Contemplating this problem, Christian thought discovered that another logical step was required in the solution of the problem—a step partly implied in their statements, and partly divined even by Plato and Aristotle. The primal reason distinguishing itself in consciousness, generates from all eternity a Logos in every respect like himself. His knowing and willing are the same (Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* I, q. XXVII, art. iii: “In Deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus”); which means that God, in knowing, causes the object of his knowledge to exist; for it is an imperfect knowing which knows only unreal fancies or that knows one thing and wills another. The Logos is possessed of the same perfection as the First Principle, and hence is self-conscious and his knowing is likewise creative, so that there is a third perfect Reason. But here comes in the special insight of Christian thought.

The Logos in his self-knowing not only knows himself as present perfection, but also knows himself as generated or derived, though in infinite past time. This is essential to his self-knowledge. This is his recognition of the First Principle as his unbegotten "Father." But whatever he knows in his self-consciousness he creates or makes to exist. Hence he not only originates a third perfect Being, but makes at the same time a "Procession" out of imperfection, a really existent Procession which is always going on in all its stages, but has always been complete. The contemplation of a genesis or generation out of the non-being of the divine Reason into the perfection of the same involves the thought of pure space, pure time, matter, motion, worlds and all stages of organic being—a process of evolution so complete that all degrees of unreason as well as all degrees of reason appear. But the unreason only appears as the matter or material upon which the divine Reason works creatively transmuting it into reason. The last step of nature is a self-active being who possesses the capacity to grow individually into the divine Image. He has the potentiality of all self-activity, but is at first only this possibility. He must actualize this possibility.

But to consider further this Third divine Reason who has eternally proceeded (rather than been generated): does not the Third make an object of Himself and thus cause a Fourth, who in turn originates a fifth, and so on in infinite progression? Christian thought had this difficult point

to solve in order to make its solution complete or even possible. It comprehends the procession as the eternal return of the imperfect towards the perfect. The perfect is not reached in the single individual, but in the union of men in a divine church, a community of the faithful (a "holy city, the New Jerusalem, a bride adorned for her husband"), all united in the principle of divine charity (the missionary spirit), that causes each individual to devote his whole self to the highest welfare of his fellow men, not only in this life, but in an infinite future life. Such an institution as the "invisible church" is an infinitely perfect institution, and as all institutions have, in a certain sense, a personality which transcends the personality of the individuals who compose the institution, so the perfect institution has a perfect personality (the Holy Spirit). As every institution collects power from each of its members, and endows each with the power of all, so the perfect institution endows each with its infinity and perfection, and makes possible a divine life to each man in a sense utterly impossible to man as a mere individual. Inasmuch as the third divine Person has proceeded from all eternity, is proceeding and will proceed through all eternity, His institution (the "city" of which He is the spirit) includes the souls that have ascended from an infinite series of worlds. There is a perpetual stream of newly created souls ascending into it from all inhabited worlds. The souls have one and all the vocation of helping all in need of help to gain knowledge

and wisdom and goodness. The condition of all is a state of divine charity which gives to all and receives from all. What each gives is finite, but what each receives is infinite. The mutual co-operation of intellects and of wills makes this divine institution whose spirit is a perfect personality, that reflects perfectly the personality of the First and Second divine Personalities. The differences are preserved in this First Principle of First Principles. The First is not begotten nor has He proceeded; the Second is begotten, but has not proceeded; the Third has proceeded, but is not begotten. The personality that has proceeded differs from the First and Second in that He thinks with the aggregate intellects of the infinite invisible church, and wills with the wills of the same. The thinking and willing of this Third Person are perfectly distinguishable from the thinking and willing of the individual members of the invisible church nevertheless; because each individual mediates his thinking and willing through the thinking and willing of his fellow men, as a condition of belonging to that invisible church. The will of a nation is always distinguishable from that of its individual citizens, or even from its rulers, no matter how absolute they are. For even the absolute ruler mediates his own experience of knowledge and will through that of others, and must do this in order to rule even himself, to say nothing of other men.

To what a singular doctrine our reflections on the constant problem of philosophy have led us!

The chief ideas that have ruled the civilizations of the world, Asiatic as well as European, are found in contemplating the phases of this problem. The solution I have called "Christian" is of course barely sketched above. Its essential feature is the explanation of the actual existence of imperfect beings in a world created by a perfect being, through the self-knowledge of a derived Logos who contemplates his derivation and thereby converts an eternally past and completed derivation into a present derivation (actually going on) or world of evolution containing beings in all stages of imperfection, but all existing in a process of elimination of imperfection and of realizing perfection. Since perfection is absolute reason, pure self-activity, imperfection must be its opposite or pure passivity, or any form of existence in and through something else. Thus mechanical or inorganic existence is less perfect than the humblest form of organic life; for life has some degree of self-activity.

Religion is the first form of human thought that grapples with this great problem of problems. By a semi-instinctive, semi-conscious form of thought, reached through a sort of institutional thinking rather than by the independent thought of individuals, it proposes its several solutions and gives them ceremonial forms and intellectual confessions of faith, which it imposes with authority on entire peoples irrespective of national or political limits.

The systems of philosophy that prevail are in-

dependent attempts on the part of individuals to grasp the ideas of their civilization.

These ideas are to be found in the religious consciousness of the people, and it is the province of philosophy to see their theoretical necessity. Usually, therefore, the system of an individual falls far short of the depth of the unconscious idea organized in a civilization.

When we say "individual attempts," we must not take this strictly. Philosophy is far from an individual product except when comparing it with religion. The philosopher takes his problem in the special form in which his age delivers it to him. Moreover, he is stimulated to his solution by the solutions of predecessors and contemporaries. Just as natural science progresses by the accumulation of observation and reflection, so philosophy, too, progresses by combining the results of human speculation. In science each observer sees nature through the eyes of all preceding observers, and makes use of their reflection in classification and explanation. In philosophy each thinker refines on the systems of those who have gone before, and uses contemporary thought to assist his own definitions.

The test of any system of philosophy is the account it gives of the institutions of civilization. What does it see in human history and the institutions of the family, civil society, the state, the church? If its word is only negative and it finds no revelation of divine reason in these, but only fetters and trammels to individual freedom, then

it belongs to the crudities of the youthful period of reflection which has to make its beginning by a declaration of independence. The utter emptiness of such formal "free thought," as it calls itself, is obvious to itself as soon as it leaves off its work of denying what it finds already current in the world and attempts seriously to reconstruct a reasonable substitute for what it condemns. We respect this negative independence as a necessary epoch in one's culture. It is not philosophy, however, but only the indispensable preliminary to it, and should be outgrown as soon as possible. True independence grows with the insight into the truth. That which was external authority becomes freedom when one discovers its identity with his own inborn rationality.

These reflections serve to introduce us to the philosophy of Hegel, who is preëminently the thinker that explains and justifies institutions. He grasps the problem of life in the wide sense which I have indicated, as the fundamental question to which the religious ideas underlying civilization furnish practical solutions. He asks: "What is nature? What is man? What, in brief, is the world?" And reports the answer which he finds written alike upon masses and atoms, upon the individual and upon society: The world is the process of the evolution and perfection of immortal souls; the history of the human race exhibits the progress of souls into the consciousness of freedom; the philosophy and history of art show us how each people has succeeded in realizing for

itself in sensuous forms the ideals of its civilization; the philosophy and history of religion is an account of the dogmas and ceremonial forms in which each people has celebrated its solution of the deepest problem, that of the origin and destiny of imperfect finite beings; the philosophy and history of jurisprudence and political constitutions is an exposition of the devices invented by nations to secure freedom to the individual by the return of his deed upon him, and these devices are a series of statutory and fundamental laws, progressing from the form of absolute despotism and slavery up to the constitutional form of government that defines the law for the governing class as well as the governed class; the history of philosophy shows us the extent to which each people in the persons of its deepest thinkers has become conscious of the elements of its problems and their solution; logic is the science of the principles, method, and system of what is universal and necessary in thought, and it unfolds or defines and criticises all the elements of thought, from the simplest, shallowest and most rudimental up to the richest, most comprehensive and luminous idea to which philosophy has attained.

Inasmuch as "logic" in Hegel's system holds this central place of unfolding the method and principles of all thought, it is much more comprehensive than the "formal logic" handed down to us from Aristotle, as we shall see. While the formal logic attempts only to show the laws of the judgment and the syllogism in which all knowl-

edge is set forth or expressed, the Hegelian logic undertakes to show the genesis, and indeed the complete biography of every ultimate "notion"—concept or idea—which is used or can be used in judgments or syllogisms to collect or analyze or explain the contents of experience. It has, therefore, to discuss the forms in which existence is possible, actual, or necessary, and is ontology or metaphysic as well as logic.

Everything known or thought or expressed in language, is known or thought by means of notions, ideas, or concepts, and explained by the aid of words that stand for these general predicates or categories. Some of these general predicates are generalized from experience, while others are furnished by the mind itself as the *à priori* conditions necessary to all experience. These *à priori* thought-forms which Kant calls forms of the mind, and which he proves to be not derived from contingent experience in as much as they are necessary for the very beginning of such experience, are called notions of "pure thought," because they are pure or free from all elements derived from contingent experience. To investigate these pure thought-notions is to investigate the laws of existence as it is known or knowable in experience. We cannot know or conceive of existence as possible in any other modes than by these *à priori* notions of our mind. Hence we cannot call them "subjective," as Kant did, and deny their validity as laws of all being without contradicting ourselves by setting up at the same time other notions

or thoughts which transcend these "categories." Kant, for example, used the notion "thing-in-itself" as transcending the application of the categories. But in so doing he implied that he possessed a standpoint to which the categories as well as the intuitions of time and space were merely subjective.

Since the relation of Hegel to Kant and his followers, as well as to ancient and mediæval philosophy, requires a more detailed treatment, we shall continue this introduction, discussing in another chapter the relation of German philosophy to the Greek philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and the Schoolmen, showing Hegel's significance as the thinker who unites and reconciles the two great movements of thought, and afterwards tracing in other chapters Hegel's "voyage of discovery" from the Kantian standpoint to that of the Greek.

CHAPTER II.

THE GREEK AND GERMAN PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES.

THE significance of Hegel in the History of Philosophy is to be found in the fact that he unites in one system the Aristotelian and Kantian movements in thought. Aristotle had long ago discovered the principle of absolute truth, and had made application of that principle in the explanation of the two worlds (nature and man) as those worlds appeared at the epoch in which he lived. His principle as found in his *Metaphysics* (or, as he called it, *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, II, γ), is that of absolute cognition and life, God as the perfect living being, whose cognition is that high form of knowing by wholes or totalities—“the knowing of all things in their causes,” the knowing of the entirety of relations of a thing in its cause. He calls this highest activity of mind *θεωρεῖν*, theoretical knowing, or speculative knowing (the Latin translation of the word being *speculare*). In his *De Anima* he calls this highest principle active Reason (*νοῦς ποιητικός*) to distinguish it from lower forms of mind found in the human soul.

This conception of the absolute first principle of the world, thus identified by Aristotle with the human soul as being the perfect reality of what the

human soul is potentially, makes the destiny of man an eternal one, and makes the soul more substantial than any object in the world of nature in time and space.

Such a philosophical view was especially adapted to interpret the deep insights of the Christian dogmas, and St. Thomas Aquinas completed Christian theology by founding it on Aristotle's system.

The Greek movement in philosophy culminated in finding the absolute form, which Plato calls the Idea. The Idea means a universal that is self-active—what Aristotle calls energy or formative process. It is self-determination, and not a mere external shape given to something. Although Aristotle seems to polemicize against Plato's Ideas, yet he holds substantially the same view of ultimate, true being, and names it, as we have seen, God, Active Reason, and pure speculative knowing. That this is meant for a personal Reason, we may know from the fact that Aristotle calls it self-knowing Reason (*νόσις νοήσεως*), though there was no single Greek word meaning consciousness at the time he wrote.

The procedure by which this absolute form is found is wholly objective, in the sense that Greek philosophy always investigates the objective coefficient of knowledge—what necessarily is, rather than how we know ~~it~~, the subjective coefficient of knowledge.

Modern philosophy is occupied chiefly with the problem of certitude—the how we know it—the subjective coefficient. But when modern philoso-

phy has taken a complete inventory of the forms of subjective Mind it discovers that pure reason—absolute subjectivity—is the form that must necessarily be the highest principle of objective being. Just so, religion finds the world to be a lower order of being, compared with its Creator. The Creator is absolute mind and the true objective reality, while nature is dependent being or phenomenal. Fichte and Schelling call this absolute form “subject-objectivity,” that is to say, that-which-is-its-own-object, or subject and object of itself. This is the form of self-knowing or self-consciousness. This is true individuality, true being. Without self-consciousness it could have no individuality, because its changes in time, and its parts separated in space, would have nothing internal to unite them. Self-consciousness is a unity under change and separation. The unity of space or time is only external.

Kant showed that these subjective “forms of the mind” make possible all knowing which knows universals or generalities. To generalize is simply to ignore the multiplicity of objects and give attention to the form of mental activity that knows those objects. Fichte completed the exposition of the deduction of the subjective forms which the mind regards as the necessary conditions of the existence of things. Schelling further perceived that objectivity is just as valid a predicate to these universal forms as subjectivity is or can be. In fact, Kant had grounded his doctrine of the subjectivity of those forms (time, space, quantity, quality,

relation, mode) on the very circumstance that these forms are seen by the mind to be the logical conditions of the existence of things in the world.

Hegel discovers the identity of this result with the results of Aristotle. The subjective philosophical movement ends in the same way as the objective movement. The psychological movement comes to the same conclusion as the ontological. The modern method has arrived at the principle of absolute form—that is to say, the form of consciousness, that which is its own object—as the highest principle. This is the same result that Aristotle reached—a “knowing of knowing,” a self-cognitive reason, a pure, self-conscious essence, God. The methods differ, but the results are the same. The Christian dogma of the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ points to this principle. The absolute is not formless like Brahma (who may be called pure being but is better named pure naught), but is pure form, or self-conscious being. It is purely universal and purely individual at the same time.

Beings that possess the form of self-consciousness, therefore, are already in the form of the highest principle, and are its incarnations. They may forever approach the absolute by realizing this ideal within themselves through their own free activity.

The subjective tendency of thought which has been called the characteristic of modern times, leads to a peculiar skepticism, a skepticism based on partial insight into method. Method is the

form of activity. The modern tendency seeks to know the form of the mind's activity. All faculties of mind exist only as active. Hence the problem of certitude arises only when the mind is directed inward on its own method of activity. If the insight into method is partial, it cannot be sure of the results of mental activity. All wrong views of method lead to wrong philosophical views.

From this point of view we could define the work of Kant as a voyage of discovery into the realm of method, using the term "method" to denote the form of all mental activity, whether of the intellect or of the will or of the emotional nature.

When we consider the fact that any glimpse into the forms of activity will give a basis for skepticism that no amount of objective philosophizing can remove, we see at once the significance of that philosophy which explores method in its entire extent, and makes a complete inventory of all mental activity. The three critiques of Kant—those of Pure Reason, the Practical Reason, and of Judgment—attempt this vast work.

This insight into method, which is the problem of the modern mind, is the object that Kant successfully pursues. It relates to the opposition between the subjective and objective, and essays to define what pertains to the ego and constitutes its forms, and thereby distinguish from it what pertains to the objective. It regards all cognition as composed of two factors, and it investigates the subjective coefficient in order to know what to

deduct from the sum of knowledge to find the true remainder.

The ancient thinking also had two factors to investigate in cognition, but it did not regard the one as subjective and the other as objective. It defined one factor as universal, and the other as particular. One was abiding, the other, transient. Hence arose the science of formal logic as the chief contribution on the part of ancient philosophy to the world's science.

The answer to the Greek problem, namely, to unite the particular and universal, is found in the principle of Causality. Cause, in its four aspects of efficient, final, formal and material, is identical with "active reason." It is "entelechy." Conscious energy or personality is efficient cause, design or purpose, and form-giving cause. And it is, moreover, the material ($\epsilon\lambda\eta$) or potentiality of receiving forms, that is to say, the mind makes its thoughts out of its own potentiality.

Ancient skepticism doubted the existence of the multifarious objects of the objective world. They appeared to be; but since they existed in a state of contradiction, change, or evanescence, they could not be said to have substantial existence. The ten tropes of the skeptics developed this inconsistency. In them we see the beginning of the modern method, in that the certitude of the senses is attacked. Their attack on method confines itself to the method of sense-perception. Hegel points out the striking fact that ancient skepticism doubted the real existence of objects, while modern skepticism

has no doubt of their reality, but questions our ability to know them.

This later form of skepticism, suggested by the Neo-Platonist, Porphyry, was openly proclaimed by the scholastic Nominalists. It is noteworthy, too, that the Scholastics attempted to unite the Greek antithesis (universal *versus* particular) with the modern antithesis (subjective *versus* objective); all universal or general terms are mere names (*flatus vocis*), there is no objective reality corresponding to them. They are mere subjective devices (arbitrary aggregates) by which we store up the results of our experience. The universal is here made subjective, while the particular is made objective.

The war between realism and nominalism has this great meaning in the history of philosophy: It is the first attempt to assert the subjective basis of observation against the objective basis. With this distinction the Nominalists attempted to overthrow the old distinction between the universal and the particular, which tradition had brought down to the Middle Ages as the heirloom of speculative science.

This accounts also for the great place which Aristotle's *De Anima* occupied in the controversy. The great Arabian commentators held that the human mind is essentially passive reason as opposed to the world mind, which is purely active reason. Hence man is not immortal as individual human soul. That which differentiates, that which makes the individual a distinct en-

tity, is perishable ; the species lives, but the individual dies. Aristotle had shown how an individual may become an "entelechy," that is to say, how a particular being may unite within itself the attributes of the universal as a totality. His "entelechy" is very nearly equivalent to Plato's "Idea." Change and perishability exist because the particular is not adequate to the universal, that is to say, the universal has many particular attributes or phases, while the special individual realizes only a few of these phases, and the rest are potential, but not real. Let some of these potential phases become real, and at the same time some of the real ones be annulled or become potential, and the individuality is lost. But the universal (always in the sense in which Hegel understands it) is a self-active process to which all the phases belong, and since none are suppressed or made merely potential except through its activity and none are realized or made manifest except by the same activity, it follows that all its changes take place by the activity of its individuality, and that the individual does not perish through change when it is a self-activity (or "energy," or "entelechy," as Aristotle called the soul). This is the aperçu of the immortality of the soul which Plato and Aristotle both had, notwithstanding all assertions to the contrary based on the Arabian commentators, or on the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

Aristotle's "entelechy" is an individual which has realized within itself all the potentialities or

phases of the universal so far as to be a process of self-activity. Such a process is a process of self-identity like the ego, which is a perpetual act, always discriminating the me from the not me, and always identifying the two by recognizing itself. Its changes do not annul it but realize it. Its activity is only a continuance of its function, it is a circular movement, what Hegel in his peculiar technical phraseology calls "return to itself."

Here in fact is the central point of the philosophy of Hegel as well as of Plato and Aristotle. It was the insight into the fact that individuality is not a thing (not a molecule or atom) but a process, an energy, that led Plato to the doctrine of ideas—a doctrine repeated substantially in Leibnitz's doctrine of Monads. Plato saw that change happened in a thing because that thing is not a whole of reality but is, in part, only a potentiality. The realization of its potentialities changes it and destroys its identity. But such realization of potentialities only confirms the self-identity of the activity. Individuality is an activity therefore. When it acts it realizes its potentialities;—just as any force manifests its nature or realizes itself by acting. What was in it as potential now appears in the form of reality. Individuality is an energy which continually acts, and each act is a manifestation to it of its inner potentiality. Such a being whose essence is activity Plato calls *Idea* ($\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ means form and, in Plato and Aristotle, formative energy, constructive and destructive). To learn how to think it: consider any given thing and

its producing cause. Consider all the possibilities that it may have, and the total complex of these makes its idea. All the changes that the thing may have are mere realizations or manifestations of its idea. Hence any mere thing in the world is only a partial manifestation of its true self—the true self of anything being the idea. The idea is the total of all the potentialities of a thing. This doctrine is the clew to Hegel's use of *Begriff* as expressing the self-active cause. Hence Plato spoke of things in the real world of change as not being fully realized ideas but as only having participation ($\mu\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\acute{\xi}\tau\iota\varsigma$) in ideas. But to this thought of the complex of potentialities we must add that of self-activity (as Plato repeats in many places, and especially in *The Sophist* and in the tenth book of *The Laws*). Then the thought is clear. All things in the world are fragmentary manifestations of self-active individuals or ideas.

This is Aristotle's view of the world and also Hegel's. Hegel calls this self-active being *Begriff* (variously translated notion, conception, idea, comprehension, etc. See Chapter XIII. of this work). Aristotle calls it *entelechy*, soul, reason, etc. Aristotle refuted the doctrine of ideas as held by the Platonic school, probably because Plato's followers interpreted it mythologically and Aristotle dreaded the consequences of retaining a terminology sure to be misunderstood. His so-called refutation of the Platonic doctrine of ideas does not touch Plato's real doctrine, as

we may see from the statements in *The Laws*, *The Sophist*, and many other dialogues. It contends against the mythological view of ideas which forms mental pictures of them as things or spatial entities, and does not think them as self-activities. In great detail and with precise technique Aristotle unfolds as his own this thought which Plato had reached. His doctrine of matter and form, energy and potentiality, explains the Platonic doctrine of participation. Matter is the as yet unrealized potentiality. Form is the realizing energy. Perishable things, according to Plato, are mere partial realizations (participations) of their ideas. According to Aristotle, perishable things are mostly matter (unrealized potentiality) and their change is a manifestation of their form (*εἶδος* meaning total formative activity) or entelechy. As in this progressive change or realization the steps of the process are means of realization, they manifest adaptation when looked at with the whole form in view. Hence Aristotle laid the greatest stress on final cause, design or purpose (the *οὐ ἕνεκα*). The formal cause, too, expresses this; for it names the totality of possibilities as the object or purpose of the process of realization or change. Aristotle often calls the formal cause the-what-was-to-be (*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*)—the ideal that shapes the process and its results. Hence formal cause and final cause must be identical and the world-process must be a revelation of the lineaments of the pure form or pure self-activity that causes it to be and

to change. Aristotle with this thought in his head very consistently looked upon nature as worth inventorying. If nature is carefully inventoried all its phases will reveal this Formal Cause as the design or purpose of all things and their history. The idea of ideas (like Leibnitz's monad of monads) is self-active Reason.*

Water is either solid or liquid or gaseous, but only one of these states at the same time. When one is realized the other two states are merely potential. In Plato's language all three states would be called in the aggregate the idea of water, which actual water perceptible by the senses never fully realizes, but only in successive states—one-third of the idea being real at one time. Now conceive that the idea of water were an entelechy or individual possessing the power to realize all its states at once. Then no farther change would be possible because all its potentialities would be already real. Change consists in realizing a potentiality that is not real already. Of course water is not an entelechy; but it must have one somewhere in the universe, and that entelechy doubtless finds water and all other material being necessary to express all of its potentialities. But in the case of a soul like man we have an entelechy already which

* *Νοῦς*, whose nature is *το ποιούν*, or, as the commentators called it, *νοῦς ποιητικός*. *De An.*, Book III, ch. 5. "The active reason is creator of all things"—*τῷ πάντα ποιῆν*, because the perceptibility of objects proves their origin from a rational creator or creative cause—*τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν*. "The passive reason"—*νοῦς παθητικός*, "has the power to become all things"—*τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι*, that is to say, to perceive what exists.

is able to make for itself by its will a second state of being through its deeds, and thus change from the state of a first entelechy to that of a second entelechy—from a state wherein the individual has the power to realize itself but has not done so, to the state wherein the individual has used the power to realize itself. God is eternally a second entelechy completely revealing his Infinite power. Man is a first entelechy on the way towards becoming a second entelechy.

These distinctions in Hegel are expressed by the words *Begriff* and *Idee*. The *Begriff* or notion is self-activity or individuality in its first entelechy or state of power, self-activity that has not completely revealed itself by actualized intellect and will, while *Idee* is the individuality of God who has from all eternity completely revealed Himself in perfect intellect and will. Such perfect intellect and will are one, so that in thinking He creates what he thinks.

The great scholastic Fathers, commencing with Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, learned this insight of Aristotle and were able to defend Christianity against the Moslem pantheism which denied immortality to man. Nominalism held that all general terms are arbitrary or conventional signs used to denote subjective aggregates or classes. Looking solely upon things and neglecting forces and processes, the nominalist intellect could see only isolated individuals and not the energies that generated them. Hence all that is real was held to be the individual thing. If it had

seen that the reality of things is only the manifestation of a greater reality behind them, the reality, namely, of the energy manifested in the things, it would have seen the falsity of nominalism—it would have seen that general terms correspond not to things but to processes and energies, namely, to what is more real than things, because energy gives to a thing its reality, and energy also causes it to change or vanish.

The triumph of nominalism is the triumph of shallow thought over deeper and truer thought. But its day is forever set in this world since the rise of the dogma of the correlation of forces and the persistence of force, in modern natural science. For this doctrine is realistic and holds to energy rather than things as the true reality.

It is one of the mysterious phases in the history of philosophy, this triumph of nominalism at the close of the great era of scholasticism, an era of profoundest thought and clearest insight. Christian thought had been almost completed—very little has been added or is likely to be added to the ontological system of St. Thomas Aquinas, a system said to be more familiar to the world through Dante's *Divina Commedia* than through St. Thomas's *Summa*. Yet at the close of that period of the history of thought nominalism gets the field wholly to itself and William of Occam inaugurates his agnosticism. He also marks the utter eclipse of the great insight of Aristotle in theology and there ensues an epoch of divorce between faith and reason.

This mystery, however, clears up somewhat when we consider the momentous importance of seizing in its entire compass this antithesis between psychology and ontology. The "unceasing purpose that runs through the ages" of human history makes continually for freedom. Every new freedom gained emancipates humanity at first. But after a time it imposes on the soul a sort of external authority and needs to be replaced by a newer freedom, more internal, more subjective, more psychologic and less ontologic in its form, though not less ontologic in its substance.

Christianity alone, among the world-religions, makes the individual man worthy of immortal life in a continued human existence of growth in intellect, will, love. For Christianity holds that God himself is Divine-Human. Hence the human being need not lose his humanity in approaching the absolute, or when he is placed "under the form of eternity"—*sub specie æternitatis*, as Spinoza describes it.

If the human form is divine, the human mind in the image of the divine mind, it follows that to know the nature of the mind is to know in some sense the nature of God. In the two worlds, the world of man and the world of nature, we may find the revelation of God. In man—in our minds—we may find this revelation of God in the depths of each individual. But in nature—in animals and plants and inorganic bodies—the revelation is not complete in the individual but only in the species and genera.

The Christian doctrine of the infinite importance of each human soul and of the transcendence of the soul over all merely natural existences through the fact of its immortal destiny, generates the impulse towards subjectivity that manifests itself in this progressive series of emancipations from external authority. Each man is above and beyond nature—a soul belonging to a supernatural order of existence.

This idea leads back to nominalism. There is a perpetual recurrence of the antithesis between subjective and objective methods. Nominalism or the denial of the existence of universals is the complete sum of all that is negative and skeptical in philosophy. It holds that all genera and species are subjective syntheses of thought, mere classifications. The reality consists of isolated individuals, each one independent of the other. The result of this is atomism and the principle that “composition does not affect the parts or atoms of which things are composed.” When once reached it is impossible to explain anything except on the supposition of an external arranging, directing, combining intelligence which produces the phenomena that we behold in the world. The atoms are conceived as pure simples, and all the relations and properties and the other results of combination, all things perceptible, in short, are transferred to the other factor of the world, the ordering intelligence. When atomism gets to this point it collapses,—in all consistent intellects; because the atoms have become empty

fictions, an utterly useless scaffolding, and the "ordering intellect" has become all in all.

The only thing positive about nominalism is its attribution of universality to the subjective mind; for by making universality a product of the mind, it unconsciously attributes all abiding and substantial being to mind. It does not become aware of this wonderful endowment that it claims for subjective mind, but the exercise of thought will continually bring it to the surface of consciousness.

It is wonderful to see how the most negative phases, the skepticisms, the heretical doctrines, the most revolutionary phases in history, all proceed from the same first principle of thought as the most positive and conservative doctrines, and that all of these negative things are destructive only in their undeveloped state and when partially understood. By and by they are drawn within the great positive movement, and we see how useful they are become. Through these negative and skeptical tendencies, arising from this great antithetic movement of thought—the movement from the objective to the subjective—human thought has ascended into a knowledge of self-determining activity as it is realized in mind, and this knowledge is far in advance of the old objective view of mind such as the Greeks delivered to the world. I do not say that it is far superior to the Greek in its principles and system, but in its method. It is a proximate insight into the nature of the divine creative process itself. We ascend through a

philosophic mastery of the relation between the modern and ancient point of view—the latter directed its attention to the relation between evanescent phenomena and the abiding process (this is the relation of particular to universal), while the former looks upon the relation of the subject to the object and inquires what we know as truly objective and how we know it:—we ascend through a mastery of both these views to a plane that is above all skepticism. Skepticism is, as we have already seen, directed against method only. With the skeptics of old, as Hegel points out, the doubt was objective in the sense that it touched the method or transition by which being, or a knowledge of being, proceeds from universals to the objects of sense-perception. It seemed to the old skeptic that things of use wore out and perished in the course of their process. They were all in a flux, becoming each moment something else and presenting new phases of their universals, or “ideas”—(we have explained this expression to mean the total process of a thing by which all its potentialities come successively into realization). While the ancients doubted these objects of sense-perception, modern skeptics doubt the truth of the objects of reason, that is to say the universals, the species and genera, and are unwilling to accord real being to anything but the objects of sense-perception—to the very objects that ancient skepticism doubted! They question the method of knowing, or the transition from subject to object.

But the cause of this change, we repeat, is the

turning of the mind in upon itself for the truth, a partial movement in this direction producing doctrines in which there is utter disharmony between the Greek view and our own view.

Up to the time of David Hume the movement was centrifugal and it seemed likely that thought would never return to the point of view of the old ontology. Nominalism began then to see the ultimate consequences of its subjective point of view. According to David Hume there is no causality in the world so far as we can know. There is only sequence in time. He says: "All our knowledge consists of impressions of the senses and the faint images of these impressions called up in memory and in thinking. Even the ego is only a subjective notion, a unity of the series of impressions called myself." This is the Ultima Thule of the subjective doctrine—it is the subjectivity of subjectivity.

This is, as we have seen, the point in the development of modern philosophy at which Kant arises and offers his more complete sketch of our subjective nature as an explanation of the world of man and the world of nature in time and space. His sketch of mind has become familiar to all persons who make a pretence of studying philosophy.

The subjectivity of man including the will, the intellect and the feeling, according to Kant, has native forms of its own. These forms are not derived from experience or from anything external. These forms, in the aggregate, make up

the constitution of the mind itself. If we wish to know the truth we must be aware of the subjective factor in knowledge and make due allowance for it. Things-in-themselves are modified (in our cognition of them) through the constitution of the mental faculties that know them. What we actually know of things-in-themselves will be ascertained only after we eliminate from our cognitions the subjective element due to our mental forms.

All this is so simple and in accordance with the spirit of the subjective skepticism of the followers of Hume that it recommends itself to the latter at once as the best of good sense.

But as soon as the skeptic begins to comprehend the *Critique of Pure Reason* he finds ground for amazement. He looks over the inventory of the possessions of our subjective constitution and beholds among the forms of the mind time, space, quantity, quality, relation, modality, God, freedom, immortality, the infinite, the beautiful, the good. It would seem that the subjective constitution is very rich, with all these ideas belonging to it; skepticism, however, does not see the ontological consequences, but strenuously asserts that these are only subjective. These categories and transcendental objects are not valid except for us in practically dealing with phenomena. We cannot know (it holds), any object in itself whatever—not even the ego-in-itself—we cannot think it except in the categories or forms of mind, and such categories apply only to phenomena and not to things-in-themselves.

But if we turn over this surprising result and ask what follows if we cannot apply any categories to things-in-themselves we suddenly discover that we are at the end of subjectivity and skepticism and at the beginning of an ontology founded on psychology. Here is Hegel's significance in the history of philosophy, as we have already expounded it above.

Hegel sees that the logical consequence of denying objective validity to these "forms of the mind" is to deny objectivity itself. The constitution of mind is as objective as it is subjective, and its necessary ideas are the logical conditions of existence. Take nominalism at its word, take Hume at his word, or Kant at his word, and we have a self-refutation of the skepticism asserted. This is what Hegel calls the dialectic.

Skepticism had said: "We can never get at the truth and know things as they really are—things-in-themselves. We can only know what is radically modified through our own subjective spectra, our forms of perception." Let us look, then, and behold what these subjective forms are, and learn to subtract them and find the remainder which is the true "thing-in-itself." In the first place there are time and space; those are the forms of the sensory and are purely subjective. Kant proves this by showing that they are the logical conditions of the existence of what we call the world of nature. But they are more objective than that world of nature is, because they are its logical condition. The necessity of this is clear and it is this necessity

which proves to Kant that time and space are "forms of the mind." The science of mathematics is rendered possible by our *à priori* insight into time and space. The world in time and space, it seems, is subjective because the very logical condition of its existence is subjective. True, we have called it "objective" and have been satisfied if our subjectivity attained validity throughout time and space. Nevertheless, if we are to make a serious business of inventorying our subjective possessions, we must begin with writing down Time and Space at the head of the list as subjective forms.

But things-in-themselves, deprived of time and space, will never trouble us or anybody else—for they cannot have extension nor change. Yes, it is worse off with them than that. They cannot have unity, nor plurality, nor totality, hence they cannot be spoken of as "they"—it is a courtesy on our part to lend them our subjective category of "plurality," to which they are not really entitled. Nor can the thing in itself (singular or plural) have quality or existence for anything else—nor relation, nor mode of being, either as possibility or necessity, or even as existence. The "thing-in-itself" cannot exist without borrowing one of our subjective categories (found under "modality"). As for the objective, then, which is opposed to our subjectivity and unknowable by us, it cannot be extant in the world of nature or in the world of man. It is a pure figment of the imagination, and cannot exist in any possible world without becoming "subjective" at once.

In fact, Kant's subjective has taken up within it the entire antithesis of subjective and objective as understood by skepticism, and has become purely universal through the fact that its forms are universals. Such a subjective mind is Aristotle's *νόησις νοήσεως*, and a self-knowing being. Whether Kant intended it or not, his remarks on things-in-themselves and on the limits of our knowledge make no sense unless they are taken as ironical.

Here we see that Kant has taken up into the subjective what is commonly meant by the word objective. What is more objective than trees, animals, rocks, houses, men? Yet these are all "phenomena" because they arise in time and space, which are mere "forms of the mind." But when all that has been known hitherto as objective is called subjective, there is no longer any force in the distinction. Skepticism has lost its ground altogether.

This insight of Hegel brings the subjective movement in philosophy to an end and inaugurates the third movement of philosophy—psychological ontology, or ontology based upon psychology and identical with Greek ontology in its general view of the world, but far superior in its method.

CHAPTER III.

HEGEL'S EDUCATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES UPON HIM.

GEORGE WILLIAM FREDERIC HEGEL'S ancestor, John Hegel, in the seventeenth century migrated from Carinthia into Swabia, seeking freedom for the exercise of his religious convictions. The Lutheran Reformation, which extended into the mountainous portions of western Austria, was vigilantly repressed by the reigning princess and the consequence was a migration of numbers of the most industrious and intelligent inhabitants. George Louis Hegel, the father of our philosopher, held at first the office of Rentkammersecretair—secretary of the public revenues—and was promoted subsequently. His mother was a woman of much education, considering the standard then prevailing.

George William Frederic, the eldest son, was born August 27, 1770, in Stuttgart. It is noteworthy that besides Schelling and Hegel, both Swabians, the greatest genius for philosophy in the Middle Ages, Albertus Magnus, was also a Swabian. Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart were his pupils.

His biographers report that Hegel began to attend a Latin school in his native town at the age

of five years, and at seven entered the gymnasium. He read Shakespeare in Wieland's translation at the age of eight. Before thirteen he had studied geometry, surveying, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.

He translated the whole of Longinus *On the Sublime* at seventeen, and at eighteen the *Antigone* of Sophocles, which remained his favorite work of art through life. His efforts at declamation while at the gymnasium were unsuccessful by reason of awkwardness of manners and a stammering tongue. His French, however, was quite good and he wrote a clear, distinct hand. He early began the practice of entering in a common-place book interesting extracts from his readings.

In the autumn of 1788 at the age of eighteen he entered the university of Tübingen as student of theology. Here he heard lectures on metaphysics and natural theology by Flatt and attended courses by different professors on the Bible, and in particular on the Psalms and New Testament, and the book of Job, which greatly delighted him. Besides his theological studies, he studied anatomy and botany, and reviewed his favorite Greek tragedies.

He received great impulse from two companions at the university, Hölderlin and Schelling, the latter coming to the university in 1790 at the age of fifteen—five years younger than Hegel. Hegel appeared older than he really was, so much so as to earn the familiar name of "Alter" or "the old man" from his mates. In his personal demeanor, however, he was honest and jovial. He was

awakened to a new activity by contact with the precocious intellect of Schelling. He had already made some acquaintance with the Wolffian philosophy as early as his fifteenth year. Wolff, it is well known, systematized the ideas of Leibnitz and invented formulæ for schematizing all knowledge. It was Wolff's system of philosophy against which Kant chiefly directed the attacks of his Critical system. Hegel received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1790, writing on the occasion a dissertation in Latin: "De limite officiorum humanorum seposita animorum immortalitate," in which he showed some acquaintance with Kant. In 1793 he received his theological degree, writing another thesis on the Württemberg church and the relations of Protestantism to Catholicism.

Rousseau's writings had made a deep impression on Hegel at an early age. The gospel of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" had been received by all Germans who retained any youthful enthusiasm. A political club for the dissemination of French ideas had been formed at the university, in which Hegel and Schelling took an active part. Notwithstanding the interest in French thought which was then universal in Germany, the philosophy of Kant and his successors may in one sense be regarded as a speculative reaction against the tendencies that led to the French Revolution. Goethe's *Faust*, too, portrays the same reaction in literature. Its content is a collision between the natural man swayed by selfishness, and the institutions of civilization.

After completing his theological studies at the university in 1793, Hegel became private tutor in a family in Berne, a position which he held for three years. (Fichte shortly before and Herbart about the same time also held the position of tutor in Switzerland.) Hegel passed these three years in a quiet and studious manner, gradually departing from the ideas he had received at Tübingen and beginning to grapple seriously with the problem of human responsibility and to feel distinctly the want of a fundamental principle that should subordinate both the theoretical and practical phases of life. After writing a life of Christ, taking up a more thorough study of the Kantian Critiques, and entertaining himself with the theories of Benjamin Constant, he bent all his energies upon the mastery of Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*, which had just then appeared. By this latter book his Swabian stubbornness and patience were put to a severe test. But he found some assistance in his correspondence with Schelling at this time in the work of gaining an insight into the subtile psychological analysis of Fichte. Schelling's genius had been thoroughly aroused by the *Science of Knowledge*. He not only comprehended the positive doctrines of the book, but detected the unconscious fallacy that had led Fichte to place subjective limitations to the validity of his theoretic principles, Fichte following in this respect the example of Kant. The universal and necessary truths, which, according to the critical system, were held to demonstrate the subjectivity of all knowledge,

seemed to Schelling to establish its objectivity. For they were not universal and necessary unless they were the necessary condition of the existence of objects in time and space. With this insight he hastened to construe the world of nature *à priori* by means of transcendental ideas. Self-consciousness revealed the hidden laws and principles implicit in ordinary knowing and these laws and principles drawn out of the unconscious activity of the mind were identified with the moving forces of nature and thus came to be attributed to an impersonal reason, a "soul of the world."

Schelling diverged in this direction during his first career until he developed a system in strong contrast with that of Fichte. Fichte laid all stress on the subjective, conscious ego, and the free moral will; Schelling emphasized the objective—the unconscious development of nature. There was no necessary incongruity in the two systems except what arose from one-sidedness due to the intense emphasis given to the opposite poles of this philosophy. Fichte subordinated everything else to the moral will and regarded nature as merely phenomenal and scarcely worthy of man's attention, while Schelling turned to nature and history as unconscious realizations of spirit in time and space and hence worthy all study as divine incarnations. Fichte slighted time and space and hence everything real and conventional—institutions, beliefs, systems—the world, in short. He tended towards asceticism, and subordinated the world to the soul somewhat as did Thomas à Kempis.

Schelling, on the other hand, looked upon the world as a revelation of the absolute and held it sacred, while subjectivity—the ego and its interests—became less and less important in his eyes. As a consequence, human practical aims and endeavors, and even morality, lost their interest for him.

Through the assistance of his friend Hölderlin, Hegel obtained a situation in 1797 as tutor in Frankfort. His interest in philosophical studies increased. He studied Plato and Sextus Empiricus and began to seize what he afterwards called the “objective dialectic” into which he could translate the psychological process of Fichte.

In 1790 his father died leaving him some property and in 1801 he removed to Jena, then the centre of literary activity. Fichte had recently gone to Berlin and Schelling was at Jena as Professor Extraordinarius. Hegel lectured on logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of spirit. In 1805 he lectured on the history of philosophy, pure mathematics, and natural rights; in 1806 on the unity of philosophical systems and the phenomenology of spirit. He had been, up to this time, a follower of Schelling, but with differences. He had approached nearest to Schelling when the latter, in 1799 to 1801, held the doctrine that the absolute is the identity of the subjective and objective and that this identity is reason or intelligence. The subjective retains all its rights within an absolute which is intelligence, and Hegel could hold that the absolute is

reason and agree with Schelling until Schelling, in 1803, began to construe his absolute identity as the absolute indifference of subjective and objective. The "indifference of the two poles" being understood to transcend both the subject and object at once, all possibility of solving the problem of the world by philosophy is precluded. Schelling, however, inconsistently went on philosophizing; but Hegel became aware of a radical difference between his own view of the world and Schelling's. By Hegel great light had been seen in the fact that nature is the becoming of Reason and hence that there are two phases of Reason in the world: conscious reason in humanity and in the absolute; unconscious reason in nature. Nature in all its activities is moving towards consciousness. The absolute is Conscious Reason who creates nature as his own reflection; "He elevates his not-me into a likeness to Himself" (as Rothe expresses it). Seen at bottom, nature is only the spectacle of the victory of divine reason over its opposite. This is manifested in a series of stages or degrees of ascent out of pure space, which is the emptiest thought of the objective opposed to the subjective. In all changes and processes of nature the substantially existent is only the divine act of negating the opposite of reason. This act of negating, however, is affirmative as well as negative, for it is a process of self-determination which constructs by continually using what it has already made, as material out of which to build the new.

Hegel's own system began now to reveal its outlines: (1) Logic or science of pure thought (pure reason), including the universal ideas applying to nature and mind alike; (2) Philosophy of nature, detecting these pure ideas as the substantial energies underlying the processes of nature; (3) the philosophy of man as finite spirit, rising in religion to the conception of the Absolute or Pure Reason again; thus completing the circle of philosophy.

Hegel had been greatly attached to Greek literature and philosophy. His studies of Plato and Aristotle were quite as fruitful as his studies of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. Schelling discovers the principle of absolute identity, but Hegel discovers what is more valuable, namely: the identity of the results of Plato and Aristotle with the true logical outcome of the psychology of Kant and Fichte. Having once found the fundamental thought that unites ancient and modern thinking, Hegel is able to begin the work of philosophical interpretation.

When one is continually discovering the new and different, one continually advances towards self-estrangement. If I am the only one who ever saw this truth — if all former thinkers were in error — how suggestive is this of another consideration: "Is it not probable that I am still groping in error myself? I behold everywhere systems of error set up by enthusiastic but mistaken thinkers. I recall the fact that my own career has been the development of systems of apparent truth which

I have soon outgrown and laid aside as false. Unless the course of the world changes, I shall myself change again and my present view will be seen to be false."

The epoch of new systems must be followed by an epoch of despair and skepticism unless a philosophy arises that is synthetic and unites all previous ones in a harmony of thought. If each one helps illuminate every other, the light is reinforced by every philosophic system and there is perfect day. If each one refutes all its predecessors and is refuted by all succeeding systems, then the net result of the entire movement of philosophic thought is darkness and night. Kant's and especially Fichte's philosophizings tend in the skeptical direction through the attitude of radical hostility they assume towards all previous systems of thought. But Schelling is in two senses constructive: (1) Instead of leaving nature as a thing in itself outside of and beyond all mind, or making it merely an empty occasion for my own moral development, Schelling recognizes in it a genuine objective and independent development of reason fundamentally identical with my own spirit: my own development of reason is thus reflected in other forms of nature and so the goal at which I have arrived and am arriving is approved by the great process of struggle for existence which I see and call nature. (2) Quite as important is the mastery, one by one, of the great systems of preceding thinkers by Schelling. He successively appropriated the standpoints of Kant, Fichte,

Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Franz Baader, Jacob Böhme. His studies in these philosophers are of great value because he unfolds their inner necessity. The bane of superficial historians is the method of setting down the doctrines of philosophy without depicting the inner necessity of their point of view. They are thus made to appear like mere fanciful opinions and when arranged in an orderly manner, as in Mr. Lewes' *Biographical History of Philosophy*, remind us of an amateur's collection of insects — carefully asphyxiated and then placed upon pins.

To be of value, the history of thought must not be presented as a series of dead results, but as living insights, each one of which is seen by us now in its necessity. Philosophical systems vary less through their principle of explanation than through their application to the problems of the time. Their principles, of course, are what is essential — not their application to transient problems nor their technique, which is always colored by local and temporal issues.

Schelling made one epoch therefore in the Kantian philosophy when he set up the doctrine that the "thing in itself" is intelligence, and still another when he began to interpret the series of subtle thinkers and rehabilitate the living insights which their systems contained. He had discovered the vital basis for a history of philosophy that should really interpret the different systems.

Hegel was profoundly impressed with Schelling's discoveries in the history of thought, and

was perhaps impelled in this direction by their influence. But Hegel's success in history surpasses that of his master as much as Aristotle's results in natural science surpass the suggestive hints of Plato. Hegel was fortunately led in the beginning to the very centre of ancient thought. It was evident enough that the thought of the past two thousand years had been not merely influenced, but almost wholly formed, on the systems of Aristotle and Plato. Hegel studied those systems, and, to his great delight, recognized in them the living idea which had been lately announced as a new discovery of Schelling. There had been only a new road opened to the goal, not a new goal found. But Hegel saw that this new road was of uttermost importance for the reason that it flanked the position of all possible skepticism, and hence made the central bulwark of philosophy secure for all future time.

Hegel's advantage, therefore, consisted, as we have shown in the previous chapter, in his recovering for us, by adequate interpretation, the speculative insights of the great system of thought which had prevailed in the world for twenty centuries and on which, in a sense, the institutions of modern civilization had been built. This old system had lost the insight into its speculative necessity and had become mostly a tradition, taught in the universities from one generation to the next in prescriptive formulæ that had become dead. Nothing so surely drives the living spirit of insight out of a system as to adapt it for use in

schools. The guiding principle kept in mind in the preparation of a text-book is the capacity of the pupil. In the attempt to make the subject clear on the plane of thought of the immature mind which thinks only in images and pictures, the author changes his attitude towards truth from that of a discoverer to that of an expounder. He suppresses the definition of the pure thought and sets down only the analogies and illustrations that flow from it. He offers baked bread instead of seed-corn. The pupils nurtured on this philosophical pap in time come to be professors themselves. They have no tradition that the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle ever had any other meaning than the commonplace truisms which they have learned. Eccentric philosophers off the line of the traditional school-wisdom, like Bruno, Spinoza, Böhme, and Swedenborg, have a power to arouse original thought, because their technique is unconventional. Like Schelling, the aroused student begins to see the morning-red and turns away from commonplace to gaze with wonder on the growing light. He becomes a mystic and it never occurs to him that there is besides the morning redness also clear daylight behind the commonplace dogmas of school-wisdom.

Schelling finds the truth of the mystics, and Hegel finds the underlying truth of the school-wisdom. The former works in a remote field of human inquiry; the latter in the very highways of the world of thought.

CHAPTER IV.

HEGEL'S "VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY" — THING,
FORCE, LAW.

SCHELLING removed to Wurzburg in 1803 and at the same time began a removal in thought that placed him farther and farther from Hegel. In the *Critical Journal of Philosophy* Hegel had, in 1801, characterized Fichte as a subjective idealist in contrast to Schelling as objective idealist. Now he had begun to define his own relation to them both.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, published in 1807, a work which he afterwards called his "Voyage of Discovery," he undertook to trace the history of consciousness in its growth from the first stages of culture up to the theoretical and practical conviction which underlies modern civilization. In the preface to this work he attacks the immediate "intuition" of Schelling and shows that thought or knowledge without mediation is entirely empty. To think a pure simple or a pure unity is to think a pure nothing. All thinking of distinctions is a mediate knowing. Hegel employs in this voyage of discovery a method that he names the "dialectic." It has throughout the appearance of being a stricter method than that of Fichte's "Science of Knowledge," and

claims to be objective—an exhibition of the necessity of the process which is in the object before us, in contradistinction from mere subjective reflections upon it made from points of view external to the object.

The stage of simple sense-perception he calls Consciousness, in contradistinction to “self-consciousness,” “reason,” etc., more advanced stadia of the mind. This simple sense-perception in its first form without mediation—that is to say, without the act of comparison which traces out relations between its object and other objects and takes them into consideration in its knowing, is found to know nothing true. The evidence of any immediate act of sense-perception is refuted by the next act. What I see this moment is different from what I see the next moment, and unless I can adjust and reconcile these differences they cancel each other and reduce to zero. I accordingly explain the changes in the object first by referring them to myself, and not succeeding in explaining them by this means I discover that the object cannot be known immediately, because it is not a simple absolute being, but a relative being, mediated through its environment. Hegel's method does not seek to find an external basis of attack or defense, but to get this basis from the object itself. If sense-perception can know anything we ought to discover the fact by analyzing its procedure. Time and space are the general forms of existence for all that can offer itself to sense-perception. Whatever is extended in time and space

is compound, having parts. The sense-knowledge must seize these through analysis and synthesis and hence reach its knowledge through a process. The word perception etymologically signifies a seizing-by-means-of, *i. e.*, one might say, "by means of other objects," relative objects being seized by means of the other objects to which they relate. The German word *wahrnehmen* implies this mediation. Hegel delights to find in the etymology of technical terms indications like this of the unconscious poetic insight that presided at the formation of language—but one may easily be too confident of his etymologies. Hegel wishes to write the ideal history of the development of consciousness, and hence proceeds to describe the points of view that naturally follow from the discovery of successive difficulties and the suggestion of obvious solutions. In every imperfect stand-point there will arise conflicts just because of the imperfection.

I. For example, the object that is now found to be mediated or dependent on others has this contradiction: (1) It is one and many—excluding others and yet participating in their being; for I cannot know it as *one* without distinguishing it by some of its properties. But a property is a relation of an object to some other object and hence a bond of union essentially uniting two objects. This contradicts the simple oneness that appeared at first glance. (2) My object is therefore this common relation of two, but I perceive that a property not only unites but distinguishes;

for by its properties one thing is distinguished from another.

(3) Hence I contemplate another phase, or rather return to the phase of exclusion which characterizes unity. (4) But here I find that the exclusion by means of which the object is one is through many properties and that the object is internally a manifold : hence, again, I conclude that the object is a common medium, a collection of properties each of which excludes all others. (5) The fifth step, therefore, of this observation of the mediated object will be to take an isolated property as the ultimate unit of true objectivity. Here I discover that my attempt to know the truth has led me round to the first position, that of simple sensuous certitude : I try again the impossible feat of holding a single individual out of all relation. In such isolation it cannot be a property, for that is a relation to others ; nor can it be definite except in contrast, and contrast is also relation. I am holding an abstraction that exists only in my fancy, for the truth.

II. This minute analysis of the necessary procedure of consciousness continues ; it is suggested that we explain the duality and contradiction which arises in experience by referring one phase to the object and one phase to the subject. By discriminating properly we shall be able, perhaps, to escape the contradiction. (1) The object then is one ; but as I have many senses there arises an appearance of many properties through the variety of my sense-organs. The one object appears

white to the eye, cubical to the touch, acid to the taste, etc. I make allowance for these subjective appearances and thus convince myself of the simplicity of the object for my thought. But a new difficulty arises: the object without these properties cannot be an excluding unity, it has nothing left to it by which it can be distinguished from any other object, or by which indeed it can be an object at all of my thought or perception. I perceive, therefore, that I have destroyed by my theory all that I receive from the object and have even left it impossible that the object should ever have attracted my attention at all.

(2) Out of this dilemma the consciousness escapes by adopting the opposite theory: the object is really a collection of properties and its appearance of unity is borrowed from my subjective consciousness. The properties are independent, simple materials combined so as to form an object, and I by a law or habit of my thinking attribute unity to the combination. Here I come suddenly back to the former conviction, namely, that the isolated properties are the simple and true units of existence, and, recalling my former proof of its untenability, I give up this method of explaining the contradiction by referring it to the duality of subject and object. I see that the object itself is one and many.

III. Consciousness sees now the necessity of admitting that the duality (unity and multiplicity) is entirely objective. For the purpose of avoiding contradiction it at first adopts the theory that

rests on the distinctions of being-for-itself and being-for-others. The object is one when taken for itself; its multiplicity of properties arises through its relation to other objects. It is one for-itself, manifold, for-others. Here consciousness adopts a device similar to a former one; then (II. 1) it explained the multiplicity through relation to itself as subject, now it explains it through relation to other objects. "In so far" as the thing is for itself, it is one and simple; "in so far" as it is for others, it appears manifold. Here at last we have come to the root of the contradiction which has masqueraded under the foregoing problems. The previous solutions were only attempts to avoid meeting the issue squarely. But is our present solution valid?

The being-for-others is necessary to the object in order to preserve its individuality—that is to say, without a multitude of distinctions and differences one thing coalesces with others—hence multiplicity belongs to it of necessity. Without these properties that arise through its relation to others there could be no being-for-itself. It would be null. I conclude, therefore, that the being-for-itself, which is the simple, radical character of the object, is essentially in relation to others and hence essentially multiplex within itself, and all my painstaking to escape the contradiction has been to no purpose.

The explanations have amounted to a mere postponement of the solution—"The multiplicity comes from others;" that is to say, it is presup-

posed but not explained after all. But it does not help the question to postpone it, for it comes up again in a new quarter, and, what is worse, reappears in the place from which we thought to have shifted it. To suppose that a series of objects, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, and *e*, in the world, are simple units and yet stand in relation to one another so that the appearance of multiplicity arises, does not rid us of our difficulty. To suppose that *a* differs from *b* by its fundamental simple quality and that it differs from *c* by the same quality, while yet *b* differs from *c*, is to suppose that *a* is distinguished from *c* by a different difference from that in which it differs from *b*. It will also differ from *d* and *e* by still other differences. So, too, of each of the others, and hence we see that relativity implies indefinite multiplicity in the simple quality assumed to explain the object.

The truth reached is that that the object is being-in-itself precisely in-so-far as it is being-for-others; or, in other words, that it is one in so far as it is manifold and manifold in so far as it is one.

Such a result can have no meaning to the sensuous consciousness which sees, hears and feels only present impressions; nor to perception, aided as it is by that stage of reflection which undertakes to explain all by the category of "thing." This necessary result is comprehensible in a higher stage of thought, however, namely in that stage of thinking which explains all by the idea of Force.

→ In explaining the world of sense we presuppose forces that manifest themselves. The manifestation is an utterance or externalization of a unity which we conceive as an energy. A force is a being-in-itself which is at the same time being-for-others; or, in different language, a force exists only in its manifestation. Hegel calls the stage of consciousness that uses the thought of force to explain experience, the understanding. Force should be, according to him, the characteristic category of the understanding.

The understanding will not see, at first, all the difficulties involved in this thought of force. It will begin to use it with feeble insight. In solving its difficulties it will rise to the idea of law, according to Hegel.

If we consider the idea of force we find that in order to explain the activity by which it manifests itself we have to presuppose something else which furnishes the occasion for the manifestation. A force acts in a definite direction because it is limited through other forces which guide its direction. A force acts when the restraint to its action is removed. But the guiding forces are restraints upon which it manifests itself. So we conceive force as pent up (Hegel uses the expression "*zurück-gedrängte*") by other forces before its manifestation. But in truth we see that a force is expending its energy already on the forces that keep it pent-up. To hold back the force of a reservoir the dam must every moment exert a pressure equal to that of the water that it confines, and

in and through that pressure the force is already manifesting itself.

Consciousness thus perceives upon reflection that a force cannot exist as an isolated impulse. It must always form a member of a complex of forces which are conceived as furnishing its incitement to activity as well as its guide, constraining form, or mould that determines the channel of its activity. With this it arrives at the idea of a higher unity than force—Law.

To explain this more fully : In the complex or system of forces each particular force is held in tension by all the others and is furnished the occasion of its activity by the others. Conceived as a system, therefore, each force contributes to furnish occasion for all the others, and hence to incite them to furnish occasion for its own activity. Hegel says that each force is solicited (“*sollicitirt*”) to activity. If one force incites to activity another that again reciprocally incites the former to activity, this complex of forces is self-activity. For the force incites another force to react upon it—in other words it incites itself through the agency of another.

The unity of the system whereby each force has its own “utterance” returned to it is called law. This is a new and most important conception for consciousness, the conception of a law governing forces—furnishing them their occasion for activity and giving direction to them. It is a conception similar in some respects to Plato’s “Ideas,” which were also determining forms containing the com-

plete or total sphere of all determinateness, or in other words the total round of all change and particularization. Of course one would not contend that the popular notion of law comprehends all this. Nevertheless, it brings together under the concept of law the elements of the thought without uniting them completely on the one hand, or even perceiving their incongruity on the other. It looks upon law as governing a system of forces correlated in such a manner that they furnish not only the energy, but the inciting occasion to activity. When we say "nature acts according to law," we include these thoughts. Often, however, law means simply a ratio of two forces which measures the activity of one by another, as the law of positive and negative electricity or of the distance and period of revolution of the planets. Even then it is the unity of the system that incites and guides the one force through the other—the positive inciting and regulating the negative, and the negative, in like manner, its opposite.

The law is conceived as a sort of internal unity which explains the external variety of manifestation that is found in the action of the system of forces.

Thus we began with things and came to forces and thence to laws. Thing, force, and law are the three categories of consciousness by which it construes to itself the world of experience. But these ideas are not coördinate; they do not stand side by side like trees and houses. The stage of consciousness that thinks with the category

“thing” is very shallow compared with that stage which explains the object dynamically with the category of “force”; likewise the category of “force” is partial compared with that of “law.” The category of “force” includes all that there is in the category of “thing,” but fuses it into a unity which is coherent, whereas the elements are incoherent in the category of “thing.” “Thing” is conceived as a unity of different properties, which exclude each its opposite and yet interpenetrate as it were in the “thing.” The idea of “force” solves for us the difficulty of conception, for it furnishes the notion of that whose nature it is to be a process of unfolding from one into many, from a hidden identity into a manifest difference. It never occurs to us that there is any more difficulty in thinking the thought of force than there is in thinking the thought of thing. To the person not an adept in this way of studying psychology, it is an amazing discovery that force is a deeper and truer mode of thinking an object than that which calls it a thing. Force stands to thing as motion stands to rest.

“A thing cannot move where it is and of course it cannot move where it is not,” said the Eleatic thinker. Motion translated into terms of rest is utterly incoherent. Rest, too, is an incoherent category taken by itself. For it is a relative term and implies other things. It involves plurality as well as unity. But the idea of motion seems as simple as that of rest and is in reality far simpler, because it explicitly states what rest only implies.

The idea of motion makes intelligible the existence of an object in different places. So the idea of force makes intelligible the existence of manifold properties in the unity of a thing.

But the thought of force is not an ultimate thought. It suppresses some important determinations that are implied in it. It implies external incitement and external guidance and hence presupposes other forces in unity with it in a system. But there must be a uniting force to hold these forces in a system. Hence arises the idea of a form-giving force which is called law.

If one conceives law merely as a statement of the uniformity of action, as a mere rule in short, still he implies behind this uniformity some cause of it which is at the same time unity and multiplicity, just as a single force is unity and multiplicity. The difference between a particular force and this force underlying the system of forces must consist in this: it (the system) is its own incitement or occasion and its own guide or form, and it furnishes the incitement for the other forces and gives them form or directs their activity.

Whether the name "law" be given rightly or not to this form-giving principle which incites into action the special forces, it is clear that we have a self-activity which is the origin of all the special forces and hence also of all the static equilibria of forces which are called "things." This is clear to one who reflects on the following considerations:

(1) To incite into activity a system of forces and guide their action, the one through the other, requires a power that is its own incitement and guide and therefore a self-activity. If each demanded an external incitement and could not act until such were furnished, and there were no self-activity to furnish an incitement, there would be no activity. For if one force is incapable of originating its occasion for action, an infinite number of such incapables does not help the case. (2) A power that can incite into action and give direction or guidance to another force must possess an equal or greater force. Force can be pent up only by an equal or greater force and it can be guided only by such a force. Hence it follows that the law contains a force equal to all the special forces united by it into a system. Hence, too, this surprising result: the law does not need independently existing forces to have something to act upon, because it has to furnish an equal number of equivalent forces and provide their incitement. The supposition of independent, already existing forces for the law to act upon therefore does not help to explain anything, for the inciting and guiding forces of the law can perform everything required of the independent forces.

(3) Hence the law or the power that exists as a unity which furnishes special impulses of force as incitement and guidance is a unity that unfolds spontaneously into multiplicity.

(4) Every force is conceived as an energy existing in the form of a tension. It impels outward

and is restrained by another force, which in turn impels outward and is restrained by the former, and others. The activity of a force is a movement to restore equilibrium and this presupposes that the tension or restraining force has been changed. If a force in acting destroyed another equilibrium equivalent to itself it would give rise to another force precisely its quantitative equivalent. Here we come upon the recent thought of the conservation of energy or correlation of forces. Hegel used the technical terms (1) force (*Kraft*), (2) utterance or manifestation (*Æusserung*), (3) inciting or soliciting (*sollicitirende*), (4) restrained or pent up (*zurückgedrängte*), (5) internal world of law which corresponds to the external manifestation of forces (*Innere der Dinge*, or *wahren Hintergrund der Dinge*, corresponding to *Mitte des Spiels der Kräfte*). This internal world of law which is behind the play of forces in the foreground he calls also the interior truth, the absolute Universal (because it is both one and many, both for-itself and for-others). He calls it also a supersensuous world, "an abiding beyond" opposed to a "transient this side," "an in-itself which is the first, and therefore an imperfect manifestation of reason." Next he describes it as "a quiet realm of laws, beyond the world of sense-perception which shows to us the law only under the form of constant change, but that realm of laws is present in the sense-world and its immediate unchanging image or copy."

The language which Hegel uses shows, therefore,

the road over which he traveled to the thought of this self-active essence presupposed by all phenomena. It indicates his studies of Schelling and his predecessors, Kant and Fichte. Hence, too, his illustrations of these thoughts. He calls up the law of universal gravitation as the very notion itself of law as lying behind the play of forces. It is that which constitutes its great significance, he tells us. So, too, electricity, which as simple power manifests itself as self-opposition or polarity of positive and negative. Gravitation, too, has polarization or duality taking the form of time and space relations, the ratio of the squares of times to the cubes of distances passed over. We can see how Schelling's symbol of polarity and the point of indifference is the original subject of Hegel's investigation here, and that he thought it out in this universal form, changing a symbol derived from a mere particular object, a magnet, into general abstract thoughts—pure thoughts.

The advance made over Schelling is to be found in this new conception of the point of indifference between the two opposite poles. Here was an essential divergence from Schelling's semi-poetic thinking, which was very suggestive but imperfect, because it used symbols instead of abstract thoughts. The symbol suggests, but does not define. It helps at first and hinders afterwards. The magnet, for example, was a brilliant metaphor and stimulated reflection at first. But owing to its peculiar limitations, which made it only a magnet and not the World-Spirit, it soon began to mislead—suggestive

of truth at first and then of error. For the magnet's poles are mere north and south directions, and not subject and object as in consciousness, and yet the magnet had to do duty for the latter. The indifference point between the opposing poles, too, is neither north nor south, and devoid of polarity, a mere indifference utterly indeterminate—a sort of zero or nothing. Applied to the world the limitation and error appears; for the one pole shall be mind and the other pole nature, and the absolute essence shall be the point of indifference, an utter void of determinations, a substance that is neither mind nor matter. Spinoza's "substance," which is the indifference of thought and extension, is something like this symbolic absolute of Schelling, and the East Indian pantheism and all other pantheism amount to essentially the same thing. The results of this doctrine have been drawn out of it by the unconscious syllogistic process of human history again and again. Thus it has been inferred that the absolute transcends not only matter but also mind. It is therefore above intelligence and consciousness—a supreme unity above the duality of self-knowledge as well as above the duality of dependence which matter manifests. Hence all beings, material and spiritual, are devoid of the divine principle and must perish in their individuality and be "absorbed" in order to return to the divine. Such an absolute cannot be called a creator, for to create is to impart substance and existence, and such impartation would be self-separation and not "indifference," but rather a polar

difference of positive and negative or active and passive within itself. Hence such an absolute does not explain anything; it does not show how the world of difference arises. All steps lead towards it, but none from it, as has been said of Spinoza's substance :

Quærentem nulla ad speluncam signa ferebant.

When in the first excitement at seeing the suggestive symbol, Schelling had inclined to recognize pure reason in the identity of the two poles, nature and mind. Nature is petrified mind—reason is the identity. What a glorious inspiration this thought was to the thinkers who had begun to be disappointed with the limitations of the critical system as interpreted by Kant and Fichte ! Hegel was glad to call himself a disciple of Schelling with this doctrine on his banner.

But Schelling soon began to inquire more closely into this identity of mind and nature and guided the course of his investigation by the symbol of the magnet. His guiding compass pointed directly towards the empty void of indifferent, negative unity. He began to develop this standpoint of the empty absolute as transcending mind just at the period when he left Jena for Würzburg. The subsequent four years were given by Hegel to the development of the thought of the identity of mind and nature and the systematic statement of his views in this Phenomenology of Spirit.

CHAPTER V.

VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY — “BEGRIFF,” OR SELF-ACTIVITY.

THE first part of the *Phenomenology* treats consciousness in the three stadia of (*a*) sense-certitude, (*b*) sense-perception, (*c*) force and understanding, the phenomenal and supersensuous worlds. These three stadia we have endeavored to present to the reader, in our interpretation of the Hegelian thought, avoiding his style of expression as being unnecessarily difficult to people unfamiliar with the questions under discussion in the philosophical circles of Germany in 1803-7. Had Hegel written his book seventy years later, he would certainly have used the technique of the correlationists and illustrated his thoughts from the writings of Mayer, Helmholtz, Grove and Spencer. He would have shown how they have made inferences that lifted them to a new stadium of thought, that of LAW, which these writers call “correlation of forces,” or “persistence of force,” not seeing how unlike their new thought is to the old thought of force. The thought of force involves an unstable equilibrium, an energy in a state of tension, and its incitement to activity must come to it from without through another force equivalent to it. Even

its action must be the creation of another pent-up energy equivalent to it, and hence its passing over into another correlated force. But this "persistent force" that is the indifference of all forces and is neither heat nor light nor electricity nor magnetism nor gravity, and yet the energy that produces them all in succession—what is it? Is it, too, a force? Hegel would have pointed out the fact that it was not coördinate to particular forces and hence could not receive its incitement from others, and being ultimate or absolute must be its own incitement; it must be in other words self-determined, self-active, self-polarizing into positive and negative opposites. In a self-determined being the negative process of determining annuls the indifferent indeterminateness, or emptiness, and originates finite, limited or particular beings. The universal or general becomes specialized, not however by some external influence, but by its own activity. If the correlationists should consider carefully their result and not stop before it as the unknowable, they would discover that they have traced determinations back to self-activity, or all rest back to motion, and all motion back to self-motion. A careful study of Plato—the tenth book of the *Laws* for example—would elevate any thinker into the consciousness of this stadium of thought. A like study of Aristotle, who is more difficult to read than Plato, would bring one to the same or a higher result. For Aristotle is very careful not to use the term self-motion, a too symbolic term, but to substitute

the term energy for it." He carefully discriminates it from motion in space, confining the word motion (*κίνησις*) to this latter signification. He probably did not gain much by this except against the disciples of the "Academy," who for the most part followed the symbolic mode of exposition derived from the master, Plato, and in consequence contributed little or nothing to the furtherance of philosophy, symbols being good servants but bad masters. As before remarked, they serve to stimulate and arouse us at the beginning, but lead to error if taken as norms of thought, or as adequate definitions. Hegel is the first of the great Coryphei of German philosophy who studied Greek philosophy thoroughly, and this he had done before his proper discipleship of Schelling. But he returned to that study again and again throughout his life. We may therefore legitimately accredit something in this chapter on Force and the Understanding to Aristotle.

Hegel proceeds in the chapter under consideration to trace out the growth or development of the thought of LAW as an explanation of the differences in phenomena. In addition to the above-named technical terms he uses "pure interchange" (*reiner Wechsel*) to describe the process of formal explanation of force by means of law. The formalist says that "lightning is caused by electricity," meaning nothing more by "electricity" than he meant before by "lightning;" or he says that "it is the law of electricity to manifest itself as positive and negative electricities." The

fact is stated twice in the same sentence, once as cause and once as effect. This tautology is not merely a tautology of expression but is found in the idea of law itself, and in it there is this self-separation which appertains to self-activity. Hegel proceeds to use the technical terms homonymous (*Gleichnamige*) and heteronymous (*Ungleichnamige*). In the attempt to think the idea of law without being obliged to think self-activity, the understanding explains the procedure from unity to multiplicity, from the simplicity of the law to its differences necessary to incite and guide the different forces, by supposing the law to be also a force that duplicates itself, giving rise to all the differences in the supersensuous world before they become a "play of forces" in this world. Thus we have an inverted world (*verkehrte Welt*) placed beyond, in order to explain *this* world. But this tautology on being made manifest is given up and the law that produces its variety is seen to be the really present law that produces the really present variety of phenomena. The homonymous repels or dirempts itself (*sich von sich abstösst, oder sich entzweit*) and the heteronymous attracts (*sich anzieht*). The like becomes unlike and the unlike becomes like. This describes the nature of that which is pre-supposed as the ultimate ground of thing or force—a pure self-activity which Hegel names infinitude (*Die Unendlichkeit oder diese absolute Unruhe des reinen Sichselbstbewegens*).

This he identifies with thought-movement, the

“notion” (Begriff), the universal which is particular and singular because it is a universal which determines itself. It is the simple essence of life (*Der absolute Begriff ist das einfache Wesen des Lebens*).

Hence the understanding reaches the truth of phenomena. It discovers it to be a self-determining activity like itself. A like which repels itself into opposition—a self that opposes to itself an object; an unlike that identifies itself with its opposite unlike—a self that cognizes its object, recognizes itself in it—looks out upon a world of difference and by reflection upon it discovers it to be a phenomenal manifestation of reason, of rational self-consciousness.

Here Hegel comes to use the word Begriff (English “concept” or logical “notion”) in the peculiar sense that gives rise to more serious misunderstanding of his system than any other cause. He falls into the habit of designating this idea of self-activity (*causa sui*) as “Begriff” in all his works subsequent to the *Phenomenology*. What led him to this was probably the fact that he was struck with the consideration that logical notions have the characteristics of universality, particularity, and singularity, and that these three distinctions all belong to the idea of self-activity. As self-determining it is subject or universal, not yet being determined. As self-determined, it is object and in opposition to itself as determining; antithesis gives specialization or particularity. But as the

self, identical in both of these and including, therefore, universality, or the possibility of all determinations, as well as particularity or actual determinateness, it is individual or singular.

In the individual, the universal and the particular are both contained as moments. But these are both modified in such a manner that neither is just the thought that it was as a category by itself. Universality is not merely the possibility of all modifications, but is in relation to the special determination of particularity as a negative to it. It annuls the particularity as inadequate to the expression of its complete sphere, and thus appears in the rôle of the negative universal. The universal as the abstract category is not in the special phase of negation. Particularity, on the other hand, is not abstract particularity in this category of individual or singular. It has received the negation of the universal, and is not a mere particular opposed to possible other particulars; but it is itself the entire sphere of particulars—the total sphere of possible particulars realized. The individual or singular is therefore the complete actualization of the universal in a total sphere of particularity; and the particularity by reason of its exhaustive completeness, which leaves no phase unrealized, is a complete realization of the universal. This perfect actualization is the individual or singular, and it may be seen by this that it is a good description of it to say that it is the identity of the universal and

particular — not their sum nor their dead unity, but their living unity, which results from their complete actualization through realization of possibilities.

“Begriff,” or notion, is used, therefore, by Hegel in the sense of self-determining being. This use is similiar to Plato’s use of the word “idea” as meaning perfect form. Hegel, too, may be said to use Begriff to mean perfect form—*i. e.* the form that furnishes its own contents or matter, not a form externally imposed on some matter furnished for it.

With the idea of self-activity as the origin of the entire phenomenal world before it, consciousness has become self-consciousness. This means that it has ascended above the stadia of thought in which it contemplates a world of objects different from itself—a world of things or forces which are alien to mind, apparently independent of mind. It has discovered that every object is a phenomenon or system of appearances, and that every phenomenon reveals a self-active being as its cause or noumenon. Hence a concrete identity has been reached for subject and object, and this identity is not a substance that transcends both but only material nature, and is affirmative of the determinations of the spiritual or conscious individual.

This psychological study is a sufficient voyage of discovery for the first principle that Hegel adopted as the highest truth. He describes it (truth) in the chapter on Force and Understanding as the

“Simple infinitude or the absolute notion (Begriff = self-determining being) which is the simple essence of life, the soul of the world—the universal blood, so to speak—which everywhere present is interrupted by no distinction and which is rather all distinctions as well as their annulment; which pulsates within itself without moving itself and which vibrates within itself without ruffling its repose.” He identifies this with thinking being—in reaching this insight into the world, consciousness becomes self-consciousness.

Arrived at this point, what follows next? Is not the *Phenomenology* concluded? Not according to Hegel's method. He must now consider the appearance this conviction of the identity of mind with nature's essence puts on in human history. If this theoretical conclusion just drawn from psychological investigation is a true one, it must have made its appearance long ago in the world as a practical conclusion. For man discovers the great truths of his nature in many other modes than by logic and scientific investigation. There are poetic and religious seers through whom these truths are disclosed as divine revelations.

CHAPTER VI.

VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY — THE ETHICAL WORLD.

HAVING arrived at the standpoint of self-consciousness, what next? This standpoint we remember is the insight or conviction that all possible objectivity is grounded on a conscious absolute. This being the case, the consciousness of the individual who is making this voyage of discovery now recognizes consciousness everywhere as its object, and is self-consciousness, which is the topic of the fourth division of the work. Under whatever alien guise the object appears, it is at bottom the appearance of self-activity as mind. This is the insight which Hegel has reached by considering the nature of things to be manifestations of force, and all forces to be phases of self-activity. Only self-activity can be independent being, or as Hegel calls it "being-in-and-for itself." All dependent being gets its qualities and attributes from its relation to others.

In this *Phenomenology* the necessity of self-consciousness is seen as the true and final view of the nature of objectivity. We have reached that which is sufficient for itself and does not need anything else to explain it, hence, we can go no farther with the object of consciousness, strictly considered. The object which at first appeared as

the opposite of the subject, now is recognized to be the same in essence—to be a subject in short, or rather to be subject-object. Consciousness has therefore become self-consciousness. Here he has arrived at the theoretical conclusion of the Platonic philosophy. All reality is at bottom the manifestation of ideas. Ideas are self-activities, independent (absolute) beings. Moreover, as heretofore remarked in this book, “ideas” are intellectual activities (*Laws*, Book X). In Plato the human mind gains the insight of self-consciousness. But the conviction of self-consciousness was attained long before by the Hebrew who saw that “In the beginning God (an immaterial spirit) made the heavens and the earth.” Nothing material, nothing in time and space could possibly be independent or absolute being, according to the view of the Old Testament Scriptures. All is the “work of His hands,” and is dependent on His will. So, too, the Greek popular consciousness as shown in its mythology has the same conviction. It held that all material reality is only a manifestation of spiritual powers, all movement being caused by conscious energy. Hence it peoples all nature with spirits and makes the visible a veil behind which is an invisible kingdom of spirits.

But this *conviction* of self-consciousness is something far below the *insight* of self-consciousness: hence the course of human history and its slow progress for three thousand years gradually ascending from the conviction to the insight. Conviction

is an insight of the social whole, the aggregate thought of the entire community reaching a conclusion which the average individual can only share in through faith in the fundamental religious dogma of his people.

At this point in his "Voyage of Discovery" Hegel must have seen the principle of human history which he enunciated afterwards in his lectures on the philosophy of history: "The world history is the onward progress of man into the consciousness of freedom."

The *Phenomenology* proper ends with the stage of self-consciousness, as we see in the third part of Hegel's Encyclopædia, where we find that Reason (*Vernunft*) is the next stage following completed self-consciousness, and that this stage of "Reason" is developed under the head of "Psychologie." In this, his voyage of discovery, however, he includes also the standpoints of Reason (V) and Spirit (VI). But this is only a matter of nomenclature. At a later period *The Philosophy of Spirit* was thought by him to be a better name than *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

IV. *Self-consciousness.* To return to our question, "what next?" we must see that our investigation takes a practical turn here. The individual comes to the insight that mind or conscious being is the essence or "thing-in-itself" underlying phenomena. What will the individual do when he arrives at this conviction? Hegel sees quite clearly that he will adopt an individualistic standpoint and assert the world to be the

mere non-substantial phenomenon of himself as essence. In other words, he will deny the essentiality of other beings, including his fellow-men. A self is necessarily transcendental; that is to say it is not and cannot be a sensuously perceivable being: it is an energy that can only be perceived in itself by introspection as feeling, thought, or will. Individualism asserts itself as the only self, the essence. "The world is its oyster." Consequently Hegel takes up the historical phase of individualism first. It is of course a perpetually recurring phase, but its typical history is always the same. First there is an attempt to subdue all other being and make it subject to its own will. In this struggle it attacks other individuals of its own species, and death, or its alternative, slavery, ensues. This results in the first social relation, namely "dominion and servitude," that is to say, slavery, which has its own dialectic resulting in a consciousness of ethics, as we shall see later. Hegel does not attempt to write a real history, but only a typical history of man—or rather an evolution of each principle of history by itself. These principles are arranged in the order of their evolution one from another. But in real history one of these principles is not exhausted before another principle is begun. Each principle being established calls into being another comparatively higher principle, whose growth is conditioned upon the former principle, and yet reacts upon its growth. Thus the family institution rises and directly after it the institution

of the State appears in the form of the tribe. Family morality developing through the reacting influence of the tribe, the tribe becomes gradually a better form of social organization and finally becomes a nation. But a certain development must be attained before a given principle may give rise to its sequent principle. The idea that nature is the revelation of a self-conscious absolute must be reached before a science of nature can arise which will address itself to the work of inventorying the orders of being. Aristotle necessarily comes after Plato, and no natural science, properly speaking, arises among the Asiatic peoples.

The conviction of self-consciousness, which I have spoken of as arising with the Greeks and Hebrews, is therefore not the first appearance of self-consciousness according to Hegel, but rather a quite advanced stage of it, a stage in which it appears as a spiritual religion. It must appear in the stage of fetichism, and begin its evolution with the cannibal tribes, even. Hegel will draw his illustrations of this evolution from the earliest and from the most recent epochs of history, as we shall see.

Hegel had been greatly interested in the French Revolution and its new consciousness of the rights of individual men. His own voyage of discovery had to solve for him the environment of institutions surrounding him, as well as discover a philosophical first principle. Accordingly he puts his first principle to the test by interpreting the course of human history and

deducing the consciousness of his time, in its political, ethical, religious, and scientific phases.

Let us now review more in detail this his next question, which as already stated is: "What does the instinctive conviction of self-consciousness that it is at one with the substantial might of the universe produce?" Its consciousness that it is an essence appears first as an assertion of independence, an independence that proves all else to be merely phenomenal. It enters into life and death conflict with its fellow-man. The certitude of self as essence can only be attained by renouncing life and its enjoyments. To enter on the death struggle tests the sincerity of this renunciation. If it prefers life to independence, then it becomes a slave. Hence the first institution arising after this conviction of essentiality is attained, is that of slavery. One reflects on the fact that in savage tribes this is the characteristic condition. This is the lowest stadium of human history, but it has its uses in preparation for further developments. Hegel makes some interesting and valuable suggestions on this head, showing how the fact that the slave does not gratify his wants immediately from what is before him, but receives his food, clothing, and shelter as a gift from his master, although he, by his own labor, produces those things, develops ethical insight. The slave mediates his will through another, and begins the discipline which may lift him above a worse servitude to his passions and appetites. Even in modern civil-

ization this discipline is retained as essential, and the system of industry demands of each man that he labor at some occupation which produces an article for the market of the world and not for his own consumption. He shall receive for his own consumption, for the most part, the products of the labor of his fellow-men. This mediation is necessary. But there can be a higher freedom attained in stoicism, and the slave who withdraws into the depths of his soul away from the actual, and renounces his finite interests, realizes this higher freedom. Skepticism in the ancient sense of the word, realized a still further emancipation from this dependence on external conditions. For it not only despised and renounced them, like stoicism, but it denied them essential existence. Here we see a new step toward the realization of the conviction of self-consciousness, that it alone is essence, and that the world is phenomenal in so far as its existences do not attain self-determination. Ethical maxims are invented by the soul in its state of stoical reaction against enslavement to arbitrary tyranny. In its discontent with the present world, the soul rises to the thought of an ideal state of existence, which it places in a future. The contemplation of the ideal intensifies the ugliness of the real, and the soul enters what Hegel calls the "unhappy consciousness," (*das unglückliche Bewusstseyn*). The pain of the soul finds relief in earnest labor, which brings self-forgetfulness, and at the same time elevates

to a higher consciousness of self in the fact that labor transforms the real into ideal patterns fashioned for it in the mind. Hence there go on two processes of reconciliation: (1) the renunciation of the self, and (2) the conquest of the world and the realization of one's ideal in it. There arises, gradually, a perception of the immanence of reason in the world. This conviction gives rise to a new phase of intellectual history, namely Reason (V), which Hegel treats under three heads: (A) experimental observation, (*Beobachtende Vernunft*); (B) the realization of the rational self-consciousness through itself; (C) the individuality which has become real in and for itself.

V. *Reason.* (A) Under the first of these heads (experimental observation), he indicates the steps in the process whereby man gains scientific possession of nature, and discusses:—(1) the observation of nature; the method of describing its qualities and properties; the discovery of its laws; the relation of the organic to the inorganic; teleology; internal states and conditions manifested in the phenomena of sensibility, and reaction against environment; the relation of the internal to the external as producing organic shape; the imposing of the organic form upon the external and inorganic; the organic as genus, species, and individuality. All these things belong to observation of self-activity, under the form of life. (2) Observation of self-consciousness in its purity and in its relation to external reality; logical and psychological laws.

(3) The observation of the immediate reality of self-consciousness, physiognomy, phrenology.

(B) Under the second of these heads he considers the realization of reason through (a) the struggle between the seeking for pleasure and the necessary limits which it finds in nature; the abandonment of pleasure as final aim and the seeking of happiness in the gratification of its heart which desires the good of its fellow-men; (b) the delirium of self-conceit that arises in the heart on meeting the limitations of nature and human institutions which prevent the immediate realization of its philanthropic impulses; (c) the adoption of the law of duty and the practice of virtue,—the correction of vice, but the preservation of respect for individuality, allowing individual freedom within the limits fixed by public law; lastly, the revolt of the heart against the wickedness of the world, and its lament at the difficulties in the pathway of duty.

(C) Under the third rubric (Individuality become conscious) he discusses (a) the realization of individuality in the products of its industry, first considering the question of disinterestedness of two kinds—actual, and unconsciously affected. To this he gives the surprising title: “The Spiritual Zoölogy”—or anthropology, the treatment of mind as a physiologic phenomenon (*das geistige Thierreich*) and “self-deception or the interest of the object itself (*die Sache selbst*)”: *i. e.*, a disinterested treatment of the business in hand. Much of this seems aimed at the conceits of the Romantic

school of art and art criticism which exercised great influence in the early life of Hegel. But it is treated as though it were a necessary phase in the history of consciousness, because it was a phase that Hegel himself worked through. It is certainly a prevalent phase in our time. (b) Law-giving reason and law-proving reason are the topics discussed next. The search for disinterested methods of production and criticism has led to (c) the discovery of the rational laws that govern objective production.

At this point consciousness has reached an insight that will enable it to understand the unconscious development of reason in the shape of human institutions as well as the revolutionary reaction against them which sometimes happens. Here we discover Hegel's approach to the solution of the great event of his time—the French revolution and the revolt of all Europe against institutions.

VI. *Spirit*. The sixth general division of the *Phenomenology*, therefore, is devoted to the consciousness of institutions; and as institutions are the self-revelation of spirit or human nature, he names this division “Spirit” (*der Geist*). Hegel's distinction between the fifth stadium, “Reason” (*Vernunft*) and the sixth stadium, Spirit (*Geist*) is this: Reason includes the discoveries of laws and systems of consistent activity and arrangement in the realms of nature and mind. It is the discovery of reason in nature and in the forms of mental activity. In all this the individual acts as individ-

ual, and his seeing and knowing is individual, even in the highest stage of knowing. "Spirit" (*Geist*) names the product of society and not of the mere individual. In social combination, according to Hegel, there is a higher manifestation of intelligence and will, than in the mere individual, and he calls this manifestation "Spirit." This is the great distinction made by the profoundest of Swedenborgians, like Henry James.

"Self-consciousness," the fourth stadium, is moreover distinguished from "Reason," the fifth, through the fact that it has not yet discovered its objectivity in nature and in other individual self-consciousnesses, but has merely a subjective conviction of its own essentiality. It feels itself to be substantial, but it does not recognize others as substantial nor perceive nature to be a phenomenal manifestation of an objective Reason.

Restated with greater fullness, these three phases are to be distinguished thus :

Self-consciousness (IV) is sure of its own independence of all else in nature and humanity, but does not recognize itself either in nature or in its fellow-men, hence it struggles to subdue any manifestation of independence in other beings.

Reason (V) is the recognition of self-consciousness as realized in one's fellow-men and as manifested phenomenally in the laws of nature. (A) Hence, on this plane, the individual first finds it worth his while to take an inventory of nature and trace its fixed shapes (things) into phases of process (forces), and these again into total sys-

tems of forces (laws). It likewise takes an inventory of its own activities and discovers its own laws. Thus arise formal logic and psychology. It hungers and thirsts for the manifestation of itself in the form of law. But we must not suppose that it does this because it knows that the essence of law is "the repulsion from itself of the homonymous and the mutual attraction of the heteronymous"—that is only what *we* found as the outcome of our psychological investigation, and having discovered it *we* know that law is a reflection of self-consciousness. This statement of the essence of law expresses the distinctions of force, but in the higher form as they are found in self-activity, while force itself has only the form of finitude, or in other words the form of dependence on another. It is true, and must never be forgotten, that Force compared with Thing is an approximation to independent being: for a force has energy of its own, although it can not manifest it without incitement and guidance from other forces. But Law is conceived as a guiding and inciting energy, or, at least, even in its shallowest form it describes the result of such an energy.

This search for laws, therefore, which characterizes the activity of consciousness in the stage of "reason" as distinguished from the same activity in the stage "self-consciousness," so called, is a search for, and recognition of, the essential activity of consciousness as the essence of the objective world. It is therefore a carrying out of self-con-

sciousness to such a degree of completeness that it recognizes itself as the essence of the inorganic, organic, and intelligent phenomena of the world of experience. Hence it is still "self-consciousness," but more properly "rational self-consciousness."

(B) But this is only the first phase of reason, the theoretical phase; a second phase, a practical one, is inaugurated by the will. As immediate individual filled with the conviction that nature is the phenomenal manifestation of the ego, and especially that the body is a direct manifestation of it, it seeks pleasure as the harmony of the internal and external. For pleasure is this feeling of the perfect adaptation of the self to its environment,—the complete correspondence of internal and external, of desire and gratification. But here develops a contradiction: this is the attempt to produce the reality of reason by an act of the will, rather than to find it already existent, as the observing reason did. In gratifying its appetites and passions it quickly discovers that there is a limit beyond which it must not go. The principle of the "golden mean" states the law of the maximum of pleasure. But with this it becomes apparent that pleasure is not the highest principle because it contradicts itself and needs the principle of renunciation in order to make pleasure at all persistent. On this standpoint it finds a higher pleasure in promoting the pleasure of others, and thus enjoying pleasure vicariously and by such means escaping the reaction which

comes through external necessity. Hegel, as before mentioned, calls this "the law of the heart," *i. e.*, the rule of life to make others happy and thereby become happy yourself. Here it must be noticed we still have the individual as the end and aim of reason : although there is altruism in this last result, yet its aim is individual happiness, produced through the spectacle of individual happiness and the consciousness of having co-operated to that end.

But experience does not confirm this attitude of consciousness any more than it did the preceding one. The world is not adjusted to any such individualistic basis. Human institutions, at all events, are established on a different foundation. It is of no purpose for one individual to seek the pleasure of others and renounce his immediate pleasure unless all do the same. For he will behold the spectacle, not of persistence of pleasure, but rather that of pleasure as the vestibule and forecourt leading to pain, its opposite. Hence, in order to have this pleasure of the heart, or happiness, he must behold the same renunciation of immediate pleasure on the part of others ; and more than this, he must act to produce this renunciation and altruism in others. Hence the law of the heart, that it must produce happiness in others, now develops into the law that it must seek to elevate others out of the desire of pleasure. At first in the self-conceit of altruism, it had condemned the world and its institutions, because not altruistic according to its own standard. Becoming aware

of the significance of its present endeavors, it recognizes that it has arrived at a moral standpoint; it finds the law of the heart not pleasure-seeking even for others, but rather the sacrifice of pleasure within one's self and in others. This law of sacrifice it names "virtue" and becomes virtue-seeker.

In seeking virtue, it is ready to sacrifice all happiness and pleasure—in short, it is ready to sacrifice its individuality and perform its duties for their own sake. With this it comes into conflict with the course of the world (*der Weltlauf*) which prizes individuality and fosters it. Consciousness laments the depravity of the course of the world, and condemns it for not living up to the standard set for it by the virtuous individual. It rails against the men in high places, and explains the actions of rulers, priests, etc., through unworthy motives. But the course of the world goes on. It is altogether a matter of individual whim and caprice what constitutes virtue when it is opposed to the course of the world in this manner, except that it is essential that it should attack individuality.

(C) But individuality sustains itself against this attack for the reason that this conceited virtue which attacks it is based wholly on the individuality that it attacks; it sets up its individuality against the universe in the form of private judgment. But a new phase of consciousness appears now, which Hegel characterizes as "real individuality *per se*," and of which we have already spoken

before as beginning with the strange feature described as "the spiritual zoölogy and the self-deception that arises concerning the objective." For it is no longer the delirium of self-conceited private judgment that sets up its ideal standard against the universe, but it has discovered a sort of self-deception in regard to the objective—its own likes and dislikes have been imposed upon the objective. The ego has gone to the opposite of the previous extreme and now tries to find an entirely objective standard for its action and to act entirely from disinterested motives. It pretends to itself and to others that it acts not on account of any selfish interest, but solely on account of the "cause." Those who behold the deed, on the other hand, are also to judge it according to the standard of the object itself and not according to their own likes and dislikes—or at least are to make the claim to do so. This desire to be objective and the simultaneous discovery that after all subjective tendencies and capacities constantly mix with his work and also with the criticism of it, leads to the investigation of the real laws of objectivity as they affect matters of morals, art, etc. This phase, Hegel calls "law-giving reason" (*Gesetzgebende Vernunft*). Again these laws or mere maxims need testing and sifting, so that real objective laws shall be reached, and not the mere opinions of individuals.

VI. *Spirit*. This movement is, therefore, an attempt to rise from mere subjective whims and caprices to rational necessity. The result is the

discovery of the true constitution of reason, or the nature of things. Upon this is based the Ethical, properly so called. This, in contradistinction to that mere subjective virtue which was opposed to "the way of the world," is not the creation of the individual as such, but the joint product of the community which organizes its convictions in the form of institutions.

The ethical will realized in institutions is called by Hegel "Spirit" (*Geist*) in order to distinguish it from Reason, which is the individual discovery of the true and right. When this discovery is accepted by the community it founds an institution upon it and thus makes it substantial. For it no longer depends upon the individual taste or preference, but the institutions, organized aggregates, enforce on the unwilling individual a conformity to the rational laws which they affirm.

This ascent from subjective truth and individual standards of right to the organized standard of the social whole, and the view of the world which has been adopted by humanity, is the most important step in Hegel's progress on his "voyage of discovery." 1. He proceeds to unfold Spirit or "*Geist*" as this moral standard set up by the social whole and organized into institutions: first, the family, second, the State. 2. Then he considers the spiritual element of education or "culture" (*Bildung*), in which the individual is prepared for this artificial world of institutions which embody not the individual will but the will of the social whole. In order that the mere individual may put

off the "natural man" and put on the spiritual man, he must be educated to know the requirements of the general will or the social standard of right and then to make it his own by habitual practice. He thus puts on the "new man." (a) But education, since it mediates between the natural individual and the social individual, performs the office of taking the individual out of his familiar or native state of mind and making him acquainted with something that is strange and foreign to him. Hence Hegel calls education or culture (*Bildung*) the self-estranged spirit (*der sich-entfremdete Geist*.) Through self-estrangement the individual becomes ethical in the true sense. He gives up his inclination and adopts the prescribed forms. At first this is an act of obedience to an external mandate. But education gradually converts blind faith into "pure insight" (*reine Einsicht*) and the individual discovers his own rational necessity under the alien commands. In short, he finds the ethical laws reasonable, and therefore to be that which harmonizes with his own insight. He would announce these laws himself if he did not already find them announced.

Now, however, commences another subjective reaction. The consciousness has discovered that the requirements of the social order are binding upon it because they are reasonable and this at once relieves them of the form of alien constraint and reconciles them with individual freedom. The individual has reached his majority and is freed from external authority. Going over to an

extreme, he at once declares his independence of all manner of prescribed laws and sets up a court of reason as the internal tribunal before which their validity shall be tried. Whatever commends itself to his reason shall be adopted, not for its external authority, but because of its inward recognition.

(b) This revolt against all external authority Hegel calls "*Aufklärung*" clearing-up, or *eclaircissement*, or enlightenment, a word that suggests at once the French Revolution. Consciousness clears up its doubts, becomes "enlightened," turns the dependence on external guidance into self-reliance, "does its own thinking" and becomes "free thinking," as it loves to call itself.

Enlightenment throws off allegiance to prescription and gets rid of the laborious self-alienation, at a blow. It develops rapidly the consequences of this standpoint, and arrives at a revolution against the established order. It repudiates the inherited wisdom of the race and sets up its individual opinion as the measure of all things. The old order of things resists this revolt, but is overcome. Then comes the terrible dialectic of its own deficiency as a universal principle. (c) All external obedience is gone, and all subordination of the individual to the will of the social whole, for that will is precisely what enlightenment has revolted from. But what is now left to mediate between individuals? Each acts according to his own impulse and takes no care for the others. But the first result of this is that each cannot depend on the rest; each dis-

trusts the rest. Universal distrust reigns. The authority that is set up by the revolutionary party fears everything in turn and attacks it with severity. It puts to death its enemies, and then begins to suspect its friends and guillotines them, too. This is the "reign of terror" thus deduced by Hegel. Absolute freedom culminates in terror (*die absolute Freiheit und der Schrecken*).

In this chapter Hegel's thought moves in a subtle current of ideas, using the categories of "pure will," "negative relation of the will to itself," "usefulness" (as the chief category of enlightenment). The category of "usefulness," we are surprised to learn, contains the idea of the unity of thought and being. However, this becomes clear to us when we see that usefulness is the adaptation of something as means to the realization of a result beneficial to man. If all things in the world are useful; if the inorganic is useful to the plant; the plant to the animal; and both plants, animals, and the inorganic, too, useful to man, and if this is essential to their very being; then it follows that being is essentially dependent on an ultimate purpose, an ideal, and the ideal is the inward principle of being. Even if one were to say: "There is a struggle for existence and the fittest survives," he would still admit by his use of the term "fittest" that there is a real standard based in the nature of things which is the law of the totality of conditions, and when the individual thing, plant, animal, or man, conforms to this law of the being of the totality, he survives.

3. The downfall of this stage of enlightenment is the reaction from the individual again. But it is a reaction from the ethical standpoint as well as the "enlightened self-interest" standpoint. It retires within to a moral view. This view of the world is the exact opposite of that view which looked upon the world as a supreme adaptation in the form of usefulness. This moral reaction finds the world unfavorable to the virtue of the individual. Instead of prosperity, the virtuous are rewarded with the guillotine. But this moral will has the advantage over that former conceited virtue which reacted against the pleasure-seeking consciousness. It has before it the dicta of the ethical consciousness of the social whole, but notwithstanding this it does not yet fully take it up into its present view. In this instance it tends towards quietism, purism and separation from the vulgar world. Mystic piety—which, however, revels in the divine contemplation with a sort of æsthetic sensuality—cuts a sorry figure when it is brought face to face with the repenting sinner. To hold itself aloof from him is to be hard-hearted and to become wicked itself. For it must pardon the wicked who confesses his sins and repents of them. Hegel expands on this topic, for the power of negating negation which the soul possesses in that it can renounce within itself the negative or wicked deed that it has done, and hate it, gives us a wonderful glimpse of its transcendent nature. The forgiveness of the repentant elevates us above the ethical sphere to that of religion.

CHAPTER VII.

THE VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY — RELIGION.

RELIGION is the fifth general topic of the *Phenomenology* according to Hegel's division. Consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, spirit, religion, and absolute knowing are the rubrics of the entire work. But if we count the three states of consciousness, namely: (a) sensuous certitude, (b) perception, and (c) the understanding, each as a general topic, religion is the seventh. Under this seventh head he gives a succinct critical history of religion, discussing the stages of consciousness which recognize the absolute or divine, *first* in nature-religion—fetichism and the like—*second* in art-religion, and *third* in revealed religion (*Offenbare Religion*—revelate rather than “revealed”—signifying not so much that its scriptures are divinely inspired, as that they make known a revealed God whose nature is throughout an imparting and participating nature—one that makes a revelation of Himself to his creatures and does not hold Himself aloof in utter inscrutability as the pantheistic “nature-religions” teach).

1. Hegel traces the process of nature-religion with its divine in the heavenly bodies, in plants, and animals, up to the Egyptian cultus which reverentially builds eternal dwellings for the soul's

material encasing, the body. Engaged in architecture as its chief form of worship, it approaches art-religion and prepares the way for it. 2. He next traces the Greek religion, which worships the beautiful as divine, through all its stages. It learns to see the beautiful in its youth trained at the games. The national taste is perfected. Next come the sculptors and fix in stone the graceful forms—or rather the ideals of these graceful forms—ideals which live in the critical taste of the people. Then epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry form a descending scale for the Greek mind by which it descends from its portrayal of the beautiful in external form towards the description of the internal struggles of the subjective against the objective and universal. First there are serious and earnest tragedies, and, by and by, comedies that whelm the divinely beautiful world under inextinguishable laughter. Faith has been destroyed and the oracles have become dumb. The religion of the beautiful passes away.

3. Revealed (*offenbare*) religion is the religion that reveals rather than is revealed, the religion of a self-revealing God. “Through the religion of art,” says Hegel, “spirit ascends from the form of substance to that of subject, for it produces the form of the subject [or of the conscious being, man] and represents it as performing self-conscious deeds:—in the religions of feared and dreaded substance [pantheistic religions of the orient] self-consciousness is not preserved, and, in its blind faith, it does not yet recognize itself.”

“From substance to subject” is a great word with Hegel. He prized it as one of the most important statements of the aperçu which he gained in his “voyage of discovery.” It characterizes in a direct and striking manner the difference between the principle of the orient and that of the occident. Asia clings to despotic forms, because its highest principle is conceived as substance and not as subject; it conceives the absolute as a pure, empty infinite, devoid of all properties, qualities, and attributes. For it cannot discern any other alternative than finitude on the one hand or an empty infinite on the other. Europe conceives, as its idea of the highest principle, perfect form rather than perfect formlessness, perfect fulness of being, rather than perfect emptiness.

With an absolute that lacks form there can be no explanation of finitude, nor any salvation for individuality; it must all perish by absorption into the abyss of the absolute substance.

But how can any such “perfect form” be possible which is neither the absolute void nor the finite? This is the very point of Hegel’s discovery: It is pure “subject” or self-determination—the self-active, *causa sui*, that which is its own object,—this is perfect being. Perfect self-consciousness is the Absolute. It eternally knows itself and thus eternally makes itself an object, but recognizing therein itself, it elevates the object into self-activity and independence. It thus forever “returns to itself from its other.” This constitutes absolute subject: that which knows

itself as object and recognizes only itself in its object.

Subject, therefore, is essentially self-revealing, while *substance* is the negation of all others or the reduction of differences and distinctions to negative unity wherein all individuality is lost. Absolute subject makes of itself an object, and a genuine real object, not a mere seeming object. Hence it gives its own independence to its object and also its own self-activity to it. Hence the object is likewise subject. If not, the subject has not itself for an object, but only an alien object. But if the object is absolute, real subject and independent, then the self-knowledge of the absolute results in origination of independent existence and is not only knowing but also creating. Here the insight of the Scholastic theologians is verified: "*In Deo sit idem voluntas et intellectus.*" The thoughts of the Absolute are real existences.

On first consideration one would be apt to say: "If all things are only the thoughts of God then all things are perfect, for He sees Himself in them." And this is certainly a logical objection, but it does not follow out the insight to the end. God's knowledge of Himself must create one perfect being like Himself, who being creative likewise must in His knowledge of himself create another perfect being. But being generated from the First, the Second's self-knowledge involves a consciousness of this derivative origin. But to be conscious of anything is to make it objective.

The Absolute's knowledge gives independent existence to its object; hence the process of derivation becomes existence of a created world gradually rising from nothing towards absolutely perfect form.

In the Second Person all derivation has been annulled in infinite past time by the fact that perfect form is attained—pure self-determination in the form of a will that is one with the intellect. Hence the world of finitude is not the first act of the Absolute, but rather the second act, and the second act because of the recognition on the part of the Second Person of His derivation from the First Person. For it is the knowledge of derivation which creates a world of finite or derivative beings. The Second recognizes His timeless past derivation—His eternal begottenness, so to speak—and thus creates a finite but progressive world, developing from below into higher and higher forms. The second Perfect Being moreover knows His own perfection but recognizes it as the summit of a progress from pure objectivity or empty passivity, the bottom of the process of derivation, up to self-activity wherein all derivation is annulled and pure spontaneity and freedom reached. Tracing back, as it were, the derivation of Himself as a presupposed eternally past act, He perceives the First and inspires the Third, the summit of a created universe. He recognizes the Father and the Father recognizes His recognition. Thus the Third may be said to be the Procession of eternal Love, the mutual recognition of the First and Second.

In this insight the world of finitude is seen as a product of grace—for it is a free gift of independent existence where none was deserved. The imperfection attaching to finitude does not forfeit this gift of grace. Self-activity increases it (the gift of grace), for by self-activity it progresses towards the perfect form and becomes more independent and at the same time more in the likeness of the Absolute and hence more in unity with Him.

This First Principle is the goal of Hegel's Voyage of Discovery. It is seen to be the ultimate because it explains all and itself too, and needs nothing else to explain it.

This First Principle is found clearly revealed in religion. But it is not reached in the religion of substance. Only the religion of subject, or that which makes the Absolute to be subject and object of Himself—or self-conscious person, reveals this ultimate presupposition of all being and all knowing.

Hence Hegel finds in Christianity the explicit recognition of a self-revealing God and hence sees in it the religion that demands on the part of its followers not a blind faith, but an enlightened faith, in short a knowledge of God. For if God is revealed, He is to be known as well as feared. In fact, to substitute reverence for fear (as Goethe hints in the *Pedagogic Province*) there must be knowledge.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE VOYAGE OF DISCOVERY — ABSOLUTE KNOWING.

HERE is the transition to the eighth part of the *Phenomenology*, the absolute knowing. The content of the revealing (*offenbare*—self-evident) religion is the Absolute Spirit, but in so far as it gives to this the forms of the imagination, or pictures it in the fancy, it does not attain completely the adequate presentation of what it reveals. The demand of this religion of revelation is that God shall be revealed; and the Absolute can be revealed only to the adequate stage of consciousness, that namely which can think the Eternal Being in His eternal self-activity. Such a stage of thinking we found developed out of the understanding when it conceived force and law as totality—then it reached the idea of self-determination or subject-objectivity (as Fichte and Schelling called it, to name it as an activity which assumed the form of subject and object). That which is subject and object of itself is personal.

The consciousness may have before it this content in two forms—in other words it may have this Absolute Person as object in religion and also in philosophy. In religion, Hegel finds that there is a difference between the immediate expression

and the true meaning;—religion expresses this profoundest thought by means of a symbol so as to address its doctrine to the uncultured mind. A symbol has two senses, an immediate or literal sense and a figurative or spiritual meaning. “Consciousness,” in Hegel’s technical use of the term, means that form of knowing which knows its object directly and does not go behind it for a deeper signification. But “self-consciousness” technically means the knowing which reaches the ultimate truth underlying objectivity, and this truth Hegel has proved to be the absolute self-activity in the form of subject and object of itself or self-consciousness or person. This, in fact, is named the stage of self-consciousness because it penetrates the disguise of objectivity and discovers itself underneath it and hence knows itself as the truth of the object. Since religion recognizes this only symbolically or under the guise of an existence that has an immediate existence not at one with this spiritual significance, it has not yet reached the highest form of consciousness. Any difference between form and content occasions the dialectic procedure. In other words, such difference between form and content indicates an uncompleted process of adjustment, and the presence of an activity which results in change. The incomplete penetration of the material by the spiritual is the occasion of the continuance of the process of rendering the revelation more complete. The spiritual presses through the symbol towards a more complete revelation of itself—towards a

knowing which sees the pure spiritual truth directly and not through ambiguous symbols that have besides the spiritual meaning a literal meaning antagonistic to the former.

Hence Hegel concludes that besides the religious form there is a higher form of expression of the same truth — namely, the expression in pure thought.

What is this pure thought in which is to be sought a more perfect statement of truth than by means of the symbol? The answer to this question is Hegel's Logic.

A symbol cannot be a definition nor can it be dealt with syllogistically, because it does not distinguish the phases of universal, particular, and singular, and therefore does not admit of any subsumption of one term under another. The symbol confounds in one term the universal and particular. Although "when embodied in a tale the truth may enter in at lowly doors," yet it does not enter in appareled in its own native light, but disguised in a peasant's garb or hidden in a material vesture, which is not the truth itself, but something else.

But, asks the mystic, is not all language a symbol? Is not the highest and most adequate form of speech poetry, which is a conscious and professed symbol? Human consciousness answers this question in the negative, but with qualifications. The beginnings of language are symbolic. The metaphor is used at first but it soon ceases to be a metaphor because its tropical or spiritual

sense becomes the immediate sense, and the literal or material meaning is lost altogether. The word at first was a symbolic term because it had a direct sensuous import and an added spiritual one. By constant use in the symbolic sense, the immediate sensuous import fades away and the mind goes at once to the spiritual thought upon the sight of the word. The word then ceases to be a symbolic term and becomes a conventional term. The symbolic term has not a definition but a parallelism or correspondence between literal and spiritual meanings, both of which are retained as valid. Each import stands in the way of a definition of the other. "Bossuet was the eagle of eloquence"—what is the definition of "eagle" here? The definition would contain a hundred items, two of which are strength and daring and a third is high-flying or soaring. Strength and daring express abstractly their meaning without reflection from the surface of a particular object. But "soaring" has a physical meaning that has to be translated into a spiritual meaning before it can apply to eloquence. In abstract terms it implies the region of light and clearness of seeing at a single survey a multitude of details in their connection. It implies a greater degree of universality. Some persons will find the symbolic term "eagle" to express one thing and some another, but no one will be sure of the meaning of the author of the expression.

This is no harm, but rather an advantage in poetry and eloquence. In science and philosophy and theology, however, it is a disadvantage.

The question is not one of discovering a form of expression that shall take the place of all others, but rather to find all the legitimate forms of expression and not omit any, and, on the other hand, to discover in each its perfections and imperfections. To discover that the philosophic form of knowing is higher than the religious form of knowing does not signify that philosophy itself is a higher spiritual activity on the whole than religion, still less, that philosophy can be a substitute for religion, or for art, or for ethics or jurisprudence. There is the suggestion, however, that the philosophical knowing may reinforce religion, art, ethics, and jurisprudence by substituting its more adequate comprehension for the more feeble intellectual apprehensions that enter those spheres as constituent elements. To reach the insight into self-determination as underlying force and law does not imply the further disuse of sense-perception. But it does imply that the consciousness that has become self-consciousness shall in its use of sense-perception so reinforce it by thought that it shall become rational, scientific observation instead of mere animal perception. So the speculative insight into the First Principle either supports or supplants that portion of religion which involves the insight into the nature of the divine. For, notwithstanding religion provides for imperfect intellectual culture by minute prescription of ceremonial and an educated priesthood to expound the application and concrete meaning of the symbolic statements, yet even the highest religion be-

comes a "nature religion" or fetichism to the mind without intellectual education. The stage of mind that cannot think the objective essence under a higher form than "thing" will have a tendency to make fetichism out of every religious doctrine. Again, the stage of consciousness that is involved in the conception of Force (and dependence or relativity) will think the divine nature as an inscrutable, negative power which does not admit the approach of any finite beings to its purity. This is pantheism. It conceives all determination whatever—self-determination included—as finitude and evil, and the Absolute as an abstract essence pure of all distinctions whatever. The Christian theism, finally, which ascribes personality to the Absolute, can be adequately seized only by the consciousness that possesses intellectual insight into the spiritual nature of the First Principle that is presupposed by all existence—material as well as spiritual.

The doctrine that God is incomprehensible, strictly adhered to, leads to pantheism, for it denies the possibility of the revelation of God's nature to man. Certainly there can be no revelation of truth to a being incapable of comprehending it. The common form of this statement of agnosticism takes the plausible ground of the quantitative infinitude and argues that because knowing is a process of becoming—a growth from more to more—that it will always remain capable of increase; and hence that it will always remain imperfect; hence again that it can never know the Absolute, for a relative

perfection is imperfection. Were this pertinent to the question it would establish much more than the barring out of human reason from matters of religion and the annihilation of philosophy; it would of course destroy the possibility of a true religion based on a revelation of the divine.

It is fortunate, therefore, for religion as well as for philosophy that there is a knowledge of the Absolute possible. This quantitative argument of agnosticism rests upon the standpoint of the idea of divisibility, as will be seen further on in the discussion of the idea of quantity in the Logic. The agnostic theory considers that the idea of the Absolute involves completeness and totality, and therefore infinite application to details. On this definition of the Absolute the possibility of its comprehension is denied. For according to that, to comprehend a principle or being must mean the application of it to the infinite details to which it is related; to comprehend a universal term would demand that the individuals falling under the general term should each be seized in a distinct and separate thought. There is no comprehension extant according to this view of the case. No one can comprehend movement, because it is impossible to form a mental picture of each of the infinite number of points successively occupied by the moving object. It is just as impossible to comprehend the finite as the infinite according to this fantastic definition of comprehension. There is no finite that we cannot divide *ad infinitum* in thought.

But comprehension signifies, strictly speaking, the grasping together of individuals in their generic principle—the seizing of their unity in the sense of a productive energy capable of producing the multitude of individuals; it is this which gives comprehension. To comprehend means, therefore, to see a principle which contains energy and directive power. Given the creative or generic energy and the individuals are given in their indefinite multiplicity. The comprehension of one unit of space is the comprehension of all units of space, for they are all alike. It is just as easy to comprehend a mountain of sand as a bushel, or a grain. Quantitative repetition is indifferent to comprehension.

The comprehension of the Absolute implies that there shall be insight into the principle presupposed by the existence of a world of finite beings. Such a comprehension is implied in all philosophy and in all religion. Philosophy, for instance, is that kind of knowing which attempts to refer all things to one principle. If it says water, air, matter, force, or mind is the one principle, it is all the same so far as this fundamental assumption is concerned. The principle (*a* or *x*) assumed to explain the universe is asserted to be the origin whence proceeds all the variety extant. Since the origin gives rise to all, without itself being originated through another, it follows that it is assumed as a self-active principle. It produces all individuals that come to be and destroys all that perish. In the presence of such a first

principle there is no multiplicity or variety extant whose comprehension is different from that of the first principle in and for itself.

So, too, in religion in general, a supreme being is revered ; his nature is taught and learned for the sake of practical religious life as well as for religious contemplation. In the lowest form of religion the Absolute is thought to be a thing or a system of things : the sun, the moon, the thunder-bolt, or a fetich. In so far as the religious consciousness is present with it at all, there is present with it in some form the conception of a unity transcending the multiplicity of things and possessing power over them. Reflection on the power elevates the consciousness to a higher stage in which it conceives a pure force or power distinct from its manifestation in sun, moon, or thing. The thought of a unity transcending the multiplicity of things in the world is an act of comprehension, for it seizes the unity above the things and apart from which the things do not possess existence. The unity contains their explanation and thus comprehends them, and the insight into this absolute unity is an absolute comprehension. If the absolute unity conceived omitted some objects of the universe as inexplicable by the unity, then it could be said that its comprehension is incomplete. The comprehension of Ormuzd in the Persian religion is an imperfect comprehension because Ormuzd does not comprehend the total absolute, since the Absolute is a dual principle of Ormuzd-Ahriman.

Comprehension, therefore, it must be remembered, is not a movement from one to many, but a return movement from many to one through the idea of dependence and derivation. The goal reached, the dependent beings are taken up into their principle and comprehended. Any religious man will explain all things through God, and thus he assumes an all-comprehensive principle and sees its all-comprehensiveness. If it is demanded of him: "Show all the mediating steps through which the Absolute reaches each one of the parts of the universe," he will reply: "I see that the One produces these and hence these are created or derivative beings one and all, comprehended in the One. Their mediation is a relative matter and not essential to the act of comprehension, for it does not concern the supremacy of the One, but rather the establishment of many, for the effort to understand mediation is an effort to see relative unities as ultimates. It discovers that this is dependent on that and that on something else, and inasmuch as this discriminating of one phase from another is an endless process because time and space are infinitely divisible as well as infinite in extent, I perceive or comprehend its impossibility of being completed by an act of inventorying. But my perception of this impossibility as well as your perception of this impossibility likewise is an act of perfect comprehension because I see and you see the very necessary nature of all such mediation, or in other words we grasp it as a complete whole

or totality. Not merely is there one step of mediation behind this phenomenon, I know before I look to see the phenomenon that each and every phenomenon has an infinite series of steps of mediation behind it, because I know the necessary nature of all phenomena conditioned by existence in time and space. More than this, I know that the mediation with its possibility of subdivision into an infinite multiplicity of steps is likewise only one step, one immediate act of the Absolute.

If the religious consciousness is merely a passive reciprocity of the revelation concerning the divine, it may perform ceremonies and repeat formulas of words and obey implicitly all external requirements of the government of the church; but it cannot inwardly respond to any religious ideas without activity of the intellect, although the theoretical apprehension is only a part of religion.

Comprehension, then, does not refer to the detailed application of the principle to all possible individuals so much as to the insight that all possible individuals are explained by it. The insight into the geometric theorems that define the nature of a triangle is a comprehension of that figure. This comprehension of the triangle is indifferent to the repeated application that may be made of it. The ratio of the hypotenuse to the perpendiculars of a right-angled triangle is comprehended when its universality and necessity are seen and no amount of application of the truth to particular triangles can make it more or less a comprehension.

To comprehend the Absolute means, therefore, to know the necessary presupposition of the world of transitory and limited things, and to see in it an adequate reason for the origin and destiny of them.

Hegel in his *Phenomenology* finds absolute knowing to be the presupposition of all the phases of consciousness that have appeared in history. For this remarkable work is an analysis not of history direct, but of the ideas that have moved at the bottom of the historic process.

It is summed up in the following statement: The first principle of the world is found by a consistent philosophy to be a self-conscious absolute thinking being. Such a being has been revealed in the religion accepted by the civilized nations of mankind. But the process of reaching the insight into the necessity of such a first principle as well as the capacity even to conceive such a first principle when revealed implies the possibility of absolute knowing on the part of man. The first principle of the universe is an absolute knowing being; man is made in his image.

The *Phenomenology* was upon its publication called by Hegel the first part of his system, containing the justification of his method; the second part was to be the system itself, contained in his *Logic*. But in later years he came to regard his *Logic* as not requiring the *Phenomenology* as a first part. The contents of the *Phenomenology* are expanded in the third volume of the *Encyclopædia* into the philosophy of psychology, ethics, jurisprudence, art, religion, and philosophy itself.

No one can study the *Phenomenology* without being impressed with its dialectic method, and the apparent or real connection between the topics there arranged in a series. It is easy to concede that Hegel has described his own voyage of discovery in it. First by itself at the beginning giving us the psychological ladder to the standpoint of *Begriff* or *causa sui*; secondly, his historical ladder, on which he climbs up from the institution of slavery to the Christian church, and constitutional government, and to the idea of a self-revealing Absolute whose nature must be known through philosophy and logic.

CHAPTER IX.

HEGEL'S METHOD.

HEGEL'S whole "Logic" is a refutation of first immediateness and a demonstration of the completeness and perfection of that final immediateness that comes of mastering the steps of mediation and removing them. Comparing mediation to the staging which the builder uses: the foundation does not need any staging; but it is no building, only the empty possibility of a building. Then there is the process of building in which the staging has to support, piece by piece, one after the other every stone and timber that is built into the structure; this is the mediation. Finally the building is completed and the staging removed altogether, as a needless incumbrance. The building supports itself now.

Applying this comparison, any idea of the mind when first seized is lacking in its relations to other ideas and its internal relations also are not seen as yet. This is the first immediateness, the idea without any mediation. Reflection on this idea discovers one by one its relations to others and to itself; its structure is thus revealed. This act of reflection is the process of mediation—the building of the idea through the use of an external staging of other ideas. During this process the idea seems

altogether derivative and dependent on these relations. But at the close of this process we arrive at the logical necessity of thought which originates and defines all these relations. All that was loose and external like a staging is now seen to unfold from the idea and the idea becomes for us the absolute. By the word *absolute* we mean that which is no longer dependent on others, but is itself the originating cause of all its belongings.

In the ordinary idea of causality there is implied the idea of independent origination of changes and effects. A cause originates a change in something else, and this change is the effect. If the supposed cause is discovered to be only a link in a chain of influence down which the causal impulse descends to the effect it does not matter. The supposed cause has been found to be a part of the effect, that is all. The change in both the effect and in the first supposed cause is produced by a true cause somewhere beyond them. Make the chain infinite if you please and you only multiply the effect and do not dispense with the cause. In fact the necessity for a cause becomes the more manifest the larger the effect. A smallest effect requires a real cause for its change. An infinite effect requires an infinite real cause.

“Supposing that the series of effects forms a circle;” suppose that the cause A is an effect of B; the cause B an effect of C; C again an effect of D; D an effect of E; and so on to the term Z, which is the effect of A, once more. Here is a circle of effects through which the causal energy

runs and manifests its entire round of possibilities. But it is just as evident that the entire series from A to Z constitutes a chain of effects, as it was evident that the infinite regressive series is a chain of effects. The cause that moves A is a real cause; the cause that moves A, B, C, D, etc., to Z, is likewise a real cause, with a greater manifestation than that of the cause of A alone. And if we consider carefully this circular movement of causal energy we shall find self-activity or self-determination. The circle begins and ends with the term A, and A may be said to initiate a series of changes which ends with the change of A itself. Hence A causes its own change by originating a series which results in changing it. Call the series X and the process may be described thus: A initiates a change in X and the change thus originated in X causes a change in A. Thus A changes itself by means of X. Here is mediation and also absoluteness. When we consider A in its relations to X, or X in its relations to A, we have simple mediation and dependence. When we consider the whole movement we have self-relation and absoluteness. For the mediation X is traced back to A and forward to A again, and all is seen to belong to A. The mediation is the self-mediation of A.

This consideration of causality is an example of Hegel's method of refuting the pure immediate as well as the mediate and demonstrating the absolute mediation. The pure immediateness would be A, B, C, D, etc., to Z considered by themselves

and without dependence or derivation, or any kind of relation within or without. It is necessarily the attitude of the mind when it begins to consider anything and before it has discovered relations of its object to anything else. It is the first stage of the mind in childhood. This immediate unrelated being is the great first principle discovered by the childhood of the race—the Supreme Being of Hindu Pantheism and of Buddhism. Under all names which oriental imagination invents for the description of the absolute is the idea of this same empty unity—and all difference and diversity is annulled and reabsorbed into its identity. Variety of individuality is only a dream, oneness is the true reality. Human personality is as unstable as the waves of the ocean.

This absolute of the infantile thought of mankind is the starting point of Hegel's Logic. Pure being is the empty absolute. But the method of his logic is to show the impossibility of such an absolute and its inferiority even to finitude and to transient things. In conclusion he shows how all things presuppose by their imperfect and changeable reality a higher reality, a real absolute, self-active and self-determined—an Infinite Creative Reason in short.

Hence Hegel does not begin his logic with the true absolute but with its opposite, the Pantheistic absolute, and makes it the sole business of his "dialectic" to refute every possible shape under which it masquerades.

He arrives at an absolute self-activity of reason

whose form is personality instead of empty indifference or formlessness. His philosophy is the precise opposite of Pantheism. The latter begins with finite things and exhibits their unsubstantiality and nugatoriness. Proceeding thence it establishes a negative absolute which swallows up all individual beings, as the ocean swallows up its waves. Hegel begins by refuting this empty absolute as the explanation of finite things and ends by showing that the true absolute that things imply is a creative Reason whose self-consciousness is the eternal origin of distinction, difference, and individuality, which is not again swallowed up into empty indeterminateness but is permitted to grow into divine likeness through its freedom—permitted also to grow demonic and to oppose the divine order. But whether good or evil the individuality and independence is given unconditionally. This unconditional giving of independence to a creature is unthinkable on the basis of Buddhism or Brahmanism but is the true presupposition underlying European civilization, according to Hegel. Brahma or the Hindu absolute is the Pure Being of Parmenides and the first or simplest pure thought and hence the beginning of logic, but not its finality.

CHAPTER X.

HEGEL'S PURE THOUGHT—TRENDELENBURG'S OBJECTIONS.

THE Logic should begin according to Hegel with the most elementary pure thought and proceed to the highest and completest pure thought. It should begin with the simplest or first pure thought. Now, the question asked by the reader is: "What is pure thought?" The formal answer is: Pure thought is thought from which the entire content of experience has been excluded. This content may return into pure thought—that is to say, determinations may arise in pure thought—but it must never be found there as borrowed or received from experience, it must enter the system of pure thought solely because it has arisen in the self-determination of pure thought. In other words thought devoid of experience, active solely by itself and for itself, contemplating its own activity, may discover these determinations as arising within itself *à priori*, but it has no right to borrow them.

From this it is clear that the beginning of pure thought will have no predicate whatever that has arisen or can arise in experience. It will be utterly negative or indifferent as far as experience is concerned. If, however, it were the simple

opposite of experience, or to be defined merely as the negative of experience, it would imply experience just as much as not-A logically implies A.

This first thought, in which nothing is borrowed from experience, is therefore the negation of all that can be found in experience, but it does not, in its form, state such negation nor have any reference to experience. It is the first self-activity of reason affirming itself before it affirms, recognizes, or identifies anything else.

The first self-affirmation of an infant's reason would, of course, be unconscious. It would gradually arrive at consciousness through sense-perception. But sense-perception is, as I have shown in another place,* an unconscious use of the three Aristotelian logical figures in the following order—second figure, first figure, third figure. The first act of perception recognizes the object and classifies it under an already known class in the logical form called the *second figure*; it then deduces by the *first figure* whatever is already known of the class as “anticipations of perception” and verifies these by further observation. Then in the *third figure* it discovers new characteristics and divides the class into sub-classes. All this use of logical figures goes on in ordinary perception but is unconscious. When reflected upon of course it becomes conscious. In short the mind in perception moves, not from the individual

*See further on my discussion of Hegel's treatment of the three figures of Aristotle's Syllogism.

to the general, but contrariwise, by determining the general and forming sub-classes out of larger classes by the use of the third figure, in which the object of perception is the middle term.

The first act of the mind whether in animals or in men is therefore an affirmation of self but without reflection and hence without consciousness. This furnishes the first category—that of being: I am.

This simple self-assertion by which the most general category arises is not an abstraction nor a negation, but the primordial affirmation with which mind begins. It is the foundation of further perception. For all perception is a further determination or particularization of the general category—being.

All experience is of particulars—special limitations in space and time. We do not sensuously perceive the absent and the past or future, but solely the now, the present to the senses. It must be here within the scope of perception moreover, or else we do not perceive it. Here and now are points in space and time. All experience then is definite limitation of being and being itself is not the content of experience.

Now if we take away from experience all its definite contents, all the special limitations and individualizing elements, we have left pure being in general and nothing at all of experience remains. For pure being is only the pure potentiality or unlimited possibility of all perception, volition, and thought, which the Ego possesses.

The Ego is pure being as the ground of all its experience.

It is this view which makes Hegel say of Parmenides that his principle of pure being has great significance in the history of philosophy because it shows the first arrival of thought at a consciousness of itself in its purity. This view of its significance, too, leads Hegel to place pure being at the beginning of his logic as the first category. In the thought of pure being the mind frees itself from experience and seizes that thought which is the ground of experience and which makes experience possible. Now if any further determinations can be made and other categories reached by the mind itself without borrowing from experience, we may form a list of categories which underlie experience and make it possible. In other words, we may discover and formulate the mind's contribution to experience.

The mind possesses at least pure being as its own, for there is not a vestige of experience in that category—all the results of experience are negations or limitations, or particularizations of being rather than affirmations of it.

To omit the specializations of being is to omit all that is derived from experience and to have left only in our minds what is furnished *à priori* as the condition of experience. To set up being as a first principle, or to worship Brahm as the supreme principle, is to transcend all experience—the former is a philosophic act; the latter a religious act having the same import.

In order to see how Hegel develops other ideas from this single *à priori* thought of pure being we must develop in another chapter what follows when we think of pure being and at the same time reflect on the thought of this thought. We then find in our thought of being also another determination *à priori* which we can and must add to it because it is a deeper and clearer idea unfolding directly from the idea of being itself; not a determination added to it by experience, but an idea unfolded from it deductively or analytically.

Here we must protest that the ordinary meaning of deduction does not serve our purpose—nor does the word “analytically.” We might say with more truth perhaps “synthetically,” for the ideas that follow from reflecting on the pure thought of being are synthetic additions to being. It will be time enough to settle this question after we have in other chapters developed some of these ideas. Here, however, we must so far anticipate those developments as to use an example or two in order that we may consider the other side of this question of pure thought, to wit: the naming of the categories discovered.

Suppose that we grant that by thinking being we may discover *à priori* another determination, it is conceded that we must identify or recognize this second idea as one named in language and well-known and valid in the history of human thought or else our deduction will seem idle and fanciful to us. Hegel named his second category Naught (*Nichts*) and his third Becoming (*Wer-*

den). He did not invent new names for the thoughts which he saw originate from the thought of being. He recognized or identified these thoughts as those which experience had been using before. He used the names already familiar to experience in naming these ideas.

It must be evident that Hegel in this logic of pure thought cannot suppose himself to repudiate, altogether, experience. For he identifies these products of his dialectic, these pure thought categories, as the same with ideas long in use by the mind in its experience, and accordingly he gives them the old names being, nothing, becoming, quality, quantity, etc.

This naming proves that Hegel understands his logic to have two parallel lines of thought. One reflects upon the pure thought and discerns the determination implicit in being; the second line of thought compares this new determination with experience and discovers its identity with some category already used and named. Deriving thus the names of his dialectically discovered categories he shows the practical application of his logic to clearing up the problems of experience.

Thus there is a line of *à priori* thinking and a line of *à posteriori* thinking combined in one, in the logic. This has been taken for granted by Hegel without explicit mention. But the acutest critics of Hegel, like Trendelenburg, make much ado over the discovery of this empirical element as though it entirely invalidated Hegel's claim to proceed by pure thought. Where did Hegel

obtain these ideas of being, becoming, quality, etc., but from experience or else how does he apply to them these familiar names? Still more, how is it that he uses all such familiar terms as *process*, *movement*, *relation*, *sameness*, *difference*, etc.? He evidently presupposes them as well known, and yet speaks of his system as not presupposing anything. Is being a "presuppositionless beginning" when his logic assumes all these ideas as well known in order to describe its dialectic?

If a science of pure thought were to originate its language it would indeed be "presuppositionless" with a vengeance! Hegel did not anticipate such a misunderstanding of his views as Trendelenburg betrays by his criticism.

As philosophy undertakes to explain what is given in experience by deducing it from a necessary idea, it must present the ideas in two forms: (a) as they occur in ordinary knowledge (b) as they develop logically from pure thought. The names are of course found in ordinary knowledge. Moreover the ideas of ordinary knowledge are used constantly as predicates to describe what is recognized in the pure thought. Hegel recognizes a determination of pure thought as a "process" or "activity" or "becoming" or "quality" and describes it by those words. His dialectic is a perception of the logical presuppositions implied in a category of pure thought and the recognition of them as the same categories that had been functioning in experience before. The marshaling of experience and its categories is of course taken for

granted. The *à priori* deduction of categories would have no meaning without this. The logic of pure thought deduces the logical genesis of what had before existed in ordinary knowledge. By this, logic demonstrates its utility. It shows itself as the Science of Knowledge. Omit all identifications of dialectic results with the results of experience and ordinary knowledge, and the explanation explains nothing to anybody. Moreover it is impossible to teach such a logic to others because it would not translate any of its ideas into common ideas or into words current among men; any words it used to describe its pure thought with, would imply the ideas and words of ordinary knowledge. But according to Trendelenburg this would be inconsistent with the Hegelian claim to a dialectic of pure thought which proceeds without presuppositions. Hegel never foresaw this objection. Had he done so he would have taken pains to show wherein his method used both pure thought and empirical results—finding the former in the nature of thought itself as purely *à priori*, and borrowing the other from ordinary knowledge for purposes of comparison, analysis, and identification with the results of pure thought.

One should be very careful however to avoid the error of supposing that the expression “in experience” means “from experience” and that to find an idea in experience proves that the idea is derived from experience, or from external perception. On the contrary, all the ideas of pure thought enter experience from pure thought

alone. They are furnished to experience by the unconscious activity of the mind during sense-perception and subsequent reflection.

The Hegelian logic thus has for its problem the explanation of that part of ordinary knowledge unconsciously added to it by the activity of thought itself.

To sum up this chapter :

1. There is at least one category of pure thought, namely, Pure Being.

2. Hegel's logic proposes to show that there is a system of more determinate pure thoughts logically flowing from reflection on being and the activity of thought implied in thinking it.

3. Such deduction in pure thought of new determinations is accompanied by comparison with experience and common knowledge with a view to identify the ideas of pure thought with ideas previously known and named in experience.

4. Trendelenburg's criticism of Hegel's use of ordinary ideas and names as predicates of his pure-thought results is not justified ; because such use does not prove that the pure-thought results are borrowed from common knowledge but only that pure thought deduces and thereby explains the ideas that are found in such ordinary knowledge.

5. To be found *in* experience does not prove derivation *from* experience. All that can be deduced from pure thought must have come into experience from pure thought and its unconscious action in sense-perception.

Next we must inquire what Hegel's logic knows

in advance of its final result—whether Hegel blindly followed his method until it resulted in the last category, the Absolute Idea (*die absolute Idee*), or whether he obtained an insight into this highest category as the absolute first principle and then by its light discovered the inferior categories and the dialectic that exhibits their defects, refutes them, and shows the deeper ideas that underlie them.

CHAPTER XI.

THE THREE CATEGORIES OF HEGEL'S LOGIC, AN OUTLINE OF PURE THOUGHT.

THE three parts of Hegel's Logic treat respectively of Being, Essence, and Idea (*Seyn*, *Wesen*, and *Idee*), these being the three fundamental categories of all knowledge and of all existence. Being includes as sub-categories (a) quality, (b) quantity, and (c) measure (*Maass*) together with their subordinate modifications. Essence includes (a) Ground (*Grund*) or the categories of reflection ; (b) Phenomenality (*Die Erscheinung*) ; (c) Actuality (*Die Wirklichkeit*). Each of these has subordinate categories. Under Phenomenality come the important ideas of Force and Law, while under Actuality come the more important ideas of Substance and Cause. Idea (*Begriff* or Notion) includes (a) subjectivity, (b) objectivity, and (c) The Idea.

Briefly characterized, the category of Being includes all those categories which lack mediation, or, rather, the expression of mediation. They especially do not express self-activity nor dependence on others, no matter how much they may imply these ideas as presuppositions. Though the thinking of them is seen to involve in the first place the idea of dependence and secondly upon a

complete view the idea of self-activity to make them possible, yet this mediation is all suppressed and no consciousness of these ideas belongs to the stage of thinking whose highest category is Being.

The category of Essence expresses reciprocal relation of dependence and ground. Something depends on something else and is only through the latter, while the latter supports the former and by this act of support of the dependent expresses itself or reveals itself. The phenomenal depends on the noumenal for its being while the noumenal depends on the phenomenal for its expression or manifestation. The cause uses the effect to manifest its own energy; the effect depends on the cause for its being. In the very names of these categories of essence mediation is expressly pointed out; just as for example the word *positive* points expressly towards *negative*.

This category of mediation (essence) has, in Hegel's mode of expression, "arisen from being as its truth," that is to say it has been found that the thinking of being involves mediation. Pure thought cannot think being without seeing the mediation that necessarily attaches to it. Ordinary consciousness is oblivious of the subtle constructive process of mind that generates the ideas of pure thought and furnishes them to experience. We know objects of experience but we do not see the mental processes which render experience possible and constitute as it were the very forms of thinking itself. But Hegel's logic is to show all

this thought process behind the ideas and exhibit the *à priori* synthesis by which we generate all these ideas *seriatim*, beginning with the most general (or extensive) and rising to the most concrete (intensive)—in fact rising from the idea of being to that of person.

Mediation is “the truth” of immediateness because it is that which makes immediateness possible. The cause is the truth of the effect because it makes the effect possible. A mere effect is to us unthinkable without a cause. The cause on the other hand, though it implies an effect for its manifestation does not imply an effect as the ground of its being. We can think the cause by itself as self-related—as the origination of energy—hence as *causa sui* (an expression which means self-determination)—the *causa sui* is the author or creator of its manifestations and does not need to borrow other things for a field on which to manifest itself.

Being cannot be without mediation. Being is a phase of mediation. A phase is a part—not the whole—of a process. We shall see that being is that phase of the process of mediation where its self-relation is restored—this is the discovery that leads us out of the categories of being into those of essence. With this insight we can never more use a category of being without seeing at once the hidden mediation involved—that mediation is no longer “hidden” to us. Thereafter we think all categories as mediated and all categories to us are categories of essence.

It is a great mistake to suppose that Hegel deduces categories in his logic and after defining them "leaves them as valid in their sphere." It should rather be said that he explodes "their sphere" and proves that each and all of these categories of being are partial phases, inadequate thoughts of what they attempt to comprehend. We may use those categories after we gain this insight into the dialectic of being, but we never suppose them to be adequate—we always add to them in thought what we perceive them to lack. In brief we translate them into categories of essence.

A ready illustration of this difference between the mind under the illusion of being and the disillusioned mind that has arrived at the thought of essence may be drawn from the religious phases of consciousness. The unilluminated mind supposes that rocks, trees, houses, planets, suns, are all not only real but self-existent objects. He thinks in the category of being. The immediate is the true reality for him. But suppose that he happens to rise to the standpoint of the religion of East India, or to that of the Buddhistic, which is the same thing as regards the adoption of the standpoint of essence.

There are many forms of this doctrine current among us at this time besides "theosophy" and the various modifications of mysticism which prevail. There is for example the scientific doctrine of the correlation of forces or the persistence of energy, which explains all things as manifestations

of forces and all forces as manifestations of one ultimate persistent force. It is true that some who hold the doctrine of the correlation of forces still hold on to the doctrine of the persistence of matter also. In doing this they still hold to the validity of the category of being although they have adopted also the category of essence. Matter is immediate being to those minds; force is mediation. The category of mediation includes and transcends that of being and does not need it for the explanation of anything. Mediation produces the sub-categories of being as its phases. So, too, persistent force in its ceaseless play of special forces (heat, light, gravitation, cohesion, etc.) produces the special equilibria of force which we call things. A thing is a system of forces in static equilibrium, or since no things are perfectly static, but even the most enduring of things are in a process of change, we may say that things are temporary or transient equilibria of forces.

Analyze the make-up of a thing and we find only tensions of force—its hardness, its weight, its shape, its color—in short all its properties are manifestations of different forces.

When one thinks in the category of being he supposes matter to be the true reality and therefore tries to explain force as a “property” of matter. Underneath things he imagines smaller things of which they are composed. For him atoms or small particles constitute the ultimate reality of all, and all the differences that we discover among beings are thus explained by composi-

tion or combination and arrangement. The true beings are the atoms, but the things as we see them are merely the aggregations and combinations of these atoms, and hence not the true beings, for we cannot perceive atoms by any of our senses.

But the standpoint of persistent force and correlation, when thoroughly understood, dispenses altogether with the use of the category of thing and we no longer need atoms to explain things. For what is an atom but a centre of forces? Things great or small are only centres of forces in equilibrium. Now stop for a moment and use this new category (force) just as pure thought uses the category of essence in place of being. When we see things and beings of any sort we do not attribute to them immediate reality any longer, we look behind them to the forces that originate and sustain them. To us things are no longer immediate independent realities but only appearances, only dependent results, only phenomena. They are manifestations of energies hidden behind them. Or more correctly spoken they are the appearances of forces *revealed in* them and not *hidden by* them.

When we have the habit formed of regarding all immediate things as phenomenal manifestations of force rather than as independent things or material units, we have become used to the categories of essence and have dispensed with the categories of being.

Again recalling the standpoint of Buddhism or

that of Brahminism: All things of this world are looked upon as illusory appearances—as dreams of the soul. The true reality is called Brahma, or Vishnu, or Purusha, or by some other name signifying the formless essence or the abstract sameness that underlies all particular individuals. Emerson's *Brahma* is the pure essence that is one in all beings.

“ They reckon ill who leave me out ;
 When me they fly I am the wings,
 I am the doubter and the doubt,
 And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.”

All differences are superficial and illusory.

“ If the red slayer thinks he slays,
 Or he the slain thinks he is slain,
 They know not well the subtle ways
 I keep and pass and turn again.”

Let a person come out of the “common sense” that dwells in the secure possession of material things as the sole and ultimate reality, to the “theosophic” standpoint which affirms the ultimate principle to be a formless, negative Might swallowing up all particular existences and he sees the world differently. All things somehow reveal to him their side of unsubstantiality and they all look transient and evanescent. They do not abide, they merely pass incessantly from one form to another. All things flow or become, said Heraclitus, nothing abides. Here immediateness is denied and mediation is asserted as the true category.

Turning from these illustrations, which show how familiar this category of essence has become in our time, let us remark here that Hegel's logic shows us the various phases of the category of Being and the necessary transition out of it to the category of essence, thereby explaining this mystery of two opposed theories (a) that of matter and the static opposed to (b) the dynamic or the doctrine of force.

Just as necessary is the precedence of the higher category of self-activity over the category of essence. Hegel's third great category is Idea. By this he means completed self-activity, or the self-activity that has transcended the form of (a) plant life or assimilation, (b) animal life, or feeling and locomotion, (c) thinking and willing as separate phases of rationality. All these (*a, b, c,*) are ascending phases of imperfect Idea or self-activity, but perfect or completed self-activity has reached absoluteness in which the will and intellect have become one (an insight found also in scholastic theology) so that the idea thinks itself and its thinking is willing in such a manner that its thinking and willing are creative, and hence the absolute Idea is the personal God of theism. He knows Himself, and as conscious of Himself makes Himself an object or a not-me, which is at the same time a me—another me, the Logos or “Eternally begotten Son.” His recognition of this other me as Himself, and their mutual recognition bring unity again and we have the doctrine of the Trinity complete.

Under this third and final category everything is regarded as a revelation of a creator. Under the second category everything is regarded as a manifestation or appearance of a blind force or energy and as having no substantiality. Each thing is a phenomenon and not a noumenon. With the insight into self-activity as the origin of all, each thing is seen in the light of a purpose or final cause. Each thing arises in the course of divine self-knowledge and is a step in the revelation of God. God's independence and self-existence demand independence and self-existence in the creatures that reveal Him, and hence the world of things now seems to us when looked at through this highest category as a progressive revelation of self-activity through increasing independence and self-activity. Plant, animal, and man are three steps in this revelation of divine freedom and independent self-activity, in finite freedom and self-activity.

All categories of essence are taken up as phases of the higher category of self-activity and such categories are no longer used in their old meaning.

In this chapter the three great categories have been described rather than defined, and some attempt has been made to show how the category of Essence arises from the category of Being as a necessity of thought. The necessity of the category of Idea as the explanation of the category of essence must be reserved for the next chapter.

CHAPTER XII.

HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE AS THE TRUE BEGINNING OF HIS SYSTEM.

IT is evident from the foregoing discussion of the nature of pure thought and its three chief categories, Being, Essence, and Idea, that the true beginning of Hegel's system is with idea or self-activity. But we are told that there are three beginnings to a system of philosophy. There is a subjective beginning which begins with the lowest stage of consciousness, the mere certitude of sense-perception, and by the use of philosophical method climbs to the ultimate presuppositions of knowledge and discovers the first principle. This is the phenomenology of spirit. Then there is an ontological beginning with the emptiest category of experience, namely, pure being, which investigates also, like the former, the totality of its conditions—in other words it ascends from being to absolute self-activity. In the latter it finds the condition necessary to the former. In these two beginnings we perceive that the most inadequate is the first, while the most adequate is the last. Sense-perception is the crudest and least conscious form of knowing—that form which knows least about itself and understands the least about its presuppositions. Empty being also is least ade-

quate of all categories to explain the origin of finite things with their infinite variety, the least adequate to explain creative and destructive activities in the world. In both cases we leave or set out from that which is unable to explain itself and arrive at that which explains not only itself but also the inadequate knowing or being with which we began. Hence the third beginning is self-activity, which is the ground of its own existence and also of all dependent existence. The knowing also which recognizes self-activity as the ultimate first principle is also the highest form of knowing because it comprehends its method and sees how the lower forms of knowing perish through lack of the power of reflection on the method of their procedures. There is a discrepancy between their results and their method.

When pure thought sees that pure self-activity is mind, it sees that the absolute being and the absolute knowing are one. This is Hegel's famous "assumption," so-called, that being and thought are one and hence the evolution of pure thought is the evolution of the necessary conditions of being. But as ordinarily understood nothing could be farther from Hegel's meaning as the following may show.

Hegel's real beginning is with this principle of self-activity as mind. Mind is the fundamental ground of all objective being and of all subjective consciousness. Schelling's two poles of nature and finite mind rested on the point of indifference or identity, which is absolute mind. Absolute mind

according to this is the absolute being. Its thought is creative and gives rise to the world of nature and the world of spirits.

Before Hegel could form his philosophical system he must have arrived at this insight. Until one sees the necessity of a deeper principle he does not seek a road that leads from the knowledge already possessed to a knowledge beyond it. Still less could Hegel have started in his phenomenology with the right method unless he had already discovered his highest principle. Nor could he have written his logic unless he had already gained possession of the final thought which explains all the others. He could not find the dialectic of being except by placing the inadequate thought, which uses the categories of being as if they were true and valid, under the light of the final thought. He tells us himself that his phenomenology is an application of the true method to consciousness and its contents.

After Hegel had found his first principle by his own gropings, and especially by the study of Greek philosophy in connection with the Kantian philosophy, his first work was to retrace his steps and bring them to consciousness in his great work on *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. He could now by the aid of his first principle show up the dialectic movement in the inadequate and thus write out a demonstration or proof of his highest principle. A principle is proved when it is shown to be necessary in order to explain other things.

The peculiarity of Hegel's first principle, which

must be noted above all else, is the fact that his principle is also a method. For his principle is an absolute energy ; its very essence is activity ; hence it is an eternal procedure. Hegel's insight recognizes the truth of Aristotle's doctrine that the highest and most perfect being is a purely active reason. The form of self-activity is method. Hegel's *Idee* is principle and method in one. This is better understood through the scholastic doctrine that in God intellect and will are one. If so, God's self-knowing is a self-willing and the divine thinking is creative. The self-knowing of the divine reason generates the eternally begotten Word.

We see that Hegel's doctrine that thought and being are one is intended in the same sense as the theological doctrine that the world is created by the Eternal Word.

In the previous chapter we saw how the second of the three great categories arose from the first—namely, how essence supplanted being. One question now remains : How does essence give place to idea or self-activity as its higher and completer condition ?

The sub-categories of essence mentioned in the previous chapter are ground, phenomenon and actuality. These names do not express the salient thought of essence. The first of these, ground, explains difference and identity by the ideas of form and content. The second (phenomenon) explains form and content by the idea of force and manifestation. Force is an internal whose essence

it is to become external. But force and manifestation are explained by the deeper and more adequate idea of cause and effect. Causality is the chief idea of the third part of essence, which treats of actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). Consequently causality is the most important idea within the compass of the category of essence, and indeed within the whole logic thus far.

With the idea of cause we reach a fundamental reality, a true actuality. Mere existence is effect only, in so far as it is composed of things. Things are manifestations of forces and are hence phenomenal and not absolute, not independent. So, too, forces are not final realities though they are phases of energy. Each force depends on other forces for its occasion or incitement to act as well as for the guidance of its action. Hence force is dependent on a higher unity and is not a true "actuality." But with the idea of cause we conceive the actuality, or, as we prefer to name it, "ultimate reality," because we think a cause as that which can of itself originate movement and determination. The cause is that which is in its very nature self-separating. Hence, too, the idea of cause involves the idea of action on itself or self-activity as the necessary condition of its action on another. It separates influence or determining power from itself and transfers it to another, the effect.

With this thought we leave the realm of the category of essence altogether, and arrive at that of self-activity, or as Hegel calls it *Begriff* and *Idee*. The transition is made through the

thought of *causa sui* as the idea implicit in cause. Causality as a category of essence implies a duality of cause and effect as independent entities. But it is first seen that effect is correlative to cause, and dependent on cause for its existence. Next it is seen that cause is correlative to effect, but not dependent on an external effect. The cause necessarily is active, but as it originates its action by self-determination it contains within itself the whole sphere of correlation and is cause and effect in one. This is what Spinoza meant by the phrase *causa sui*. The phrase expresses happily the arrival at the idea of self-activity through a contemplation of the category of causality. It is an insight that transcends the sphere of the categories of essence. This *causa sui* is in this respect equivalent to "Begriff," as Hegel uses it, or to "self-activity" as used in this volume.

In another place we shall consider more in detail the devices resorted to by reflection to conceal or postpone the thought of self-activity implicit in causality—such devices for example as an infinite regress of causes such as Kant himself is concerned with in his third antinomy (already mentioned in chapter second). But we will now take up in a new chapter the consideration of the inner nature of this self-activity as furnishing us the sub-categories of universality, particularity and individuality.

CHAPTER XIII.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S "BEGRIFF" OR NOTION AS SELF-ACTIVITY:—UNIVERSAL, PARTICULAR, AND SINGULAR.

IF we consider the idea of self-activity we see that it is a unity of two distinctions in an idea of energy. There is the self, the subject which is the as yet indefinite possibility. The self is the possibility of all forms and yet is formless, so far as realization is concerned. Moreover, the self is an energy which can determine itself, it is self-active. That which is formless but the capacity for all forms—that which is an energy to determine itself in all forms—is the universal.

For the universal is the same as the individuals that are subsumed under it, except in non-essential details, or further determinations which distinguish one individual from another. These distinguishing and excluding determinations which make the universal an individual are entirely suppressed. The self-active as self, therefore, is universality, the general or generic.

Again the self-active determines itself and thus it is determined as well as determining. It is passive as well as active. As passive it is opposed to the active and distinguished from it; thus there

is division and mutual limitation and finitude; this is the realm of particularity opposed to universality. Particularity involves division and exclusion, the part contrasted with the whole. It is some as opposed to all. Self-activity therefore involves particularity as well as universality. Moreover it involves individuality, as we shall now see.

The determinations of particularity proceed from the self-determining energy of the universal. This energy reveals its nature, so to speak, in the determinations of the particular, just as cause reveals itself in its effects. The energy reveals itself in its activity of determining and hence each determination that is already realized, in so far as passive, contradicts the universal; in so far as the particular is self-active it continues to reveal the universal and is in harmony with it. In so far as the particular is passive, the self-activity of the universal annuls it and replaces it by another determination. In this the universal reveals its freedom because it restores its general possibility of determinations by unfixing and annulling particular determinations already realized. Such annulling activity is a return to universality, for it negates the differences and distinctions, abolishing the limitations of realized determinations and restoring possibility and energy in place of dead results and passive effects. This is individuality, for it is the manifestation of one indivisible energy as producing effects and taking them back into itself. No determination gets realized in the particularity that the producing energy cannot

modify, or replace altogether, thereby revealing its freedom. A free being is a being that is universal and can descend into particularity and at the same time return out of it. In other words, the free being is formless in so far as subject or self, which is the possibility of all determinations but not their reality, though it is the power that can produce them. Moreover, the free being manifests its freedom in two ways: first, by realizing its potential determinations; secondly, by annulling them and restoring its general potentiality or formlessness. A unit which arises from annulling multiplicity is called by Hegel a negative unity (*negative Einheit*). Such a unit is the individual or singular.

Hegel's preternatural acuteness of discrimination and identification is fully exemplified in the chapter on "Begriff" which opens the third part of his logic. He is able to see this whole process of the individual as return to the universal out of the particular, even in the ordinary experience which perceives particulars and recognizes classes. To understand this let us note first that the limitations which make the particular what it is are manifestations of the energy of the universal in its action of self-determination. At all events, those limitations by which one particular excludes others are manifestations of causal energy. The independence of the object is sustained by this power of causal energy and at the same time each is limited, or to that extent annulled, by the power of other particulars.

Thus the energy in the particulars is a sustaining and an annulling power and each particular is sustained and annulled. In this is seen the universal, which is general possibility and the energy to realize it and also to emancipate itself from such realization or particularization.

This may be seen more clearly perhaps by considering all things as realities, but with spheres of possibility. Each thing is really what it is, but also it is the possibility of many other things. A piece of wood of a given shape is what it is, but it is also the possibility of an arrow or a bow or a chair or whatever may be made of it—or also the possibility of ashes and gases to which fire may reduce it; or of vegetable mould, to which the air and moisture will reduce it. Water is liquid or solid (as ice) or vapor—when one of these states is real the others are potential. Now, if we regard the potential states as producing an effect of change on the thing we shall have a process with two factors—one, the real, which is in reciprocal relation with the environment, and the other factor the potentiality which continually acts to remove or modify the real and to become real in the place of what is already realized. The product of these two factors is the true actuality. What we ordinarily call the real is only the one phase of it. It requires the whole process of positing the real and removing it to reveal the true actuality.

We have seen that if we analyze the idea of self-activity we find that it is a unity of two distinc-

tions in one. The idea of energy unites within it two contrary or opposed ideas. First, there is the self, which acts, and second, the object or result of the action, for the self acts upon the self. Hence there is the distinction of active and passive in this idea of original energy. Moreover, the self as active and not yet passive is the possibility of the determinations or modifications which will arise through the activity, but have not yet arisen. The object or result of the activity on the other hand is the reality or actuality of the determinations that were possible in the self or subject of the activity. This analysis is probably the course of thought which Aristotle was led to in reflecting upon Plato's self-moved ideas. He noted the antithesis of subject and object in a self-activity or energy and thus derived the ideas of potentiality, form, efficient cause, and final cause. For they are all involved in that of self-activity or energy. Aristotle had to push beyond the idea of mere causality as such to the idea of original cause, or independent origin of activity, before he could find a first principle. Plato had taught him this, that all ultimates, whether one, or many in one, are such self-activities, called by him "ideas." "Idea" meant form with the implication of self-formation. Plato apotheosized final cause or purpose in the idea of the Good.

Analyzing self-activity, we discover, like Aristotle, first the self before or apart from the activity. Then it is the mere potentiality or possibility of forms or modifications which it may take on

through action. It is the possibility of all forms and yet it is formless, so far as contrasted with the realization. This phase Aristotle calls matter ($\beta\lambda\eta$) because it is that which is *to be* determined by the action and is to receive a form. He called it also potentiality ($\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$) because it is the power of or rather the capacity for such determining—the vague possibility of all determination.

Hegel calls this phase universality (*Allgemeinheit*) including Aristotle's matter and potentiality in one thought. For the universal is the as yet formless, or unformed, unparticularized matter, while it is also a power of determination. For example, we see in a living being a universal in that it is reproductive—an acorn reproduces itself through the process of growth into an oak and its fruitage; thus a single acorn becomes many or a species. An animal not only reproduces its species but as sensitive and volitional it determines itself within, by making itself object. In sense-perception the self reproduces within itself its environment, that is to say, it images it or represents it. It does not receive its environment, but it makes a model or picture of it, so to speak, within itself—it mimics or imitates it and thus becomes its own environment; or in other words, its environment is its thought or idea. In self-consciousness the ego or self is subject and likewise object, thus repeating itself. Here is the perfection of the universal—the ego finding itself under all that it thinks. It finds an object as an effect and thinks the presupposition of this object, that is to say, it thinks the

cause presupposed by this effect. To think the cause is to think the originating energy, the self of the object. Thus all thinking is a process in which the self finds the self again—the living energy contemplates the living energy under the object.

This illustration of the universal or generic in (a) its forms of reproduction of species (life) ; (b) reproduction of environment by mimetic action (feeling and sense perception) ; (c) reproduction of self as the essence of the object (self-conscious thought) may serve to orient us in this very abstract discussion. It may show us the path of Aristotle on his way from the idea of movement in space to the idea of energy as the unmoved source of motion. And it certainly is Hegel's path from essence (*Wesen*) to Idea (*Idee*).

Philosophy comes at one bound from the dependent to the independent : from the determined through others to the self-determined. It is easy to see that independent being must be self-determined. But it takes much skill in pure thought to recognize what is contained under the form of self-determination. "The determined through others" is easily identified as including all dependent being—all being with an environment of other being—everything that is conditioned by what is not itself. Hence everything in space is dependent. But what can be found in our experience that comes under the definition of self-determined or independent ? Plato at a single leap identifies life and thought with it. In the *Laws*

(X. 895) he calls self-motion (*i. e.* self-activity) "the origin and beginning of motion, the eldest and mightiest principle of change," and asks: "If I were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound—what should I say that the power is?" The reply follows: "I should call the self-moving power life and whenever we see the soul in anything we must admit that this too is life." And again (X. 896) "The soul as being the source of motion has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of things" (Jowett, IV. 408).

Aristotle after prudently discriminating the first mover from all manner of movement and defining it as a causal energy (*Metaph.* XII. 6) finds it to have the highest and most perfect form of activity such as we find in pure thought (*θεωρεῖν*). This is thought which thinks pure ideas—ideas purely *à priori* or without elements derived from experience.

When the mind thinks pure ideas, it thinks its own determinations (or forms). This activity is with us intermittent; but in the first mover, Himself not moved, but moving all things that are moved, this pure thought activity "is uninterrupted and eternal, for this is God," says Aristotle (*Met.* XII. 7). Such activity of pure thought is called also Reason (*νοῦς*) by Aristotle in his *Psychology* (*περὶ ψυχῆς* III. 4, 5). It is according to him the active principle in life, sensation, memory, and thought. In so far as these activities lack

perfect independence—being partially conversant with outside material (such as food for the body, things and events as objects to perceive, remember and reflect upon) the reason is called passive reason (*νοῦς παθητικός*).

This passive reason is transient or perishable (*φθαρτός*) or rather these faculties are perishable. This is, however, not because the soul perishes, but rather for the reason that the soul outgrows them. For it ascends towards the higher activity, that of pure thought. The self-activity involved in life by living prepares itself for sensation and locomotion; by sensation and locomotion it prepares itself for thinking and willing; by thinking and willing it reaches pure thought wherein knowledge and will are one. In thinking pure thought, the will creates the object, and hence knowing and willing become identical.

Thus in ascending above sense-perception and memory the soul dispenses with their activity, having more adequate forms of knowing; through disuse those faculties dwindle and finally perish. Insight is better than memory. To see a causal principle is better than to be obliged to retain all the details that follow as its results.

The study of the nature of pure thought in which thinking-subject and thought-object are the same, has led philosophers to the idea of God.

The student of Hegel finds this to be the clue to the thought in the concluding portion (Part III.) of his *Logic*. First, he treats of *Begriff* or self-activity—*causa sui*—which is the thought reached

at the end of the second portion (Part II. *Wesen*). This *Begriff* as self-activity is possibility of all determination, the universal; as active determiner opposed to passive possibility of being determined, it is cause (*causa efficiens*) opposed to matter (*causa materialis*) and this duality is particularity. Thirdly, it is individual or singular when considered as annulling this opposition or antithesis of active subject and passive object by transfer of energy from subject to object so that the object becomes self-active.

This becoming of individuality is perhaps Hegel's greatest and most original insight. The idea of *substantie separatæ* indeed belonged to Plato and Aristotle, and to the Schoolmen, but its relation to the universal and particular was not seen so perfectly as Hegel saw it. The basis of the universal is a negative act, but a negative act returning upon itself. This Hegel discusses at length under the head of "Reflexion" at the beginning of the second volume of the *Logic*, treating of "*Wesen*" or Essence. A self-related negative has two phases, one of identity and one of difference, all in the same act. For in the first place the relation of the negative to itself, since it is that of the same to the same, is one of identity. But since it is an activity of negating, it negates itself in relating to itself, and thus produces difference and becomes another to itself.

This no doubt seems at first, fine-spun and perhaps only a verbal quibble, but when the thinker gets familiar with the subject and learns to hold

the idea of pure activity firmly in his thought, by itself—when he learns to analyze its phases into form and content and to see their interaction (how the form determines the content, and *vice versa*) he will see the solution which Hegel has prepared for this question of the rise of individuality out of self-determination.

The doctrine of Reflexion as treated by Hegel explains all the dual or complementary categories, such as identity and difference, essence and phenomenon, force and manifestation, cause and effect. It shows how mind puts one phase (the content or identity-phase) for one of the complementary terms, and the other phase (the phase of form or difference) for the other of the complementary terms. The old distinction between the Understanding and the Reason is found here. The understanding does not see that the two phases are halves of the same act, while the reason on the other hand, recognizes their identity. Hence the understanding (or the “mere human intellect”) cannot see spiritual or divine truths, while the reason is the “mind illuminated by wisdom.”

To illustrate this further: cause is regarded as active and producing difference (or form) on another. Effect is the identity or content, the passive. But looked at more closely we see that the idea of cause involves self-activity, and that it contains an effect already. For before it can send an influence to another it must separate it from itself. Hence it is *causa sui*. It is in itself difference or

separation from itself, self-negative. In producing identity, or passive being, or effect devoid of activity, the cause loses its energy and becomes its opposite. Hence difference is produced instead of identity. Hence its very act of identity is an act of difference. Content becomes form. But in producing difference it duplicates itself as a negative act and thus arrives at its identity again. The form becomes content.

The discovery of this continuous alternation of identity and difference is called in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (as we have already seen in chapter IV.) the "attraction of the heteronymous" and the "repulsion of the homonymous," and it is the transition from "force" as the supreme category of the understanding, to "self-consciousness" as the category of the reason.

It is the idea of vitality and consciousness, as the perpetual production of itself and the perpetual becoming other to itself. This is the basis of mind which is always a self-object, and always identifying itself in its object.

Individuality as the third category resulting from the universal and the particular is simply the identity developing from the difference—the return of particularity to the simplicity of the universal. The individual is an identity pervading its own differences; all its differences are its own act and all are its distinctions from itself; but it can annul any one of these differences. But its very act of negating a difference is at the same time the production of a difference. The difference an-

nulled is the *content*; the difference that arises through the act of annulment is a difference of *form*.

This insight Hegel must have reached before he wrote any of his *Logic*, or indeed before he wrote any of his *Phenomenology*. Because it is the essence of his dialectic method. He traces a difference that disappears in the content to a difference that appears coetaneously in the form.

The dialectic of Being, Naught, and Becoming, in the first chapter of the *Logic*, is to be seen only by applying this insight to the ultimate abstraction of pure thought.

Being as content is pure identity, but as form it is pure self-related negativity. The thinking which thinks it negates all content, and then contemplates this act of pure negation as its content or object. The second act of contemplation of the negation as object called "being" is self-contradictory, because it determines what has been defined as indeterminate or "pure being." Any contrast is determination, and to make an object of a thought is to determine it. Thus the content (pure being) is contradicted by the form (object over against subject). Hence being as object requires to be abstracted from or negated, in order to correct the determination of the object. Universal negation, or naught is the correction which we try to substitute for the object "pure being." But the substitution avails nothing; for as soon as made the object of thought it is determined and is not what is wanted.

As the doctrine of "reflexion" has taught Hegel to hold both form and content before him and not lose the one while holding the other, he sees clearly that Being and Naught are impossible as objects of thought or as existences (for actual existence demands contradistinction just as the object in thought demands it). What is really thought is only the instant annulment of the one through the other, and this thought is that of becoming, which we will consider further in another chapter.

CHAPTER XIV.

DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY). BEING.

LOOKING for the simplest thought, that which must occur in every thought, and which will be present in the emptiest as well as in the most complex thought, Hegel finds this category to be that of being (*Sein*). If thought begins it will begin with being.

On the other hand, let thought begin with any other category—say the ego as Fichte suggested, or matter as the materialistic philosophy suggests, and it is clear that under the name ego or matter, thought thinks at first only being and then proceeds to determine or limit its meaning, narrowing it down until it gets the idea of ego or pure subject of thought, or the idea of matter as indifferent substratum of all things.

Hegel cannot be mistaken, therefore, when he selects the category of being as the first and simplest thought-category.

He suggests in his introduction that we may find this by analyzing the concept “beginning.” Beginning must have two terms—namely, nought and being, for it is a going from the non-being to the being of what is begun.

Taking, then, the category of being Hegel investigates it to see whether we can think it purely by

itself, and if so how we think it. Define it. Thinking is a process of seizing by definition.

“Being, pure-being without any farther limitation or determinateness: In its indefinite immediateness, it is identical only with itself, and moreover is not to be thought as non-identical with anything else. It has no difference or variety either within itself or as regards anything external. For if it had any determination or characteristic by which it could be defined in itself or distinguished from something else we should not have the thought of pure-being, but of definite or determinate being. Pure being is utter indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing in it to be seen, if seeing may be spoken of in this connection. Or in other words we might say it is the empty act of seeing—a pure seeing as it were, or a pure thinking which has no object except this empty being. The indefinite immediate is in fact nothing or naught, and neither more nor less.”

This is Hegel's analysis of the first category. Being is so simple that there is nothing in it and it cannot be discriminated from the idea of naught.

Let us note carefully here the hint that the thought is the empty seeing (*Anschauung*) or the empty thinking (*Denken*). On this view of the case it is the first act of turning the thinking on itself—thinking thinks itself in its first form as the category of being. For in thinking being it has made abstraction from the entire universe of experience and concentrated itself on its own negative act—the act of exclusion or abstraction.

Here is a fruitful hint for psychology. It would seem that the mind cognizes by putting itself under its experience—recognizing itself as it were in the object—and that it begins its knowing of the object by recognizing its own blank form, its own negative activity, under the category of being which it applies as a predicate to its object when it begins. It says “This *is*,” and in so saying it has recognized a determination of some sort (“This”) in its own negative indeterminateness, being.

Now the question arises whether Hegel or any other thinker can proceed further beyond this category. He has identified it with the category of naught—two names for one thought, we may say. Hence we cannot expect to treat the category of naught as a different category: the difference is only a matter of names.

NAUGHT.

But Hegel (p. 73)* proceeds at once to take up Naught (*Nichts*) as a separate category: “Nothing (naught) the pure nothing; it is simple identity with itself, perfect emptiness, devoid of all determination or characteristics; indistinguishableness in itself. To see or think nothing is considered a different matter from seeing or thinking something—in this case we attribute a sort of entity or existence to the idea of nothing as an

*The reference to pages will be until further notice to Volume I. of *Wissenschaft der Logik, Erster Theil, Die objective Logik. Erste Abtheilung. Die Lehre vom Seyn. Zweite Auflage.* This is the third volume of his collected works.

object of our seeing or thinking. It would be preferable to call it the empty seeing or thinking. This is the same empty seeing or thinking as pure being. Naught (nothing) is consequently the same determination (*Bestimmung*)” — “*Bestimmung*” the word that Hegel uses, I translate by the word *determination*. It is an extremely convenient technical term in logic and psychology. It describes or includes any phase of thought, any definition or limitation which thinking activity can discriminate—anything in short that defines one thought, idea, or object from another. In this case the sole characteristic is characteristiclessness or want of characteristics—and this enables us to discriminate it from all else because all else has and must have characteristics. “Naught is the same determination,” he continues, “or rather determinationlessness (want of determinateness), and hence the same thing altogether (*überhaupt*) that being is.”

Very well, again we acknowledge that we have only two words for the same thing. Now, however, we come to the first paradox of Hegel. To say that pure being and pure nothing are the same is scarcely a paradox—we see that two utterly empty thoughts must be the same and the only difference must be a verbal one. Now, however, Hegel comes to consider Becoming (*Werden*) and talks in this way about it: “Pure being and pure naught are therefore the same. The truth is neither being nor naught, but the truth is the being passed over into naught and naught passed

over into being—not in the process of transition, but actually gone over.” The “truth” of a thing is a technical expression of Hegel meaning the outcome or result—the tested and approved residuum of a process. This outcome he goes on to say is something paradoxical. “But the truth is also not their indistinguishableness: they are not the same, but absolutely distinct; they are however inseparable and each one has a way of vanishing in the other [as soon as it is seized in thought]. Their truth is therefore the movement or activity (*Bewegung*) of immediate vanishing, the one in the other. It is the becoming, which is an activity (*Bewegung*) containing both being and naught as distinct, but at the same time as losing their distinctness and becoming indistinguishable.”

Here is our paradox. If we were right in holding that in being and naught we had two words for the same idea, then there could be no opportunity left for becoming. For to go from one word to another that expresses the same thought is not a becoming in the sense that Hegel here describes.

It must be inferred that Hegel saw something in the process of investigating being and naught that he did not mention. What is it? we read over again and again carefully every word of the description of being and naught, but get no light.

We then take up the extended remarks (*Anmerkungen*) or explanations that he appends. Remark I. occupies nine pages—3600 words—and relates to the contrast of being and naught as we find it

in our ordinary thinking which uses pictures and images. This does not help us; we see at a glance that such thinking does not contrast pure being and pure naught, but only pure naught with determinate being or existence. Common sense has the idea, but it gives it only one of the names and calls it "naught." But this does not help us understand the real paradox, which is not the identity of being and naught, but their difference affirmed as the ground of the substitution of the category of becoming for being and naught. The second remark (1600 words) treats of the defect in the expression "unity and identity of being and naught." It would seem that this expression excludes diversity which needs mention as much as identity. But Hegel assumes this diversity and gives us no further clue to his discovery of it. He evidently supposes that we shall have no difficulty in seeing the diversity and that our only obstacle will be found in admitting the identity. Remark III. (5000 words) follows on the isolation of these abstractions—the efforts that had been made in vain to proceed from the thought of the pure simple being to creation and multiplicity. He adduces the discussions by Parmenides, Jacobi, and the Hindoo thinkers of Brahma. He keeps our interest excited and we expect to find in this remark the very explanation that we seek. But while he criticises with great acuteness those who hold fast to the abstraction, he does not let us into his own insight. Remark IV. (800 words) is devoted to the incomprehensibility of the category of beginning.

It affords us no help to see the difference of being and naught.

We must undertake a new analysis with a view to discover if possible this hidden step.

HEGEL'S TRUE INSIGHT INTO BEING AND
NAUGHT.

Looking freely once more at the discussion of being and naught, we note again the fact that we have the simple under two names, being and naught. We inquire into the possibility of thinking the simple by itself and here we come upon the suppressed link in Hegel's exposition.

To think is to determine, we are told. The determination of being is indeterminateness and thought is compelled by its nature to think whatever it thinks as a character discriminated from another character different from it. Hence comes the paradox: To think pure being we apply the predicate of indeterminateness and thus discriminate it from the entire content of human experience—distinguish it in short from the world and all that it contains. But we admit at the start that pure being cannot have any contrast either within or without. This very requirement is a definition which contrasts pure being with all else.

Strive as we may, we see that our act of thinking determines and thus negates or annuls the thought of the pure simple. Even to make it an object of thought contrasts it with the subject of thought, the ego, and thus annuls it.

Now that we are aware of this fact we see that we did not think the simple under either of the names pure being or pure naught. What did we think then? We thought the annulment of the simple by the act of determination, and we thought this not as a completed result, but as a process. We thought the self-antithesis of the simple—the simple which could only be a terminus or starting-point, a terminus *ab quo*. In the act of thinking it we departed from it at once, or changed it into a related or contrasted.

It is in the nature of the ego to be subject and object, and the Hindoos say that this characteristic (“*Ahankara*” as they call it—“subject-objectivity” as Fichte called it) affected all its thoughts and introduced distinctions filling a world.

We see, therefore, that we really thought a becoming instead of an isolated term which we named being or naught. Now that we have as an object a self-dualizing something, we have room for the difference between being and naught. We see that under either name we think a terminus, or one of the termini involved in the category of becoming. Start from the simple and it proves self-negative; we determine it and it has changed to a complex. Think being and it becomes determined. This act of determining is an act of negating, an act of limiting or defining—an act of annulling. Being to be pure being must exclude determinate being and thus it must be thought as negating or defining itself. Naught to be naught

must be thought as excluding all existence. But (*nota bene*) either being or naught to be a pure simple must exclude also this very act of excluding, it must get rid of its contrast or definition, for such characteristics prevent it from being pure and simple.

The simple, then, has to be thought as a self-contradiction, a self-exclusion, a negative that negates itself. Here we have found the insight that explains our paradox.

THE BECOMING.

If being is becoming and naught is becoming—if the simple under whatever name has to be thought as a self-excluding or contradictory, then it is obvious that thought begins with the category of becoming and not with the category of being or that of naught. Being and naught are only termini of that category which cannot be thought isolatedly or abstractly, but only as terms from which, or terms to which, a transition is made. They are as Hegel says “moments” (*Momente*) of becoming.

Here we have the famous dialectic which is described as the self-movement of the notion (*Begriff*). Seize an imperfect idea and it will show up its imperfection by leading to and implying another idea as a more perfect or complete form of it. Its imperfection will show itself as dependence on another. This is the philosophic method seen so clearly by Plato and stated in his *Republic* (Book VII. chapter 3). Pure science

(ἐπιστήμη) according to him has a dialectic method and starts with hypotheses—or, as we should describe them, dependent ideas, ideas that imply other ideas to make them possible, just as the idea of inner and outer or positive and negative imply each the other. But this dialectic method annuls these hypotheses on its way towards the highest principle (τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτήν τὴν ἀρχήν). He uses the word ἀναιρέω, which like the Latin *tollere* has the double meaning of to annul and to preserve in a subordinate form—the meaning that Hegel finds in the German verb *aufheben*. The etymological ground is a dangerous one, however, and it is better not to build on it. Plato seems to mean that the dialectic method starts with premises given by sense-perception and ordinary reflection, and seeking the presuppositions of these ascends to the first principle. An example of this is found in the inference of independent being as the necessary condition for the existence of dependent being, and this may be said to be the substantial insight lying at the basis of all true philosophy. Plato contrasts this method of ascending from the imperfect to the perfect by discovering presuppositions, with the geometric method that uses axioms or fixed (ἀκίνητους) hypotheses, not being able to deduce them or explain them.

Being and naught are annulled or subordinated (*aufgehoben*), found to be moments of a more concrete and independent idea, the becoming. Thus in the dialectic an incomplete idea gets lost in a

more complete one, of which it forms one of the characteristics (*Bestimmungen*).

But is this only a psychological result or is it also ontological? Is it a necessity of being or only a necessity of thought that the simple shall exist only as a phase of becoming? Undoubtedly what thought finds necessary to think in regard to existence must be ontologically necessary. This has been forever set at rest by the history of the Post-Kantian philosophy—in Fichte (his latest Berlin system, found in his *Way to a Blessed Life*), and in Schelling and Hegel. Seize the Kantian dualism of thing-in-itself, opposed to forms of subjective thought, and see what is left for the objective after subtracting all forms of thought, and one will see clearly that thing-in-itself under all its names such as “objective existence,” “pure being,” “the absolute,” is a mere form of thought. You can have no half-way ground—you cannot affirm a thing-in-itself and deny objective validity to the categories of the mind like quality, quantity, causal relation, mode, and the like. For a denial of relation and mode to the objective makes it impossible altogether.*

Hence if it is seen that the simple as pure being or pure naught cannot exist except in contrast to its opposite and cannot be thought except as an element of the category of becoming, this must be accepted as objective or ontological truth. If it is

*I regard this as my first philosophical insight. It made an epoch in my life when I first thought my way to it on a December evening in 1858 in St. Louis.

found, too, that becoming is in its turn imperfect and dependent and only a moment of a still more concrete idea. this, too, is ontological. It is a discovery of what we imply when we use the category of real existence, or objective, or thing-in-itself. We are making clear to ourselves what that thought contains, and discovering what can possibly have ontological truth.

Let us now analyze Becoming with Hegel and see if it is also an incomplete thought.

THE "MOMENTS" OF BECOMING.

Becoming has two forms (p. 102) beginning and ceasing (*Entstehen und Vergehen*). Each of these forms is the unity of being and naught—not the unity that arises from abstraction—not the unity that omits their difference, but the unity that contains their difference. Hence Hegel calls it a determined unity (*bestimmte Einheit*)—a unity that contains difference as well as identity. If we say that becoming contains being and also naught, we do not mean that these two are mixed together and that each is present as an ingredient. For we have learned that pure being is not to be thought as a pure simple but only as a self-annulling, or self-negating, which is therefore a becoming and not a simple being or a simple naught. Whatever it is taken for, it is in fact only a terminus, and the act of thinking it or taking it at once determines it as something else than that which its definition gives it.

Hence in our category of becoming, though we

have two elements, they are not any longer in their purity and simplicity but each united with the other as a becoming.

Each becoming is therefore a union of becomings. Here is our second paradox. It is the insight into the second step of the dialectic. Becoming is a union of being and naught, not as two simples but as two forms of becoming. Let us examine this closely. Make a sort of algebraic substitution of the already found values of being and naught. For being substitute the category of ceasing, and for naught, substitute that of beginning. Our becoming then is a transition from ceasing to beginning and from beginning to ceasing. Again, either of the two species of becoming is likewise a similar transition from itself to its opposite. For substitute once for all the newly found values of being and naught, namely ceasing and beginning, and we have for ceasing (from being to naught) a transition from ceasing to beginning. For beginning, which was a transition from naught to being, we have now a transition from beginning (the new-found equivalent of naught) to ceasing (the equivalent of being).

In as much as we have found the simple categories of being and naught unthinkable except as categories of becoming—*i. e.*, except as ceasing and beginning, we must substitute the latter equivalents in all categories of becoming whenever they occur. Hence universally ceasing and beginning are each a transition to the opposite and each opposite is a transition back to the former. Hence

each is a transition through its opposite to itself and what we have is *return-to-itself* and we have no longer any becoming. For becoming implies a unity of opposites and at the same time a difference of opposites—it is always from one terminus to another terminus. Hegel (p. 102) explains in his own way this process. “Becoming contains being and naught as two unities, each of them being likewise again a unity of being and naught Beginning to be and ceasing to be (*Entstehen und Vergehen*, p. 103) are these two unities, each being a union of naught and being.” Each of these is a form of becoming and since they have opposite directions they paralyze or annul each the other. For in ceasing we have being passing into naught ; but naught is as we have seen only a transition to the opposite of itself, namely to being, and this is a process of beginning. Thus ceasing (evanescence) ends in beginning (origination). But beginning is the other direction ; naught passes into being, but being is a self-annulling category and is only the transition into naught, or the category of ceasing. Thus beginning passes into ceasing and ceasing into beginning. “They do not annul each other externally, but each one of these categories annuls itself and develops its opposite out of itself.”

Hegel calls attention (under 3, “*Aufheben des Werdens*”) to the equipoise in which beginning and ceasing have now been found. Since naught and being are in unity and since beginning and ceasing are likewise each the immediate producer

of the other, we find that our entire category of becoming has collapsed. For if we cannot have a procedure *from* and *to*, we have no becoming. It is an abiding rather than a becoming. Each is a return to and arrival at itself and not a mere transition to its opposite. Hence becoming does not truly name the result. "Being and naught are, as termini of becoming, only vanishing categories. But becoming implies their sustained difference (*Unterschiedenheit derselben*). Their vanishing is therefore the vanishing of the category of becoming, that is to say the vanishing of the category of vanishing. Becoming is an unrest that does not hold out—it sinks into a peaceful state as the result [of its self-contradiction]."

We must not forget, however, that this result is not a simple—neither a simple as being, nor a simple as naught. It is a movement or activity within itself—a self-repulsion of the simple, which however returns to itself as the union of the simple with its opposite. Return-to-self is not becoming, but an equipoise, a movement to self-identity. Here we recall Hegel's first encounter with this thought in the *Phenomenology* where he found the total concept of force or energy or law of forces, to be the self-repulsion of the homonymous and the self-attraction of the heteronymous. This is the same thought. The simple (or homonymous) can be thought only as a self-negating. The self-opposed (or heteronymous) is only a self-attracting or rather a return to the simple, just as the categories of

ceasing and beginning each develop their opposites and thus become quiescent totalities. The extremes do not have to become, or make a transition, for each develops its opposite out of itself and becomes thus a totality. The totality cannot become, for it already contains all potentialities realized.

Hegel says therefore (pp. 103-104): "This result is the evanescence (*Verschwundenseyn*) of the distinctions on which the becoming depended, but is not a vanishing into naught; for that would be only to fall back into one of the categories which has already been seen to be imperfect and to pass over into another, whereas we see that our present result contains the outcome of being as well as of naught. In fact we have the quiescent simplicity that has arisen from being and naught. But this quiescent simplicity (N. B.) is being; not simple pure being as before,—but being as the form (*Bestimmung*) of the whole. Becoming has therefore passed over into determinate being (*Daseyn*), or in other words into a unity of being and naught that has the form of being—the form (*Gestalt*) of the one-sided immediate unity of being and naught."

Here is a very important thought of Hegel. "The form of being" means the form of return-to-self, the form of self-identity as annullment of the opposite. His remark that this is a "one-sided unity" hints of the development, a little further on, of the opposite one-sidedness, not in the form of being, but in the form of naught—namely, the categories of finitude and dependence.

CHAPTER XV.

REFLECTIONS ON THE METHOD OF HEGEL'S FIRST CHAPTER.

THE student of Hegel who has seized the thought of the discussion of being, naught, and becoming, will bear in mind the following great lessons that he has learned :

1. Hegel is not "deducing" the other categories of his logic from Being as an assumed first principle. Being is not a first principle, but only the emptiest and poorest of all pure thoughts. Hegel finds that this pure thought—called "pure" because empty of all ideas derived from experience—is not what it is supposed to be. A careful examination of it shows it to be a paradox—a thought that does not correspond to its definition, but immediately contradicts itself—we make the simple the opposite of itself by thinking it. Hence instead of being a first principle, "a fixed hypothesis" as Plato calls it, it is altogether untenable—a secondary principle which is seen to depend on a primary something else or to be in unity with some other principle, and hence to be only a half-thought. The whole thought, or at least a more complete thought, is discovered in the becoming. But further examination discovers that it, too, is not a complete thought but one that forms a half

of the more complete thought of determinate being (*Daseyn*). In other words becoming can be only an arc of the process of Return-to-self—a process which has the form of being.

2. The second important observation is that Hegel is not treating of mere subjective thoughts, mere psychological processes, which may be neglected as having no objective validity, but his “dialectic” is just as well objective in the sense that its results are ontological as well as psychological. For it is evident that a pure simple like being or naught must be, ontologically, only a point of departure. It could not exist or be objective, for that would make it a determinate being—a self-contrasted being. Becoming likewise is not possible as an ontological category—it is a part of the process of self-return and can never be found purely by itself. Self-return, if stated as a becoming, is always misstated. It is like describing an arc of a circle as a straight line. No part of the process of self-return is or can be merely a becoming. Self-return is the only possible form of objective reality—this is the result of the first chapter of Hegel’s logic.

3. Equally important is it to notice that the earlier categories do not remain “with a sphere in which they are still valid.” They have been refuted and exploded forever, as having truth—*i. e.* as applying to independent and eternal existence. They are only finite and imperfect categories—only inadequate modes of thinking what can be more perfectly and adequately thought by

the subsequent and final categories. This is of vital importance in dealing with the pantheistic wing of Hegelian thinkers. If these categories have something objectively valid, they will of necessity belong to God's thinking as well as to man's thinking, and hence there will be finitude in God. Hence God will be conceived as thinking His own essence in the creation of the world. The true view is that the Logos thinks his derivation—a derivation eternally past—and thereby gives rise to the Creation—Space, Time, Inorganic Matter, Gravity, Light, Plant, Animal, and Man. Creation is the Processio and not the Logos nor the Holy Spirit. In-as-much as the Absolute must be conceived as an eternally complete process of Return to Himself all forms of finitude must now be annulled and eternally annulled in his thinking. The dialectic appertains only to what is finite, inadequate, or incomplete. That must necessarily be annulled. How then can it ever exist unless the Absolute continually brings it into being? If he thinks only his own perfection he does not create the finite? No, but his perfect object the Logos, in thinking of his eternal derivation, does bring into existence finite categories. But these cannot be being, naught, becoming, and the other logical categories. The categories of creation are space, time, matter, life, etc., as we shall see when we take up Hegel's *Idee*. The categories of being, naught, etc., are the pure thoughts under which man thinks true substantial existence—a series of thoughts which begins with the most inadequate

category that lies above experience and ends with the most adequate category, namely Absolute Mind.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CATEGORY OF DETERMINATE BEING (DASEYN) OR QUALITY.

DETERMINATE being is not simple entity or simple being, but it has the form (*Gestalt*) of being, which is that of return-to-self. The simple is, as before seen, one of the two termini of becoming; becoming is the process of transition from beginning to ceasing and from ceasing to beginning; hence a process of return to itself through an opposite. This form of being, therefore, has two phases: first, that of the return to being through naught and second that of the return to naught through being—a negative and a positive return, both of which moreover have the form of being, because both have the form of return-to-self which gives self-identity. Hegel calls these two forms of determinate being “reality and negation.”

Reality is what we found to result when being returned through naught to being, or beginning returned through ceasing to beginning. Negation is what we found as naught returning through being to naught again, or as ceasing returning through beginning to ceasing.

Thus we have two threads, and we shall always have two threads to our dialectic, hereafter. The

dialectic will cease when these two are absolutely identical as "Idea." When identical there cannot be any annulment of either through the other—each will then be an entire personality.

The difference between reality and negation is deeper than that between being and naught, or between ceasing and beginning—the identity is also deeper, for they both have return-to-self.

Hegel announces the dialectic of determinate being as quality (p. 106) in the two forms, reality and negation: "Determinate being is reflected into itself, in these two categories (*bestimmtheiten*)" and this is explicitly stated (*gesetzt*) as the category of "somewhat." He explains (p. 107) the expression "posited" as used to signify what is actually developing and manifesting itself in the object, and not what is merely a result of an external comparison, or of some anticipation on our part of what will happen.

"Being and determinateness are not related to one another as general to particular. But both are coextensive . . . determinateness thus isolated as existing determinateness is quality, a quite simple and immediate determinateness."

Here we have the logical ground given us for defining quality. Quantity and quality are species of determinateness. Quality is that determinateness which is one with the being of the object; if the quality is changed the being is changed and *vice versa*. Quantity, as will be seen later, is not identical with the being but may be changed without changing the being. If a lake grows in size it

still remains a lake. But the quantity is connected with the being to some degree, for if the lake is made very small it is called a pond and not a lake. On the other hand were a salt lake to be increased in size by a thousand miles, it would be called a sea or ocean.

Reality is quality with its "moment" of being accentuated, while negation is likewise quality with the "moment" of naught accentuated (p. 109). Let us see the genesis of "somewhat" (*Etwas*).

SOMEWHAT (ETWAS).

Although reality and negation are distinguished from one another, yet they are identical as quality, as determinate being, and as containing both being and naught as "moments," and they likewise are each a "return-into-self." Reality is a return-into-self of being; negation is a return-into-self of naught. But each form of return-into-self is likewise a process of positing its other, namely: being, in its self-mediation, first posits naught; and naught in its mediation likewise begins by positing being. Remembering this, we shall see that reality in the process of "accentuating" its being, has first to "accentuate" negation, and negation has likewise to "accentuate" reality. Hence there is a synthesis of these two categories and we have a new category which Hegel calls "*Etwas*" (somewhat). Somewhat is a reality to which belongs negation as a limit—it is a limited reality. There must be also two forms of it, a positive and

a negative, because there are two forms of return-to-itself, reality and negation. Reality returning to self is "somewhat" and negation returning to self is "other." Somewhat and other are the two forms of determinate being. Here (in "somewhat") reality and negation are united, and their distinction is annulled or cancelled so that it is an internal distinction (*Insichseyn*)—a very important thought of Hegel, which he proceeds to dilate upon.

The category of "somewhat" is the first negation of negation (p. 114) "as simple, existent relation-to-itself." This is the germ of all individualization. It is this insight which reveals the necessity of all universals or generals to be individuals, or to have the form of simple self-relation. "Determinate being (p. 114) life, thought, and the like have existence only (*bestimmt sich wesentlich*) as existent beings, living individuals, thinking egos, etc. This principle (*Bestimmung*) is of the highest importance, for without it we should hold fast by those generalities" and believe in "deity rather than a personal God," and in general we should have a pantheistic unity in which all multiplicity and definiteness of character are lost. The negative of the negative in this category of "somewhat" is however only the germ of subjectivity or selfhood. Its internality is quite vague: "It will, by and by, in the categories of being-for-itself and idea (*Begriff*) gain the concrete intensity of selfhood."

Those who take Hegel's absolute to be an

abstract universal in which the individual is swallowed up would do well to study this page (114) of the first volume of the larger logic and keep this in mind afterwards in reading the entire work. In this way they will come to see that "personality" is not an idle, meaningless designation of the Absolute Idea. In fact, Hegel's philosophy may in truth be said to be the philosophy that everywhere refutes the abstract universal and everywhere demonstrates the individual as the true and abiding. But his "individuality" is not a mere particular—it is universal as well as particular, and hence this individual "posits" or "accentuates" his universality by combining into institutions—the family, the state, the church, etc.

"Somewhat," as we have seen, is a new form of return-to-self and a process, just as much as being, naught and becoming were processes. In thinking "somewhat" we think reality and negation in unity and do not name quite all that we think when we name it "somewhat." For we have the positing of another, as well as a somewhat, before our minds. Somewhat and other express the two sides of the one thought of determinate being. The somewhat is limited by the other; it is dependent on the other. Its dependence constitutes its unity with the other. To depend on another is to have one's self in another, so to speak. Hence a dependent being is outside its true self and it manifests or shows this emptiness by its dependence. The exhibition of this dependence is change. For change shows a foreign influence and proves that

the changing thing is not itself a whole, but a part of a larger whole that includes the thing and its other.

Here we have arrived at the idea or definition of finitude. That is finite which is a somewhat over against another and dependent on that other. "The finite is not in itself, but in another," says Spinoza. That is to say, it is not self-active and the cause of its own attributes, but its characteristics are impressed upon it by outside influences. This is the true insight into the category of quality. To think things under the category of quality is to think them under the relation of thing and environment, or somewhat and other. This is treated more in detail by Hegel under the category of finitude (pp. 115-140).

CHAPTER XVII.

FINITUDE.

ON arriving at the idea of dependence upon external influence, we have come to the category of finitude. A somewhat that is not a true self, but has itself in another, or, in other words, is an appendage of something else, is changeable and finite. We must turn this thought round on its various sides, as Hegel does. But it is necessary first to point out the fact that we have not yet done with, or passed beyond the category of somewhat and other. The "dialectic" has not brought us to "finitude," as though it were a subsequent category in the series. Finitude is incidental to the category of somewhat and other, just as return-into-self and the form of being were incidental to becoming when its two termini were taken as two species of becoming (ceasing and beginning).

Finitude is the form of this relation. A thought of a determinate being as a somewhat opposed to another is the thought of what is essentially finite and changeable. Because whatever is in the somewhat is there through the influence of the other, and not through self-determination or self-activity. Therefore the somewhat is nothing but the manifestation of the other, and hence a process of per-

petual change, since external influence manifests itself only in the form of change.

But here we have a multitude of shades and distinctions, some of which are very important in the Hegelian terminology. These are, first, "in itself," or potential (*an sich*). The somewhat is taken for an independent instead of a dependent being which it is. This being-in-itself is opposed to the being-for-another which essentially belongs to it (p. 115). "The category of somewhat is a becoming, and as such it is a transition whose two termini are also somewhats—or somewhat and other—and hence this sort of becoming is change, a sort of concrete becoming. The category of somewhat involves in its very definition the category of change" (*das Etwas verändert sich zunächst nur in seinem Begriffe*).

2. The determinateness of being is at first regarded as belonging to the somewhat, and not as derivative from the "other." The other is likewise regarded as an independent somewhat. (a) Each of these, therefore, is a being-in-itself. But upon more careful thought (b) it is discovered that this being-in-itself has negation appertaining to it, and hence is determined in itself. Its determinateness is therefore not merely derivative from the other, it is characteristic form, or condition (*Beschaffenheit*) of the object. This is the negation of the being-for-others and hence we have here the category of limit (*Grenze*) which is (c) the immanent definition of the somewhat, and constitutes its finitude (p. 116). For if the determi-

nateness is essentially "limit," it involves finitude. For in its limit a somewhat finds its other. This must not be conceived as though the somewhat and the other were in juxtaposition, the one here, the other there, for this is only half of the thought, but the somewhat depends on the other; its being is a part of the other, and hence it can be itself only by changing or perishing—this is essential finitude.

The treatment of this subject is very prolix, occupying 25 pages (10,000 words). Hegel was justified in this detailed treatment, however, by the prominence given to the category of "infinite progress" by the Kantians and Fichteans. Morality was treated under this category, and immortality was deduced from the impossibility of becoming moral within a finite time. This detail of treatment, however, makes the subject more difficult for the reader in our day. We have, it is true, the category of infinite progress, and it is quite as important as ever; but it masquerades no longer under the questions of morality, but is included under those of psychology. We are told that infinite progress denotes inconceivability—the finiteness of our power of conceiving or thinking. This is Hamilton's "law of the conditioned." Agnosticism results from this insight into the nature of the finite to be an infinite progress. The further insight into the necessity of the true infinite as its ground emancipates the thinker forever from the category of "quality" and its agnosticism.

Hegel, after the manner of Aristotle, enumerates

in tedious inventory the shallow views that arise from the sway of this category, and shows how each one of them dialectically passes over into the next deeper one by a little more insight into the subject.

The reader of Hegel will, however, make a bad mistake if he superstitiously takes for granted that Hegel has exhaustively discovered and discussed exactly all the subordinate categories which may be found on the way between pure being and quantity. For there is simply an indefinite possibility of shades and determinations of thought here. The caprice of thought is the only limitation to the multiplication of steps in the dialectic progress. The chief rubrics, it is true, are to be found in the thought of all nations risen above barbarism; but at one epoch there will be one application and at another epoch another application made of minute distinctions, such, for example, as are borrowed here from the vocabulary of the romantic school of thinkers who sentimentalized over human finitude and incapacity to know God as he is, and over human impotency to attain perfect virtue.

The sub-categories treated by Hegel here are being-in-itself and being-for-others, destination, actual condition, and limit, (*An-sich-seyn*, *Seyn-für-anderes*, *Bestimmung*, *Beschaffenheit*, *Grenze*) as already named. These lead to finitude (*Endlichkeit*) and under the latter come "restraint" and "ought" (*Schranke* and *Sollen*), with a note (*Anmerkung*) on "thou canst because thou oughtest," etc.

His next rubric is the "transition of the finite into the infinite," and this closes the chapter on "Finitude." But his paragraphs on "the reciprocal limitation (*Wechselbestimmung*) of the finite and infinite" show that he has not left the sphere of qualitative limitation as yet. He comes to "the affirmative infinitude" (p. 148) and makes his transition to "being-for-itself" (*Für-sich-seyn*) which is "the qualitative being completed, or the infinite being" (p. 165). "Being-for-itself" is independent being—in other words, such being as can be by itself. Hence it must be self-determined being, and not being-through-another, which is essentially finite being. Independent being and infinitude are the same, according to Hegel, as he has told us.

But what is this independent being and how have we arrived at it? Moreover, how does this lead us out of what is qualitative into what is quantitative? These are the questions that assail us here, and their answer opens one of the most interesting discussions to be found in this science of "pure thought." Once able to see this answer, we shall be inwardly competent to solve that question of agnosticism and to refute the Hamiltonian doctrine of "the conditioned" which has proved a bar to all philosophic progress for so long a time.

This insight is in itself a very simple one. We acquire it at a glance when the essential conditions are before us, and afterwards there is no difficulty in applying it. But Hegel's treatment of the subject is calculated to mislead us unless we have

already obtained this insight—for the reason above stated, namely: He canvasses many of the shallow views of the finite before coming to the essential insight which guides his investigation.

Let us concentrate our attention on this essential point first. A brief statement of the doctrine of “determinate being” may be made as follows:

1. The categories of pure being and pure naught are found to be termini of becoming and as such they are ceasing and beginning.

2. Becoming, with ceasing and beginning as its termini collapses, because each of its termini is a return-to-itself through its other—it has the form of being or self-relation. Its form of being, however, is not pure being but determinate being.

3. Determinate being has two phases—reality, or return-into-self of being, and negation or return into-self of naught. But each of these, being duplicate, is likewise the process of producing its other and hence of itself through its other; reality is in truth reality-negation-reality, or return into self through negation, and this is the idea of “somewhat,” or of that which (*a*) limits another, (*b*) is limited by another, and (*c*) affirms itself against that other. Likewise negation is negation-reality-negation, or “reflected-into-itself” negation—or the negation returned into itself through the something of which it is the other.

4. Both are somewhats and each is also another to its other. This is, however, only an arbitrary consideration of our own: it is, in the language of Hegel, an “external reflection” and does not go

for much. There is no true dialectic in an "external reflection." To say that "something is another to its other" and hence that "something passes over into its other" belongs to the shallowest order of verbal quibbling. It is of the same quality as that verbal dialectic which we have discussed above regarding being and naught which proceeded to say that pure being is naught and that naught is the same as pure being, and hence each is an immediate vanishing of one in the other. Whereas, our "hence" should conclude that we have two words for the same thought and not that we have a transition between two thoughts. That a somewhat is another to its other is an external reflection, and although we may suspect that it suggests a deeper objective process to be found in the very nature of the "somewhat," we cannot regard this verbal suggestion as of any value. That a "somewhat" regarded from another point of view is also "other" to something else is an outside consideration and this is the reason why Hegel calls it an "external reflection"—an expression which he always uses with a tone of contempt.

5. But disregarding this external reflection and turning our attention to the nature of the category of "somewhat," we discover its essential self-contradiction—it is other to itself, and hence essentially changeable and transitory. It is of the nature of a somewhat to be dependent on its environment—to have (in Spinoza's words) its being in another. Its character or quality exists only in relation to another, hence as we said it is depend-

ent on this other for its being,—dependent for its selfhood, so to speak.

6. Here comes in the paradox which our habit of external reflection hides from us: since the somewhat is dependent on the “other” for its being and its being is really in the “other,” we may see that our somewhat is in very truth an “other” to its own being. For it is an other to that other which is its true self. Ergo: the somewhat is other to itself. Q. E. D. Hence the somewhat is itself a contradiction.

7. Examining this, our paradox, further, we see the genesis of some interesting categories. In the first place the somewhat cannot exist except as a process of change. (This is like the development of our category of becoming from the “simple.”) Hence the category of finitude or transitoriness makes its appearance with this insight. It involves also the idea of limit or boundary beyond which the somewhat loses its identity.

8. Again: related to its true self, which is in its “other,” the present somewhat is only an imperfect realization, and this is what we may call “present condition” (*Beschaffenheit*) while the true self is the destination (*Bestimmung*) for which the somewhat is tending in its changes, and hence arises the category of ought-to-be or is-to-be (*Sollen*), whose realization is prevented by the restraint (*Schranke*) that appertains to finitude. For the category of quality divides the totality into two phases, somewhat and other, and refuses

to include both in their unity. It stubbornly views only one at a time.

9. Hence arises the category of infinite progress. Seeing the essential relativity of the somewhat—its dependence on another—we transfer our attention to the other. But this “other,” too, is a somewhat, or limited being, and is again dependent on another. We pass on to another, and another, again. This we may do *ad infinitum*, for we never arrive at a final “other.” Each is a somewhat which depends on a somewhat-else beyond it. This is the infinite progress or what Hegel calls “the reciprocal determination of the finite and the infinite.” We have only to get an insight into what this presupposes to see the true infinite itself.

10. We cannot see the infinite progress until we see that the somewhat is of such a nature that it depends on its “other” and cannot exist without it, and in addition to this it must be seen that the “other” is likewise a somewhat depending also on its “other.” Then it is seen that the progress to the “other” is endless just because each step posits another step like the first—there is no end to the repetition possible. Each step forward is the evolution of a new “other” which has to be reached. But how do we know that a new “other” will always arise on our view as we arrive at the “other” that is now visible? Only because we see the final nature of this “somewhat.” It must be its own “other.” Hence we posit the progress only after we have seen the

totality of the "somewhat." We must have the true infinite before our mind when we say "and so on forever." For the progress is infinite only for the reason that the true infinite makes it possible.

11. The infinitude of space is supposed by Hamilton to be an infinite progress rather than the true infinite. But the contrary is the fact. We see the true infinitude of space and affirm the infinite progress only after seeing that space is infinite. Space is of such a nature, we say, that any limits to it posit or affirm space beyond them; they cannot exist outside of space without space to exist in. Hence instead of limiting space they affirm its continuance. Space can only be limited by space, and hence it can only be continued and is infinite. In other words, space is its own "other." That which is its own "other" is of necessity infinite.

12. The somewhat is of necessity its own other —this is the fundamental truth in regard to quality. The "other" on which the dependent being depends is its true self. Hence in the change of the finite we have only a process of the manifestation of the self of the finite. We have arrived at the category of being-for-itself.

CHAPTER XVIII.

INFINITUDE.

WE ascend from the part to the whole—from the somewhat and other to the unity of their process which is independent being or being-for-itself. The first aspect of this independent being is its infinitude. There are many aspects to it, but this is the most striking one because it is so directly opposed to that characteristic of quality which leads to agnosticism and despair of the intellect.

There is no more hopeless condition of mind than to be caught in the meshes of the category of quality, or first immediateness. Great honor is due, not to Hegel merely, but rather to Plato, who first discovered the road out of this Slough of Despond. What Plato has laid down in his tenth book of *The Laws* and in other places, and which Aristotle has restated in the sixth and seventh chapters of the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*, Hegel has worked out in a new method and treated exhaustively in this first division of his *Logic*.

The gist of his doctrine as shown in the previous chapter is that independent being underlies dependent being, or that self-determined being is presupposed by being which depends on something else; or, in still other words: the partial or incom-

plete being presupposes a totality; the partial or imperfect is dependent, but the total is independent.

Infinitude is the quality of this independent being which Hegel calls "being-for-itself" (*Für-sich-seyn*). Infinite being is being that is its own other—being that relates to itself, and can relate only to itself.

But the infinite is not an empty One. It is not the mere negation of the finite—such an infinite would be the pure being or naught which we have seen refuted once for all. There can be no more any return to the category of pure being. The infinite being has also the finite within it as one of its "moments" (or complemental elements). It negates and preserves the finite. It contains all the being that the finite contains and also all the being that the finite does not contain. It is the fulness of being. It is the affirmative being of the "something" and the "other," but it does not omit their distinction or difference; for it is a process that contains all the movement of change but is at the same time more than change, namely a process of returning into self. It is a change that annuls itself. For it changes from one to another, but from the other returns to itself. It finds itself in another. Hegel uses for this important thought the expression "*Mit sich selbst zusammengehen*," literally "to go together with itself" or "to be continued by another" (see page 140).

To illustrate this: space is infinite because the "other" of a given space is also space—space thus

“goes together with itself” or is continued by its other. Space is of such a nature that its environment must also be space; hence it is infinite. Time also must have an environment of time. Any given time presupposes time before it and time after it. It is continued by its limits and hence is infinite.

Conscious being also is an illustration: the self as subject is also its own object—its own “other” and is thus continued instead of limited by that “other;” hence it is infinite. The mind does not find any object except in so far as it recognizes its own categories in it. To recognize is to find what is already familiar—to find one’s self, so to speak. It is “to go together with one’s self.”

The “somewhat” is and must be its own “other.” This is the necessary truth which constitutes the insight of this dialectic movement from the finite to the infinite.

Consider the somewhat as having its limit in another. This makes it dependent on the other for its quality. Without the other it would not be determinate or real. It would be pure being or pure nothing. But this fact constitutes its dependence. It receives its being from an external source. It is what it is because the “other” is. Hence the somewhat has its being through another and in another. Its self or identity is in the other. We may look to the “other” to find the reality of the somewhat. It exists in relation, or is itself a “relativity.”

But upon reflection we see that we may speak of

the "somewhat" more adequately from the standpoint of the "other." It is evident that it is itself an "other" to its true self. For it is another to the other upon which it depends. This is the nature of the dependent—to be "other" to itself. This is its self-contradiction—and this makes its dialectic.

The other upon which the somewhat depends is its true self. The independent being is the self of all that depends on it.

Here we change our point of view because our object has lost its individuality, so to speak—the dependent has vanished in the independent being. We have before us the independent being which is infinite and also for-itself. Now we see that the process of alteration or change that constituted the finitude of the somewhat is only its process of seeking its true self. It is not a process of perishing so much as a process of becoming its true self. It is a "going together-with-itself." An affirmation rather than a negation. It is an activity of realizing what was before only a possibility or potentiality. The "being-in-itself" is becoming "being-for-itself." In Hegel's words, its *An-sich-seyn* is becoming *Für-sich-seyn*.

Looked at from the standpoint of "somewhat" we see the finite as the reality, and all is transitory and evanescent. Looked at from the standpoint of independent being we see the infinite to be the true reality and all change to be only development and self-realization. "Reflection into itself," when seen partially or from the standpoint of the van-

ishing "moments," the somewhat and the other, is change and the decay of the finite. Reflection-into-self seen as a totality is the process by which self-identity is sustained and true independence realized. It is the vanishing only of the shadow, and the persistence of the reality.

With the sub-category of infinitude, Quality has reached its highest point of perfection. In fact there now emerges from it another category, that of Quantity. This, however, we shall see in the next chapter, on independent being, or what is the same, infinite being, or being-for-itself (*Für-sich-seyn*).

CHAPTER XIX.

BEING-FOR-ITSELF.

I TRANSLATE this category of *Für-sich-Seyn* by the expression “independent being” for the reason that the word “independent” has no tinge of verbal quibble about it. There is no “external reflection” in it. The “finite” may or may not imply the “infinite”—that is a matter for external reflection, unless we mean by the “finite” or “imperfect” what we mean when we use the expression “dependent.” For by dependence we mean derivation from another, and more than this: we mean derivation from another and present support through another. The dependent being, in fact, has its being in another. If we conceive a being as derived once in some former time, but as since having become self-existent, it is not now dependent, but independent.

Independent being is the form of any and all totality. Every whole of being is and must be an independent being, for otherwise it would be only a part (or “moment”) of a larger totality and thus not a whole, itself.

Every whole or totality is, as independent being, also a self-determined being, a self-activity. For otherwise our category of independent being would be merely the category of pure being or naught

again. The category of return-into-self or self-relation is the process of "going-together-with-itself" and this explains the relation of the finite to the infinite. The infinite is continued reflection into-itself of what, viewed apart, is the finite. This is an activity of self-determination. In this independent being, therefore, we have a multiplicity of distinctions: for there is a self as determining and a self as determined, *i. e.* distinctions of active and passive; moreover, there is sameness of self under the distinction. Taken immediately—that is to say, taken as categories of being are taken—we have the category of one-ness opposed to multiplicity and this leads to the category of quantity, or presupposes it. Let us note, with Hegel, how this idea of one-ness enters and develops.

All determinate being has proved itself to be part and portion ("moments") of independent being or being-for-itself. Because every determinate being, every somewhat is a dependent being which has its self or characteristic distinction, in another. The source of support for dependent being is a self-active, independent being. The dependent being is not a unity; it is not a whole or totality, but only an effect of manifestation, an indefinite multiplicity which is not quantitative because not made up of independent and identical units. The idea of one-ness arises first when we conceive qualitative totality. The somewhat as opposed to other is not a one, nor is the other a second one; conceived thus the "other" would

not be the limit and quality of the somewhat. But the somewhat depends upon the totality and by this dependence manifests the unity of the totality: so, too, does the other; and the other of the other. All these qualitative limits manifest the unity of the whole and the whole is a one. Here we have clearly before us the idea of the one—the one-ness of the somewhat and the other.

The one is “negative unity” in which the distinctions of somewhat and other all vanish, because they all “posit” or presuppose the totality as their sole reality—the one is their reality. They are all *for* it, that is to say, for the one totality. This characteristic is their quality and Hegel calls it their being-for-one (*Seyn-für-Eines*) (p. 168). This “being-for-one” is what he called “being-for-other” when treating it within the category of the “somewhat.” There it was dependence on another; here it is dependence on the including totality.

The “being-for-one” is the dependence of the “moments” (somewhat, other, etc.) on the including totality. But viewed from the side of that totality, or the being-for-itself, it is dependence on itself or its self-relation, its independence. In other words, the being-for-one of the dependent “moments” is the being-for-itself of the independent being. The manifestation of dependence is the manifestation of unity (of the dependent with that on which it depends.) Not only this, but the manifestation of dependence is the manifestation of the being-for-itself in some sphere which seems at first to be beyond it.

Now we come to the second consideration, which is more difficult and more astonishing. The dependent looked at anew from the point of view of the independent being must assume new phases. We must revise our account of it.

From the category of somewhat and other the dependence (*Seyn-für-Anderes*) seemed to render the being finite or partial and imperfect. Now that it is seen as the product of self-determined being (for independent being must be self-determined) each dependent being becomes a total also, and hence it becomes a *one*. This is the surprising result. It is the "dialectic" through which Hegel comes suddenly upon his "one and many" (*Eines und Vieles*) and further on to his "attraction and repulsion" (pp. 174, 181) in his discussion of *Fürsich-Seyn*.

The independent being or being-for-itself is self-determining—as subject it is determining, as object it is determined; hence it is a self-duplication and there can be no independent being on any other terms. The being-for-itself is independent because it is a reflection-into-itself out of its "other." That which seems to be its "other" proves to be dependent on it. But the "other" of the independent being is also a totality, and independent, just because it is the result of the self-determination of the independent. Hence the "other" is a "one." It must be noted, however, that the "other" is a "one" by an additional characteristic, that is to say, by something added to it as "other," namely, "reflection-into-

itself." This is precisely what was found to belong to its nature when we considered it as finitude and found that the finite is a part of the infinite. It was finite because changeable, but change is the transition of a somewhat as dependent into its own true being, its independence. Hence its change is and must be a "reflection-into-itself." The same feature that discovers to us infinitude underlying finitude, discovers also to us one and many ones in the place of somewhat and others. When we see only dependence, isolatedly, we use the category of somewhat and others; when we see somewhat and other in its ground of reflection-into-itself or totality we see ones or units. Thus we have almost arrived at quantity. The insight needed to see quantity instead of being-for-itself is this: every one is within itself multiple and every multiplicity is also a unit. In other words, we must see infinite divisibility. Each unit must appear a composite of other units, which again are composites of other units, and so on *ad infinitum*. Then each unit is an aggregate of ones and all units are constituent ones of including units. This idea is quantity.

But how do we see this necessity of infinite divisibility? Every somewhat is being-in-itself and being-for-others and is hence somewhat and other within itself. Hence, too, every being-for-itself is a unity of opposed units within itself and each unit is likewise again a self-opposition of units, and hence being-for-itself is a quantitative unity or an aggregate of units, each one of which is an aggregate.

CHAPTER XX.

THE FINITE AND THE INFINITE — A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL'S DISCUSSION OF THESE IDEAS.

IN this chapter I propose to pass in review some of the most noteworthy passages containing Hegel's doctrine of the finite and infinite, of dependent and independent being, pointing out the statements which verify my interpretations as given in the last three chapters.

THE "OTHER."

Hegel's third form of the "other" (p. 117) is that of the isolated other, or the other in its self-relation, and this of course is other of itself or the essentially "other." "It is the *τὸ ἕτερον* of Plato . . . not the 'other' of a somewhat, but the other in-itself (*an ihm selbst*), that is to say the other of itself. Such a self-other according to its essential being is physical nature, which is the 'other' of mind . . . nature is the other in itself, that which is outside itself, existing in space, time, and matter, which are forms of externality" (p. 118).

"The other for itself is the other in itself, hence, the other of itself, or, in other words, the other of the other" (p. 118). All dependent being so far as it is dependent is thus outside of

its true being, for the latter is that upon which it depends; it is therefore other to its true self and shows this unity and separation by dependence. A dependent being is essentially an "other." "To be other of itself is to be absolutely non-identical with itself, hence self-nugatory, and therefore changeable. But it also remains in self-identity," for the reason that the other into which it changes is already its true self and "it therefore only goes together with itself" (p. 118).

"IN-ITSELF."

"In the sphere of being, the self-determination of the idea (*sich-bestimmen des Begriffs*) is only in itself or [potential] and it is called transition (*übergehen*); moreover the determinations of reflection like somewhat and other, finite and infinite, [reflecting determinations=categories which suggest or 'reflect' one another, just as positive suggests negative or finite suggests infinite] although they suggest each the other are nevertheless regarded as having independent existence" (p. 122). In the sphere of essence (*Wesen*) on the other hand instead of transition between independent categories, we have "reflection in each other" (*Scheinen in einander*) in such categories as positive and negative, cause and effect, which if isolated each from the other and considered abstractly have no meaning."

"What is in-itself [or potential or implicitly contained] (*an-sich*) and what is 'posited' or explicitly stated (*gesetzt*) should be carefully discrim-

inated—that is to say, the categories as they are in idea (*im Begriff*) and as they are when existing for others (*seyend-für-Anderes*) should not be confounded. This distinction belongs only to the dialectical evolution and is not known to the metaphysical philosophizing nor to the ‘critical’ [or Kantian] which is also a species of the ‘metaphysical’” (p. 122).

This important remark should be noted as referring to the justification of the method which treats first of the immediate and then of the mediated categories—and treats all the categories first in their immediateness, adducing their undeveloped phases and afterwards their more developed phases in their order. Every category taken in its pure immediateness is pure being. But taken as such it is utterly devoid of significance. Its definition is entirely ignored. There are many grades of mediation on the way from pure immediateness to the true implication of a category. This fact that every category has various grades of mediation is truly a great discovery, but it may be variously interpreted. The first and most natural reflection is this: there are various degrees of insight possible to the person who thinks a given category. The shallowest insight thinks all categories on the dead level of immediateness, whether said categories have a deep or a shallow import. The insight that is somewhat advanced in the stage of reflection on the other hand thinks all the categories with some mediation—mediation by means of relations. Everything is relative and its relations to others

are essential to its existence, is the doctrine of this standpoint—a being is nothing, taken out of its relations. The deepest insight sees everything as a whole of self-determination—it is either independent itself or a part or phase of independent being. There are three necessary phases of thinking, and correspondent to them are the three sets of categories—(a) of immediateness, excluding all relation, even self-relation—these are the categories of being; (b) of mediation, in which relation or relativity is explicitly stated as implied (as “positive” implies “negative,” and cause implies effect). These are the categories of essence (*Wesen*). The mind in this stage is prone to use even the categories of being with a sense of the mediation that is presupposed, but not expressed by them. (c) The categories of absolute mediation or of self-mediation which express both mediation and immediateness, or, in other words, a mediation that is completed by return-to-self, are categories with which the deepest insight does its thinking. These categories Hegel treats under “idea” (*Begriff*—also translated “notion”) meaning by this self-active-being.

The insight into the categories of reflection is apt to lead a thinker to use even the categories of being in the sense of categories of essence. In this way arise such philosophic expressions as “the being of being,” “true being,” “being for itself,” “the absolute one,” “the infinite being,” “the real in all reality,” et cetera. These are all categories of being but used in the sense of essence.

But although mediation is a deeper thought than immediateness, it is still an imperfect thought until it is united with the latter in a higher category. Self-activity is an immediate that includes mediation. In it, cause and effect are one—in the sense that self-determination implies that the self is subject and also object—the self is mediated through self-negation.

Using the mode of expression adapted to mental pictures we can describe the first stage of thinking as that in which one of the three phases of reality comes to consciousness. It may be symbolized by three lines, thus: \times three phases function, but only one of these is conscious. The second stage of thinking may be symbolized thus: $\text{--}\times$, only one of three essential phases remains still unconscious. The third stage is symbolized as \times , all phases being conscious; this is dialectical thinking.

The first stage is conscious of the self-relation but not of the antithesis involved in mediation, while the second stage sees the mediation but not the self-relation; but the third stage sees the self-relation which underlies the mediation; it sees return-into-self as the ground of all finitude and dependence or relation-to-other.

LIMIT.

“ A somewhat is therefore as an immediate determinate being (*Daseyn*) the limit opposed to another somewhat, but it has this limit attached to itself (*es hat sie an ihm selbst*) and is somewhat,

just because of the mediation that takes place through and by means of this limit which is also its own non-being. It (*Grenze*, the limit) is the mediation through which the somewhat and the other both are and at the same time are not" (p. 128). Since quality depends on limit, the limit is the affirmation of each, the somewhat and its other, but the limit is also the mutual negation and hence that in which each ceases. Hence the limit seems to be distinguished from the definite being (*Daseyn*) of the somewhat and the limit seems to be distinguished from both somewhat and other, indeed to be a sort of middle term between the two in which both cease (*Sie ist die Mitte zwischen beiden, in der sie aufhören*). This develops the contradiction of quality. The somewhat is through that which it is not and hence it is dependent and finite. "The somewhat with its immanent limit, posited as the contradiction of itself, through which it refers to what is beyond itself, and is impelled toward it (*über sich getrieben*) is *the finite*." (p. 130).

FINITUDE.

"Non-being constitutes the nature of finite things (*das Nichtseyn ihre Natur, ihr Seyn, ausmacht*)" (p. 131). "The being of finite things as such is the possession of this germ of decay as their innermost being (*als ihr Insichseyn*)—the hour of their birth is the hour of their death."

The difficulty of overcoming this category of

finitude is commented on by Hegel (*die Unmittelbarkeit der Endlichkeit*) (p. 131): "Because it is qualitative negation in its extreme form (*auf die Spitze getriebene*) the simplicity of its determination does not leave room for affirmative being distinct from its complication with death and decay—hence this sorrow over finitude. The category of finitude, on account of its qualitative simplicity of negation which brings into sharp contrast with being its negatoriness and perishableness, is the most stubborn category of the understanding (*die hartnäckigste Kategorie des Verstandes*)—it is the negation as fixed essentially (*an sich fixirte*)." It is the chief category of the understanding or what theologians call the "mere human intellect," as opposed to reason, or to the divine intellect, or to the dialectical or speculative knowing. It is "stubbornly" intrenched in the position that whatever is determined, is determined through another, and therefore limited by an environment, and thus finite. That which is not finite but infinite, must be, according to this view, an indeterminate, empty somewhat devoid of all qualities or attributes and the same as "pure being" or naught, or as Hamilton's "unconditioned."

By this dilemma of finitude or empty infinitude, the understanding fortifies its position against all attacks. For it is of no possible use to set up an empty infinite over against the finite. The finite, all that there is of it, ever so small a portion of it, is better than the whole of an infinite nothing. An empty absolute or infinite is only a vacuum to thought and a vacuum of real existence.

This stubborn fortress of agnosticism can be kept secure against all would-be gnostics or speculative thinkers so long as its assumption is not discredited—its assumption that there are only two alternatives, either the finite or the empty infinite. So soon as a second kind of determinate being is shown to be possible, namely a self-determined, the understanding is confounded and its “stubborn” fortress is leveled to the earth. When further it is proved that all determinateness-through-another, or in other words all dependence or finitude, presupposes self-determination, or concrete infinitude, or true independent being as its ground, the problem is completely solved. We now see that the finite is only a “moment” of the total process of self-determination, namely the “moment” of self-opposition which is involved in the act of determining the self. For the self is dirempted into active and passive, or determining-self and determined-self. This opposition seen by itself without the identity underlying (*i. e.* without the self which is the same in both) gives us the categories of somewhat and other, and finitude. Finitude is made possible only by real infinitude.

But one may not at first perceive that self-determination is infinitude. He must note that the self is in this activity its own “other” and hence continued by it instead of limited by it—just as we saw in the examples of space and time. He must notice the totality of this category and consider its consequent independence. An independent being cannot be limited through another, be-

cause it can have no "other" to it that is essential to its being or to its manifestation.

Hegel in this place (p. 132) seems upon a superficial examination to deal in verbal quibbles, for he says, in substance, that the understanding persists in this lament over the category of finitude, and sets up nugatoriness as the characteristic of all things and thus makes perishableness itself to be imperishable and absolute. For perishableness is represented as not passing over into its other—that is to say into its affirmative quality—but by this very persistence it is suddenly transformed into its other; it is eternal. By attempting to set up finitude as persisting against infinitude or perishability against immortality, it makes perishability perish by becoming perennial. But Hegel has the rare faculty of looking behind the content of thought and seeing its essential form. He sees that the validity of this position of the understanding depends on the use of the category of finitude as absolute by itself. But such absoluteness or isolation is utterly self-contradictory. The dependent if thought as absolute and cut off from the independent changes instantly into the thought of the independent. Its dependence perishes. For if something can exist by itself it is independent. If we read Hegel as proving the infinite by the argument that those who assert the finite to be the only existence in the universe and the only possible existence—that these assert by this that the finite is infinite—we reject this as a verbal quibble for the reason that our "finite" has not changed

its nature, becoming infinite, and we have not arrived at a higher thought. The negative and relative remains negative and relative whatever its amount. But the new thought, the real thought of the infinite comes in when we turn our attention to the nature of the totality as totality. While the relative is dependent on others the totality is self-determined. The finite is a fragment and imperfect, the total is perfect and yet self-related, self-opposed, self-determined, and hence determinate like the finite, but also one and everywhere the same like the infinite. Change the idea of finite to dependent (or essentially finite) and the verbal quibble disappears.

THE RESTRAINT (SCHRANKE) AND THE OUGHT (SOLLEN).

The idea of otherness in the idea of quality, or in other words the idea of relativity involved in qualitative being, gives rise to the idea of destination (*Bestimmung*) as of something not yet realized, some internal possibility not yet made actual. Hence too we have by contrast the idea of an actuality which is not yet what it ought to be. This actual condition (*Beschaffenheit*) should however be mended and made to correspond to the inward destination. Here we have given to us the ethical application of this category of finitude. The actual condition (*Beschaffenheit*) regarded as an obstacle to be removed in the process of realizing the ideal is viewed as a restraint (*Schranke*) and the destination (*Bestimmung*) as the ideal becomes

the moral command or ought (*Sollen*). Restraint is the same as limit (*Grenze*) with the addition of the idea of negation. The limit which ought to be negated is a restraint (p. 135).

The idea of ought is a synthesis of somewhat and other—for it is the idea of other posited as the true ideal nature of the somewhat—this somewhat is in its essence the other and is a self-contradiction when not that other. Hence the ought presupposes infinitude as the truth. So, too, the idea of restraint posits infinitude. For it also contains both ideas, the somewhat and the other. The somewhat is limited by the other and yet ought to be the other. It is prevented by the other from being the other. Without the other, that is to say relieved of the restraint, it would be the other. Here the category of “other” is in self-contradiction again. The other prevents itself from being infinite or from absorbing the somewhat. But this very contradiction is the manifestation of infinitude; for the other limits itself—the restraint which preserves the somewhat finite is the act of the other limiting itself. Self-limitation is the manifestation of infinitude. Thus the moral “ought” opposed to the imperfection of the actually existing state is the actual infinite negating limitations which are already self-limitations.

But here the verbal quibble seems to intrude again: for the “other” as “restraint” seems to be different from the “other” as “ought.” The conclusion that the infinite lies as ground at the basis of the process seems to depend on a confusion

of the two "others" specifically distinct as ought and restraint under the vague including term "other."

But invoking again the unambiguous expression of this thought by the word "dependent," we see that the conclusion is not a fallacy (in the third figure of the syllogism). For the dependent is limited by the independent of which it is a phase. The total independent is the ideal or "ought" of the dependent which at the same time is posited by the independent, and hence its special limitations are there because thus posited by the independent. Hence, the ought and the restraint are both posited by one being, the independent. But this is not all. A conscious being implies independent self-existence. Hence, too, responsibility for all of its determinations. Hence the moral being feels guilt if it does not square all of its deeds by the standard of the moral law. Therefore a consciousness of ought implies present infinitude—or in other words independence and self-otherness.

THE INFINITE.

The finite is and can be only the part of a process within the infinite, the dependent is always within the independent. "The infinite is not the mere negative annulment (*Aufheben*) of the finite, but it is the nature of the finite to become the infinite. The infinite is its affirmative destination or what it is in truth when its potentiality (*an sich*) is realized." (p. 142). The infinite opposed to the

finite is the conception of the untutored reflection. It thinks infinite and finite as somewhat and other, although the infinite already contains both sides of the opposition. As such crude thought it has found the category of "infinite progress." But it possesses the category of the true infinite in the background of its consciousness as that which makes possible the thought of infinite progression. "And so on forever" implies that there is a necessity that the "other" into which we are proceeding must always remain the same. The other in such a case is always the self-same and the progress is only a going-together-with-itself (*mit sich selbst zusammengehen*) and this is a process of return to the self instead of negation and perishability (p. 153).

"The infinite is in fact the process in which it [the totality] reduces itself to one of its own determinations [or 'moments'], namely to an antithesis of finite opposed to infinite, and annuls this self-distinction thus making it affirmative [instead of negative, for it is now a negation of negation] and by this process of mediation it is the true infinite" (p. 155).

"This infinite is not a dead unity, but a process. It is not a mere becoming; but a process of return-into-itself, of relation to itself" (p. 155).

The finite is not the really existent; it is the infinite that really exists. But the category of "reality" is not after all adequate to the expression of the truth of the higher categories (p. 156).

IDEALITY.

The reality which the finite possesses is buried in a deeper reality—the first negation which constitutes finitude is buried in the second negation which as the infinite is the negation of negation. “Negation is therefore now to be defined (*bestimmt*) as ideality; the ideal (*ideelle*) is the finite as it exists in the true infinite, namely as a determination or content which is to be discriminated, but yet is not independent and self-existent (*nicht selbstständig seyend*) but only a ‘moment.’ Ideality has this concrete signification which is not perfectly expressed by the statement that the infinite is the negation of finite beings” (pp. 156-157). In this passage occurs a remarkable typographical error, at the bottom of the page 156, the word “*identität*” should evidently be “*idealität*.” Hegel did not mean to say “negation is thus to be defined as *identity*,” but “negation is thus to be defined as *ideality*.” The context shows this clearly.

In the true infinite the finite exists *ideally*—that is to say dependent being exists in the independent being as subordinated—as posited and yet annulled. For it is not the total, but a one-sided manifestation of the total. This conception of ideality as a higher idea than reality because it is the comprehension of the true relation of “reality” to the totality, is the important thought which introduces us to the idea of being-for-itself (*für-sich-seyn*) as the true independent being. “Ideality

may be called the *quality* of infinitude
 . . . as annullment of finitude and of the empty
 infinite opposed to the finite, it is the return-to-
 itself, or relation to itself and hence has the form
 of being [for all that has self-relation has the form
 of being] it is a being that rests
 on negation of negation or self-related negation
 and is to be called being-for-itself" (p. 157). And
 again (p. 159): "The solution of the contradic-
 tion of the infinite progress is not in the recogni-
 tion of the equal validity of the two sides [*i. e.* of
 the somewhat and other—the destination and
 limit], nor of their equal invalidity, but of their
ideality, the fact that they are merely 'moments'
 [complemental elements, as acid and alkali in a
 salt] in their difference and mutual negating."
 "Ideality contains the sides of this contradiction
 concretely solved and reconciled, and not merely
 overcome abstractly. And it is the nature of spec-
 ulative thinking to seize opposed thoughts and
 unite them affirmatively in a higher thought" (p.
 160).

In this thought of *ideality* we have all the
 seeming reality of the "somewhat and other"
 united with all the nugatoriness which made its
 appearance in the categories of finitude.

"The proposition that the finite is ideal, consti-
 tutes idealism the doctrine that the
 finite is not a true existent. Every philosophy
 is essentially idealistic the only ques-
 tion being how far it is consistent in carrying
 out its doctrines for the principles set

up to explain things—namely, water or matter, or atoms are not things in their sensuous concreteness, but thoughts ; as for example, Thales did not conceive water merely as water existing [in the rivers and seas] but also as the potentiality or essence of all other things. Hence all other things were explained as grounded through something else, namely, water, and not as self-existent. They were posited through something else, that is to say they were *ideal*.”

When a being loses itself in another it is said to be ideal (*ideel*). Our finite determinate beings are now seen to be lost in an all-including process of infinite being which posits them as well as annuls them and hence holds them within it as *ideal*. This process has the form of being and is a unity and self-identity and yet the source of endless distinction within itself. It is being-for-itself.

CHAPTER XXI.

BEING-FOR-ITSELF—A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL'S DISCUSSION OF THIS IDEA.

HEGEL commences his third chapter with the words: "In Being-for-itself qualitative being reaches its perfection; it is infinite being. Being at the beginning was indeterminate [*i.e.* pure being]. Determinate being (*Daseyn*) is annulled being (*aufgehobene Seyn*), but its annulment is merely an immediate affair [not a self-mediation but a mediation through 'other' as in the case with 'somewhat']; it contains, therefore, only the primary, immediate form of negation. In determinate being, being is still retained; both being and negation are united in it in a simple unity which, however, because of its simplicity unites them imperfectly, leaving them non-identical with one another; their unity is not yet posited. Determinate being is therefore the sphere of difference, of dualism, the field of finitude. Determinateness in this sphere is a relative affair and not absolute determinateness [substitute for the word 'absolute, the word 'self' in Hegel's writings—absolute determinateness means self-determinateness]. In being-for-itself the difference between being and determinateness or negation is posited and also resolved into identity (*ausgeglichen*). Quality,

other-being, limit, as well as reality, being-in-itself, ought, etc. are the imperfect mental images (*Einbildungen*) of negation in the category of being; in them the difference of being and negation is the ground-thought. But in the category of infinitude negation passes over into the *posited* negation of negation and is the simple relation-to-itself, and consequently it contains in-itself (*i. e.* potentially) the complete reconciliation and identification (*Ausgleichung*) of negation with being—that is to say: absolute determined being” (pp. 165–166).

The progress, therefore, according to Hegel has been from being and naught as utterly different and opposed thoughts—a complete dualism—to the insight into the fact that the negative is only the activity of being—only its self-determination. We now see the negative as the essentially constituent element of being.

Being is of no validity unless self-determined—unless it is itself a self-negation and the negation of its negation.

This “absolute determination” or “perfected form of quality” is self-determination as being-for-itself, the first form of individuality.

This is, in its immediateness, one; in its mediation it is many, and further on repulsion and attraction; thirdly, in its self-mediation quality passes over into quantity—the repulsion and attraction come into identity through the fact that each by itself develops into the other. This we shall explain in the course of the present chapter.

“Being-for-one” (*Seyn-für-Eines*) is Hegel’s

expression of the dependence on the whole which one of the "somewhats" or "others" has within the infinite or being-for-itself. Each one of its phases is a "moment" or a somewhat whose identity is lost in the whole. It is "ideal," to use the expression commented on in the preceding chapter. This (ideality) is one of Hegel's most important thoughts and should be studied until perfectly familiar, inasmuch as it perpetually recurs in his writings. On page 168, for example, speaking of this being-for-one: "It is only a being for another and because of this it is also a being for one; it is only the one *ideality* of all that is contained in the being-for-itself as a moment of it." "The *ideal* is necessarily for one, but it is not for-another; the one for which it is is only itself." Because in the being-for-itself the somewhats and others have vanished as such; their distinctions are no longer valid; their ideality consists in the loss of their individuality in the one. The one is the self and the ideal is accordingly not a dependence on another but on its true self.

"The Eleatic 'Being,' as well as the Spinozistic 'Substance,' would have to be explained as the abstract negation of all determinateness without positing the same in the form of ideality" (p. 170). The negation is too complete—it annuls the individuality *through* another, but does not realize it *in* another. It is the lack of this insight into the true dialectic of finitude that constitutes pantheism so-called—the doctrine that there is one only being and that all else is maya or illusion.

The difficulty of expounding this category is spoken of by Hegel on page 174 in a manner calculated to terrify the raw student: "The moments that constitute the idea (*Begriff*) of the One, in Being-for-itself, develop separately as follows: (1) negation in general; (2) two negations; (3) consequently two that are identical; (4) but which are directly opposed to each other; (5) relation to itself or identity as such; (6) negative relation which is at the same time self-relation.

"These moments appear separately here," Hegel adds significantly, "because the form of immediateness which being-for-itself takes on [through its absorption of all distinction into self-distinction, in other words through the dependence of all its moments] is also attributed to its moments and each one of these moments is posited as a self-existing (*eigene Seyende*) determination; and yet these moments are inseparable, notwithstanding their independence. Hence of each determination its opposite may be affirmed. This contradiction it is that makes the difficulty here—it is the contradiction involved in the isolation (*abstracten Beschaffenheit*) of the moments."

All of these phases are to be found in any self-activity or self-determined being. One must take note that negation, and not being, is the substrate or underlying basis of all things. All being as we have seen is result or "form" of self-relation or self-return. Being without this self-return is pure nothing. But the elements of self-relation or self-return are negative: relation

is negation. Self-relation is and must be, therefore, self-negation.

Let us comment on the six "moments" named above as belonging to the idea of being-for-itself.

1. "Negation in general." We have the negation of the somewhat and likewise of the "other;" also negation of the finite and of the abstract or empty infinite; we have negation in general, in short negation by itself. But negation by itself is negation of itself or self-negation, and hence we have arrived at the second "moment."

2. "Two negations." These are a first negative and a second negative which is the negation of the first; for both of these are involved in self-negation.

The human understanding is an imperfect faculty which sees some "moments" but not all "moments" of the object. It unites some by synthesis but fails to unite others. This partial insight into the "moments" of true being (or, rather, we may say all *of the degrees* of this partial insight, or the sphere of such imperfect insight) is called "the understanding." Now the understanding may see negation alone, or it may see two negations, or it may see that these two negations are identical or are opposed. All such insights are partial and yet they lead to practical differences in the world of opinion and action. These partial insights of the understanding furnish guiding principles for individuals and for nations; hence it is well not to despise this investigation into the pure thought dialectic which reveals to us the fundamental rationale

of the genesis and dissolution of these partial categories. Being possessed of this knowledge it becomes possible "to minister to a mind diseased"—diseased by a partial view—and cure it by leading it to the dialectic that widens it to a higher category.

3. "The two negations are the same:" the negation that annuls the "other" does this by making still another. But we cannot find an ultimate "other"—each "other" has its "other," and hence we see the fourth "moment," namely the necessary opposition of the two negations.

4. "These two negations are absolutely opposed." The one annuls the other but is annulled at once by another—so that the disappearance of one negation is accompanied by the simultaneous appearance of a new one. This leads us to the synthesis which is a far deeper and truer thought, namely the fifth "moment." This "moment" contains all the preceding—but "in their truth," as Hegel would say.

5. "Relation to itself, identity as such." All self-relation gives us "the form of being." We have noticed this thought of Hegel making its appearance first in the dissolution of the category of becoming—the return into itself of beginning and of ceasing through their opposites, constitutes "determinate being;" and subsequently it often appears; for it is one of the most important insights that Hegel has discovered. Here it gives us the self-identity or one-ness of the being-for-itself. When we come to the first part of the sec-

ond volume, treating of Essence, we shall find Hegel giving what he evidently considers the most fundamental and thorough discussion of this genesis of identity out of the self-relation of the negative. The reader will recollect also that it was used first by Hegel as the insight which in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* leads out of "Force and the Understanding" to the "Begriff" or the idea of self-activity. Consciousness became self-consciousness when it perceived itself to be the necessary substrate of the world. The negation related to itself is continued or affirmed by its "other." If the relation (and all relation implies difference or distinction) is to the self, the distinction is at once annulled and there is identity again. Only where there is persistent mediation is there persistence of distinction. The mediation is reduced to immediateness when negation relates to negation. But there is another phase to be considered: the relation of negation to itself is negative, and hence the result is to negate the self and produce what is different. Hence we have the sixth "moment."

6. "Negative relation which, however, is directed to itself." The negative self-relation is a production of distinction instead of identity. But as Hegel shows in the discussion of "Reflection" (Vol. II. pp. 15-26) this very production of distinction is itself the very self-relation which produces identity again. For the negative activity sustains itself by producing negative activity. But this is the production of what is identical with

itself and therefore it is simple identity and as such devoid of negation. Hence it (the production of identity) is the annulment of the self-activity. But such annulment is only the production of distinction—the production of what is different from the self-activity. But this very annulment keeps alive the activity and is again identity. The student may suppose this to be a process of verbal quibbling, but let him think out the objective thought which is involved here and he has *the secret of Hegel*.

These “six moments” above discussed as involved in the thought of being-for-itself, are, we now see, (or ought to see) not properly coördinate “moments,” but rather successive stages of insight. But for the understanding they will be taken for coördinate when first discovered. The negative aspect of independent being is that which first attracts us. We see a totality and the first evidence of its independence is its exclusion of others and sole reliance on itself. This is its one-ness.

Hegel points out that it is the ideality of the being-for-itself—the lack of self-existence of its moments, as we have explained—that produces this one-ness (p. 174). This characteristic of one-ness which is so prominent in being-for-itself will be applied to all of the “moments” so that each “moment” will be looked upon as independent and self-existent—in short, as a being-for-itself. This gives us the explanation of several important distinctions that necessarily arise in human thought on its way towards self-comprehension. And these

distinctions are used every day by everybody in thinking the content of experience. The atom and the void, the one and the many ones, repulsion and attraction, and the union of repulsion and attraction in the idea of quantity—these are the chief distinctions discussed. We will take them up in detail.

“The one is not capable of transition into another; it is unchangeable” (p. 175). It is not dependent on another, but is self-dependent; its activity must be, not change, but a “going-together-with-itself.” Again, it is indeterminate so far as “others” are concerned, and this is due to the “ideality” of its determinations—they are not self-existent, but dependent, and therefore the one is a vacuum so far as qualitative distinctions go. It is the void (p. 176). Empty space is simply the reality of distinction superadded to the unreality of the parts distinguished. The points in space are everywhere really separated, but they, the points, are unreal. Here is the atom and the void underlying our thought of space.

But the atom excludes the void and is excluded by it. Here is an example of the superinduction of independence on one of the moments, an application of the idea of being-for-itself to one of its moments as Hegel explained above. But this mutual limitation of atom and void is a lapse back out of the thought of being-for-itself into the categories of finitude; namely, the atom is a somewhat and the void is “another,” as Hegel acutely points out (p. 176). “The one or atom is the ne-

gation in the form of being, and the void is the negation in the form of non-being" (p. 17). But as the one is already the self-relation of negation it is the void in itself. The void as negating and excluding is too a one, and hence we have arrived at the thought of many ones mutually excluding—or at the idea of repulsion. Perhaps (as remarked by Rosenkranz in his critique of the Hegelian logic), the words repulsion and attraction are too suggestive of concrete experience to deserve a place here in the exposition of the genesis of the pure categories of quantity. But no harm will result if the reader is careful to keep Hegel's definitions in mind. "The negative relation of one to itself is repulsion" (p. 179). That is to say, the exclusiveness of the one is conceived by the understanding as negating all distinctions within itself, and by this very act as distinguishing itself as a whole from its own determinateness, and this produces the antithesis of atom and void, which further and more carefully seized, is the thought of the one and many. For the one is such a thought as involves self-opposition—in the sense that the one self can be one only through this duplication of itself. The second is likewise self opposed and so on *ad infinitum*. Here we have what Hegel calls "repulsion;" and moreover, "attraction:" for the negative act of excluding, which generates the many ones, is likewise a single or unital act which annuls the independence of the ones and makes them "ideal" again (or reduces them to moments of the total one). Here we have arrived at the

idea of quantity. The being-for-itself is still qualitative when we regard it as the self-related negative which distinguishes and excludes, which contains somewhats and others in an "ideal" condition (*i.e.* as moments.) But when the being-for-itself imparts its one-ness to each somewhat and other, making them ones over against it or within it ("repulsion"), and at the same time includes them all as "ideal" (moments), or as emptied of their qualitative distinctions ("repulsion" annulled by "attraction"), we have quantity. The repulsion is the annulment of dependence, the attraction is the reassertion of it. Being-for-one presupposes dependence (or the "ideality" of the somewhat and other); but it at once undermines, so to speak, this presupposition by negating dependence (repulsion causing the "atom and void"). "Repulsion passes over into attraction, the many ones into a single one. The two, repulsion and attraction, are at first different, repulsion being the reality of the ones, and attraction being their ideality," (p. 186). But the ideality is necessary in order to have one or ones at all; and if we have "ideality" we necessarily get real one and ones. Hence the two cannot be separated, or rather, each is the genesis of the other. "Repulsion is the positing of the many, and attraction is the positing of the one; the latter is the negation of the many, and the former is the negation of the ideality of the ones in the one; therefore attraction is attraction by aid of repulsion, and repulsion is repulsion by aid of attraction" (p. 188). Hegel shows the one

in the other (p. 190). "The repulsion of the real ones is the preservation of the one (the totality) through the reciprocal exclusion of one-another, [for this exclusion has the form of finitude—somewhat related to another]. . . and hence this is attraction as the ideality of the one. Moreover, the one according to its nature (*an sich*) ought to be devoid of relation to another; but this category (*das Ansich*) has been long since annulled, and the being-for-itself has taken its place, and now the nature of the ones (*seiner Bestimmung nach*) is to become many, as we have already seen. The attraction of the really existing ones is their ideality [their reduction to "moments"] and the positing of the one (totality) in which the many ones annul themselves and thereby produce the one (independent being); this positing of the one is an act of repulsion on their part," (p. 190). Here he finds repulsion in that very ideality (or abdication of independence) that characterizes the separate moments of finitude as they are retained in being-for-itself. They repel their independence by positing an excluding unity, which swallows them up.

Hegel summarizes the transition from quality to quantity thus (p. 191):

"The qualitative has for its fundamental determination the immediateness of being: in this the limit and the characteristic quality (*Bestimmtheit*) is identical with the being of the somewhat, in such a way that the somewhat loses its identity with each change. Hence its finitude [or perisha-

bility] is posited [expressly stated]. On account of the immediateness of this unity [of being and determinateness] in which their difference has vanished, although it still remains potentially, (*an sich*) [*i. e.*, in the unity of being and naught], this difference [of being and determinateness] falls outside of their unity [and offers itself] as otherness. But this relation to another contradicts that immediateness necessary to qualitative determinateness and its self-relation, [without self-relation there can be no immediateness—hence to place what is essential to the nature of the somewhat in another, is to destroy its immediateness]. This otherness is removed through the infinitude of the being-for-itself which retains the difference [of being and its determinateness] in the form of negation of negation, and holds it *within* itself [instead of in another], and realizes it in such categories as unity and multiplicity, and by this has elevated the category of quality to its true unity—not its immediate unity [but its self-mediated unity] of being and determinateness, so that now its determinateness is in harmony with its being.” That is to say : any quiescent being, or any being whose nature is determined by outside influences, is not in accord with true being, and cannot exist as such. But a being whose own act determines its character has true quality because it harmonizes with being, *i. e.*, the being which is self-relation is not contradicted by its character, which is also self-relation as self-determination. The discerning reader will see by this summarizing remark

how deep and how comprehensive the thought of Hegel has been in this discussion.

Now that we have a one that is many, and many that are one, we have quantity. A one that is not divisible and hence a unity of other ones, and at the same time a unit or an aggregate of ones, is not a quantitative one.

CHAPTER XXII.

QUANTITY.

ALL determination is quantitative. This is a dictum ascribed to Schelling. But we, too, at this stage to which we have arrived might make the same assertion. For we have seen that all qualitative determinateness is “*aufgehoben*,” or reduced-to-a-moment of a higher category, to wit: of quantity. The step is a very simple one when seen at a glance. All determination must be a phase of self-determination. But self-determination includes (*a*) self as determining and (*b*) self as determined—a duplication of the self, so to speak. All determinateness considered as the immediateness of self-determination must be quantitative; for quantity is the immediateness—that is to say, the first and least mature—or least developed—stage of self-activity.

We must hold in view steadily the “*Begriff*”—the idea of self-activity as the ultimate and true principle. Hegel, as we have shown in our introduction, must have reached this thought before he began either his *Logic* or his *Phenomenology*, for only after seizing that idea could he see that all phases of consciousness and all categories of thinking are more or less perfect expressions of this highest principle, and that their shortcomings

will be manifest in each category or phase of consciousness on dialectic examination. The dialectic will show the defect of each as a *nisus* or struggle to get beyond its own definition to a higher definition. The idea of the finite will contain a contradiction which will cause its annulment in the infinite. Its unity of being and determinateness lacks mediation, and therefore it is obliged to depend on external *médiation*, on the “other;” this destroys it, and the larger process, which includes both its affirmation and its negation, makes its appearance as the infinite and being-for-itself.

Hegel’s task, after gaining an insight into the first principle, was to explain all things by its light. It was not to invent all things—not to create the facts, but to *explain* them, by showing their agreement with the necessary presuppositions.

In the explanation of these categories of pure thought he was to show the lower and inadequate categories as attempts to seize the idea (*Begriff*) of self-activity—attempts which failed because only one or more phases of it were seized and the others were omitted.

The first and lowest phase of pure thought must necessarily be pure being, because it is the simplest—as the terminus from which we begin—identical with naught because it could have only the empty form of self-relation and be utterly void of content. The form of being is self-relation. Pure being is the form of self-relation but without determinateness and therefore without a self to relate or be related. As such, pure being is exactly the same

concept as pure nothing, which is utter emptiness and negativity considered substantively—that is to say considered as self-related. It is not the same concept, however, as that of non-being; for non-being contains an expression of dualism and has the form of relativity to another, namely to the being of which it is the negation.

We have seen the successive phases evolved—becoming with its two phases beginning and ceasing, their “return-into-self” and the rise of determined being (*Daseyn*); its two phases of reality and negation and their return-into-self as somewhat (*Etwas*) the category of “other” and the phases of “being-in-itself” (or undeveloped potentiality—*Ansichseyn*), being-for-others (or dependence), destination, limit, ought and restraint, change, finitude; the other of the other, and the “going-together-with-itself,” which is another expression for “return-to-itself” or reflection; the infinite progress, the true infinite; the being-for-itself, with its phases—being-for-one, one and many, repulsion and attraction. Finally we have quantity, and this thought that all determinateness is quantitative.

But as quantity is only the immediateness of self-activity we are sure that it is not an adequate category for the expression of ultimate truth, and that our principle, “all determinateness is quantitative,” will have to be set aside further on. Hegel must have seen that quantity is inadequate when he first came to it, because his method is that of the “*Begriff*,” or of self-activity, and hence it

must have been evident to him that any category that does not explicitly and adequately state self-activity is an imperfect one and will cancel itself, when tested in the rôle of universality.

And yet, quantity is more adequate than immediate quality to express the truth of the absolute. For while quality makes determinateness to be immediately one with being and therefore demands dependence on an outside determiner, quantity makes determinateness to be the result of self-activity—it is the difference of the self from the self,—the self-opposition of the one. This view looks straight towards genus (or species) and its included individuals in their external aspect. The universal, or generating cause repeats itself in individuals, ones, totalities which, however, are “ideal” elements of larger totalities—and thus are quantities.

No material thing could exist, if it were not for this self-repetition. For there would be no homogeneity and hence no aggregation. Without continuity of the same with the same there could be no quantity, and without quantity no masses and no molecules. Hence no material being. Thus it is that we may say here that all determinateness is quantitative. Though it may be something more and higher than quantity, it cannot be any less.

THE SUB-CATEGORIES OF QUANTITY.

Quantity is the indifference and non-identity of being and its determinateness, just as quality is their identity. Hegel alludes to the ordinary

definition of quantity in mathematics which reads: "Quantity is what may be increased or diminished." "To increase," says he, "means to make a quantity larger, and to decrease means to make a quantity smaller. Hence this definition amounts to saying, that 'quantity is that whose quantity may be changed.' This is an imperfect definition because it uses quantity to define quantity." This reminds us of Bardolph's definition of *accommodated*: "accommodated—that is, when a man is, as they say, accommodated," etc.

Under quantity, Hegel treats of (*a*) pure quantity, (*b*) continuous and discrete quantity, (*c*) the limitation of quantity [arising through the unity of continuity and discreteness]; (*d*) "quantum," or limited quantity, which is number; (*e*) extensive and intensive quantum, and their unity in an infinite progress (the "progressions" or "series"). (*f*) The quantitative infinitude. This quantitative infinitude he shows to rest on the idea of ratio wherein two numbers—quanta—are in relation to each other so that the value of the whole is mediated by both numbers and neither expresses by itself any absolute value;—take the terms of a fraction for example. Under quantitative ratio, therefore, we find the more complete investigation of the quantitative infinitude, and its sub-topics are (*g*) the direct ratio, (*h*) the inverse ratio, (*i*) the ratio of powers (*Potenzenverhältniss*, which means the ratio of the number to itself when it is raised to a power by multiplying it by itself). This leads to Measure (*Maass*) the third great division of the Logic of Being.

Connected with the discussion of the essential categories of quantity there are a succession of notes or remarks (*Anmerkungen*) in which Hegel has discussed important applications of his insights to the solution of vexed questions. They are the following :

(1) Remark on the definition of quantity (pp. 202-3).

(2) On Spinoza's definition of quantity as of two species, pure and determinate ; on the relation of pure quantity to space, time, matter, and the ego. He says that the ego has pure quantity—"as an absolute becoming-other, an infinite separation or all-sided repulsion tending to the freedom of being-for itself, but which remains absolutely simple continuity, the continuity of universality, or of being-by-itself [*Beisichseyens*=being at one with itself, *i. e.* being that is its own environment] which is not interrupted in its self-continuity by the infinite manifold of limits furnished by its varied feelings and sense-perceptions, volitions and thoughts" (pp. 205-208).

(3) On the Kantian Antinomy of the infinite divisibility of time, space, and matter (pp. 208-220).

(4) The common view, according to which discrete quantity and continuous quantity are considered to be two different species of quantity (pp. 221-222).

(5) The elementary operations of arithmetic. The Kantian synthesis *à priori* of sense-perception as exemplified (*a*) in the sum of $7+5=12$, and

(b) in the axiom that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points (pp. 226-233).

(6) The use of numerical expressions for philosophical thoughts by Pythagoras; the Trinity; geometric figures—circle, triangle, etc.,—as symbols of eternity or the Trinity, etc. Hegel shows the utter inadequacy of these symbols to express, as words can express, these high ideas—words, in short, can express and discriminate universal, particular, and singular ideas, whereas the symbol must always confound the universal and particular; hence with the symbol there can be no subsumption and hence no expression of a logical train of thought. That which number expresses of a thought is only its externality (pp. 236-242).

(7) Examples of the identity of extensive and intensive quantities. With Hegel “identity” means necessary connection or inseparableness and not mere empty sameness. The examples of degree of heat shown by extension of column of mercury or expansion of air, etc.; the intensity of soul shown by wide-reaching influence, etc. (pp. 248-250).

(8) Kant's application of the category of degree or intensive quantity to the being of the soul. Kant had undermined the old proof of immortality which rested on showing that the soul lacked extensive quantity and hence could not perish through division or sundering of its parts. Hegel criticises Kant's reply that the argument is good only so far as the extensive quantity of the soul is concerned, but it does not prove that the soul may

not perish through the gradual remission of its powers, losing thereby its intensive quantity (p. 251).

(9) On the high significance of the quantitative progress *ad infinitum*. It is used mostly in "tirades," much admired for their supposed sublimity—"stars beyond stars, worlds beyond worlds, systems beyond systems, limitless periods of time, *et cetera*. The imagination takes this flight into the immeasurable distance where the farthest world has always one beyond it still farther." Hegel remarks dryly that the continual setting up of a limit and then causing it to vanish is tedious rather than sublime. He commends Kant's admiration of the sublimity of the moral freedom of the ego as preferable to the shallow sense that stops before the sublilities of distance in time and space (pp. 257-264).

(10) On the Kantian antinomy of the limitation or unlimitedness of the world in time and space (pp. 264-269.) "The Kantian antinomies are expositions of the antithesis of the finite and the infinite, in a concrete form applied to special substrates furnished by the imagination." Hamilton's "law of the conditioned" will occur to the reader of this statement by Hegel. It is a matter of the imagination (*Vorstellung*=mental picture) and not of pure thought. There is no antinomy to the pure thinking. But Hamilton proves this "law of the conditioned," as he tells us, by "applying it" to space, time and other objects. Space is either finite or infinite. If we attempt to think it as

finite we see at once that its environment demands space to exist in and therefore that its very boundaries posit space beyond it. Hence, instead of being limited it can only be affirmed or continued by its limits. Space is infinite because it is its own other. But can we conceive the infinite? Yes, certainly, we reply, we can think it as that which necessarily continues itself, and is of such a nature that it is its own boundaries. But Hamilton means by "conceive" to form a mental picture, and accordingly decides that we cannot conceive infinite space. To make a mental picture of a thing means to imagine it as limited in space. A picture must have a frame, or at least a border. Hamilton's antinomy is therefore the opposition of the imagination to pure thought and not the opposition of pure thought to itself. Examined closely it disappears altogether. For the impossibility of picturing the infinite was to be expected. Indeed, had Hamilton found himself able to imagine the infinite there would have been a real contradiction as will appear by the following consideration: The pure thinking affirms space to be infinite, because any assumed boundaries are found to continue it; but on the supposition that one finds that he can picture the infinite, he has found its final boundaries, or limits, and hence it must be finite. This would be a real antinomy, but the one given by Hamilton is not an antinomy, as will also appear. For thought sees first that space is infinite; next the imagination tries to picture it but fails to do so because it cannot discover any real

or final limits ; hence the inference from the failure of the attempt on the part of the imagination confirms the verdict of pure thought. Pure thought says space is infinite ; imagination says : " I cannot imagine it as finite." Surely this is no contradiction.

The antinomies of Kant doubtless suggested both form and content of the law to Hamilton, though he claims the law as his greatest discovery. But Kant did not make the mistake of questioning the infinitude of space. For he assumes its infinitude as one of the reasons for deciding it to be the *à priori* form of intuition (*Anschauung* = sense-perception).

Nevertheless Kant undoubtedly falls into error, in this, his first antinomy of limitedness or unlimitedness of the world in time and space. To prove his thesis that the world has a beginning in time and is limited in space, he assumes the opposite to be true, and asserts that it is an inconceivable alternative. " If the world had no beginning, then up to any given moment of time an infinite series of successive conditions of the things in the world would have elapsed. But the infinitude of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed by a successive synthesis. Hence an infinite series of world-conditions cannot have elapsed, and hence a beginning of the world is the necessary condition of its existence."

But it is clear that the difficulty regarding the " elapsed " or finished (*verflossene*) series and its " successive synthesis," is one that appertains to

time itself primarily, and to the world only in so far as its existence is conditioned by time. Hence Kant, like Hamilton, should have made his proof deny the infinitude of time rather than that of the world. But he expressly admits the infinitude of time, as conceivable and obvious, in his *Transcendental Aesthetic*. And well he may, for time is of such a nature that any limit of it implies time to exist in. Any beginning implies a previous time.

Kant might have said "Every given moment presupposes an infinite series of moments of time already elapsed. But an infinitude can never be completed by successive synthesis and hence an infinite time cannot have elapsed or been finished." Hegel remarks on this point: "We see that it was unnecessary for Kant to use the indirect proof for he already had assumed what he proposed to prove. Namely, a given moment is assumed, up to which time an eternity has elapsed, eternity having here the restricted sense of the abstract infinite (*schlecht-unendlichen*, i. e. the infinite progress). A 'given moment' means nothing more nor less than a definite limit to time. In the proof therefore, a limit to time is actually presupposed, but this is the very thing that demands proof. For the thesis asserts that the world has a beginning in time. The assumed time-limit is a Now, the end of the elapsed time and the beginning of the future time. But the Now as end of an infinite series of conditions of mundane affairs is a qualitative limit and not a quantitative limit. For

if it were taken for a quantitative limit which is receding and in its very nature a moving limit, then the infinite time has not elapsed or been finished in this limit, and the proof breaks down." In other words the limit assumed in the now as a qualitative is not qualitative but a quantitative—a limit not in something else than time, but a limit in time itself, hence a limit of itself through itself which is a continuation of time rather than a qualitative, or final limitation. Hence the indirect demonstration rests on an assumption which is not valid.

The part of the thesis also which relates to space is proved by dragging in the idea of time. "The successive enumeration of the parts of an infinite world in space would require an infinite time which must be regarded as having elapsed, which is impossible. For this reason an infinite sum-total of actual things in the world cannot be thought. Hence the world is not infinite." This it is clear would refute in the same manner the infinitude of space which Kant assumes in the proof which he gives of its *à priori* nature, in *The Transcendental Aesthetic*.

Hegel, as we have seen, makes the idea of quantity spring out of the idea of qualitative infinitude. Quantity is therefore in its very nature an infinite series—infinately divisible and infinitely continuable. Its limits, being quantitative, are continuations, and not such limitations as make what they limit to be finite. Space and time are therefore given by Hegel as examples of pure quantity

(p. 266) they are such that any limits assumed in them are continuous with what they limit.

The antithesis of this antinomy is proved by Kant through the principle that "In a void time the origination of a thing is impossible, because no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being [*eine unterscheidende Bedingung des Daseyns*]=a condition favorable to originating being] in preference to that of non-being." A self-active being would not move itself to originate something nor would any cause begin to act without some previous occasion inciting it to act.

Hegel remarks that this indirect proof also assumes, without proving, the point to be demonstrated, "Namely, something beyond the existence of the world, to wit, a void time. It posits a limit and then proceeds to annul it. The world is a being, and the proof assumes that this originates in a previous condition of being. But the antithesis asserts that there is no absolute limit but only a preceding condition which is again conditioned, and this again, to infinity. Hence what the antithesis asserts is assumed in the proof. The void time moreover is assumed as something temporal and limited, and hence is a being." In other words Kant proves that the world has no beginning by asserting the necessity of a previous condition of being in order that the present condition may have arisen, and thus contradicts himself.

"The thesis and antithesis and their proofs offer nothing, therefore, except contrary assertions to the effect that there is a limit but that the limit is

annulled ; that the limit has a beyond to which it is related, but that when we pass beyond the limit we meet a new one which we can also pass beyond, hence the limits are not absolute."

Kant's solution of this antinomy through the subjectivity of time and space, as forms of sense-perception, thereby removing the self-contradiction from the world and placing it in the ego, is pronounced by Hegel to be a too tender consideration of the interests of the world and an equal lack of consideration for the ego. "This so-called 'world' contains the contradiction, but cannot sustain itself under it as the mind can, and therefore it is exposed to change and decay."

If we glance at this first antinomy once more we shall see that both thesis and antithesis rest on or presupposes the same thought, namely, the antithesis—as in the third antinomy regarding freedom and fate, both rest on the thesis. For if the world has a beginning it presupposes a definite previous condition in which it originated. But this definite previous condition is of the same finite and existent nature as the world and is therefore to be regarded as a continuation of the world's existence. Hence the world is infinite as the antithesis asserts. But the inability to complete a synthesis is an irrelevant affair and need not have been brought up here, as it has nothing to do with the case. That we cannot picture the totality of space and of time does not cast a doubt on their infinitude, but on the contrary it confirms our insight into the necessity of that

infinitude. So, too, our inability to add up in "successive synthesis," the past conditions of the world's existence, does not cast a doubt on the infinitude of existence in time (for "world" as understood by Kant, means "universe" and not the earth nor the solar system). We know that such synthesis is impossible precisely because we know the series of conditions to be infinite (pp. 264-269).

(11) On the fundamental thought involved in the idea of the mathematical infinite (pp. 272-315).

(12) On the object of the differential calculus as deduced from the application that is made of it (pp. 315-352).

(13) Still other varieties of qualitative forms of quantity (pp. 352-366).

(14) On the use of the ratio of powers (*Potenzverhältniss*), symbolically as a philosophical term (pp. 378-382).

In the three remarks relating to higher mathematics, occupying nearly one hundred pages of Volume I. of the *Logic*—one-fifth of the entire work—we see the outcome of Hegel's insight into quantity. We will take up this in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE RELATION OF QUANTITY TO QUALITY ELUCIDATED.

BEFORE taking up the question of quantitative infinitude, involved in Hegel's explanation of the fundamental basis on which the higher analysis of mathematics rests, we must discuss first the relation of quantity to quality.

We have seen that quantity is the union or "identity," as Hegel calls it, of attraction and repulsion. Attraction is the predominance of the factor, or element (moment), of dependence or "ideality" — the subordination of the parts to the whole in such a manner that they lose their individuality in the totality. Repulsion is the predominance of the factor of independence, the "reflection-into-itself" of the whole in the parts which endows them with independence and exclusiveness. Once for all, being and determinateness are united in the form of self-determination in the being-for-itself, and quantity is the first phase and consequently the shallowest phase of this, its self-determination.

So to speak, quantity is self-determination with the self left out. For the self-determination of independent being (*Für-sich-seyn*) is the duplication of self—a one which is a process of du-

plication or self-multiplication. Take the dead results of this self-determination and we have quantity. We have ones; these are excluding and independent and yet not self-active; they are anything but self-active. And yet without self-activity there could be no being-for-itself and hence no oneness, and no repetition of oneness and no quantity. The category of quantity is an insight into the form of true being, but only a partial insight. It sees just what the category of quality failed to see. The insight of quality perceived the dependence and consequent "ideality" of the two elements or factors of determinateness. It announced that all determinateness is negation and that being also is negation; being is the self-relation of negation and determinateness is negation taken apart from self-relation. Both determinateness and being are united in self-determination, which is being-for-itself.

The insight into quantity perceives, *not* the side of dependence and ideality, like quality, but the side of independence belonging to determinateness. In quality, being and determinateness were one, in quantity the determinateness and being are indifferent towards one another. Determinateness has these two phases, quality, or identity with being, and quantity or non-identity with being. The idea of quality leads over into quantity through its "dialectic." Its dialectic is an exposition of its presuppositions. Quality presupposes self-determination and the immediate aspect of the determinateness of self-

determination is quantity. Quality is dependence and the positing of a higher unity through mutual dependence of somewhat and other. Somewhat and other are "ideal" because they have no independent individuality, but are found only as absorbed in the totality. Salt dissolved in water is said to exist *ideel* (ideally) in the water. Its immediate existence in proper form has vanished. It has been absorbed or dissolved by the water. But it is *reel* (or real) in the saltish taste which it gives to the water.

The higher unity in which somewhat and other are "ideal" is a self-determined unity. The independent explains itself and also what depends on it.

The independence of the higher unity explains for us the "ideality" of its moments which causes their individuality to be absorbed or swallowed up, and it explains also how they came to be posited as seemingly independent. This is the important point for us here in getting an insight into quantity. The quantitative aspect is seen when we obtain an insight into the positing of the being of the separate moments.

Independent being is not only a negative unity (negating and swallowing up its determinations and "moments"), but is also a repelling or creative unity—positing determinations and moments and endowing them with a phase of independence. This is the phase of independent being (*Für-sich Seyn*, or self-determined being) which develops quantity for us. Quantity is the exposition of the

sheer independence of determinateness, while quality is the exposition of the sheer dependence of it. Both phases must be, because the primordial condition of all determinateness, namely self-determination, involves them both.

Having seen the general relation of quality to quantity as the two necessary phases of self-determination, we next inquire into the "dialectic," by which the insight into one of these categories widens into the insight into the other one.

Quality in its first phase seems to be immediate and independent, because it is one with being. But on examination, it is found to be not independent but to be through another. Its immediateness, as Hegel says, is its defect, for it (its immediate unity with its determinateness) necessitates mediation through another. This mediation through another interrupts its unity with being, and we come to see that such an immediate unity with being is a mere seeming, or deceptive show, which appertains to finitude and perishableness rather than to true being. Such mere seeming presupposes, however, true being which is one with its determinateness through self-mediation, that is, it presupposes being-for-itself, or independent being. In being-for-itself determinateness is one with being, but through self-mediation. Our insight has widened somewhat; we now see that all determinateness must arise through self-determination, and that there can be no immediate determinateness except through self-mediation. Mediation-through-another is directly opposed to

immediateness, but self-mediation is the union of mediation and immediateness, because it (*a*) is mediated, but (*b*) as it is mediated by itself it is not made dependent on another, and, moreover, as it is one with itself it "goes-together-with-itself" in this self-mediation and is immediate. This is the solution of all the problems of quality, especially of those that deal with finitude and infinitude.

But, with this insight into self-determination, we see that our somewhat and other have been generated through self-determination and that they are endowed with a phase of independence, or being-for-itself. In fact, their very evanescence presupposes their original creation by the independent being as repetitions of itself. We now take a broader view of these categories (somewhat and other) and see now each one to be a reflection-into-itself through its alterum or "other." Each is a self-determined unit. But each side of its self-determination is also a unit, and hence each unit is composed of units and is the infinite possibility of units. And all these units, since they are repetitions of the self, are one self. This idea is quantity, and our insight into quality has widened dialectically into quantity.

We have a great deal more than quantity here? Yes, certainly. Hegel has the fullness of the Absolute Idea (*Idee*) before him at all points in this *Logic*, or else he could not see any dialectic. For the dialectic is precisely the posited difference of the inferior categories from the Absolute Idea.

Each inferior category placed "under the form of eternity" (*sub specie æternitatis*) or, what is the same thing, under the form of the absolute, begins to exhibit its defects and to show what it presupposes to make its own existence possible. Its presuppositions are its "dialectical evolution." It cannot be too often repeated in an exposition of Hegel's logic that all dialectical evolution is an ascent from the inadequate to the more adequate, from what is assumed and therefore contingent, towards what is presupposed as the necessary ground of all. Every category, as before mentioned, is capable of being viewed in three aspects — (*a*) of pure immediateness, the shallowest view possible; for, in the shape of pure immediateness, every category is as empty as pure being; (*b*) of mediation through others—the phase of finitude, dualism, and relativity, or dependence on others; this is the view that reflection or the understanding takes of all categories; (*c*) of self-mediation; this is a speculative view (in the good sense of this word) as referring to the complete comprehension of the category in and through its presuppositions. So on this logic, Hegel treats every category according to these three points of view. Hence having arrived at the determinateness of self-determined being, the first aspect of it is taken up and this first aspect is quantity. Quantity implies sameness of quality or "indifference" (*Gleichgültigkeit*) as Hegel calls it. We cannot count together a coal-hod and a piece of coal, they are neither two pieces of coal nor two coal-hods. In order to

count them together as two, we must fall back to a common genus or species in which they are identical. Thus the coal-hod and the lump of coal make two things, two pieces of matter, two household supplies, etc. Genus and species imply originally identity in the productive process, and not merely an arbitrary act of classification for convenience of inventorying, yet there are subjective classifications in abundance; but these are secondary and derivative classes, founded on the tacit attribution of some productive process to the species named. The general name is attributed to the producing energy, or to the end and aim imposed upon the object by conscious mind. Hence efficient, or final, or formal causes, which are in their nature general, are named rather than the things produced by them. Take any general names—horse, tree, table, sand. The mind predicates each of these of the infinite variety of existences that may be subsumed under it—namely, the inexhaustible multitude of beings that pass for horses, the innumerable individual trees, the wide list of objects that may be adapted to use as tables, the different specimens and amounts of sand. The general term includes all indifferently, and yet it does not stand for a mere abstraction, as is commonly supposed. It names the generic process or energy manifested in the species horse or tree; the adapting process and purpose which imposes on a natural object or combination of objects the use of a table; the mechanical comminuting process that divides quartz or other rock into

small sand particles. For the mind looks behind the immediate object to its producing forces and gives general names to what is objectively generic as energy, or as process, or as purpose and intention. The old question of nominalism and realism finds in this its solution.

To the thinker who looks upon immediate things as independent realities, nominalism is the only theory credible. To the thinker who recognizes all things as fleeting and doomed to change and decay, and who sees permanence only in the producing energies, processes and laws, realism is the only true theory. He sees that general terms correspond not to real things, but to the *more* real causes of things, either efficient, formal or final causes. For that which produces a thing and gives it its reality, is more real than the thing itself. To this we are to turn our attention in order to see the deeper meaning of the category of quantity. For the determinateness of quantity is impossible unless there is generic being. There must be repetition or self-reproduction in order that there may be extension. The same must be outside the same.

This points to the primordial form of true being — the absolute idea. For self-knowing reason has the form of subject and object to itself, and hence the form of self outside of the self, as object. Quantity is the intuition of the blank form, so to speak, of personality — it is the self perfectly empty outside the self as perfectly empty. Space is the same concept except that the self is regarded

as a point. Everywhere in space the point is outside of every other point, but each point is unreal. Only the separation of points is real, the points themselves are unreal in space. Time regarded as a line is the same concept as space; but regarded as it is, a self-repulsion of the point, we have the other phase of personality or of consciousness, namely, the identification of the object by the subject, the recognition of the self by the self, which completes any act of consciousness. Hence time and space are the first or most immediate objectifications of God — God in his most abstract phases and not as he is in himself but as he is thought by the Logos in beginning to think his own (*i. e.* the Logos's) derivation. It is a logical and not a chronological condition of derivation or begottenness, and its thinking by the Logos produces the Processio (or nature).

Quantity is the *form* of self-determination without the *substance* of it. Independence and equality of being are assumed in the separate ones, and yet because of the identity or similarity all make one continuous whole. The independence gives discreteness, the equality and identity give continuity. The independence is conditioned on the act of self-repetition, but this necessitates equality and identity, and hence continuity is essentially involved with discreteness. The union of continuity and discreteness, in such a manner as has been shown, is number or determinate quantity. Every quantity is an aggregate of like parts — that is to say, it is a continuity of discrete units or ones.

This is the deduction of the two moments of number or *Quantum*, namely of "sum" and "unity" (*Anzahl* and *Einheit*). Every number is "sum" or manifold of units and it is likewise their "sum" or this manifold in the form of unity; seven, for example, is a manifold of seven independent, discrete ones, each equal to the other. It is at the same time the continuity of these and the unity of them which is as much a one as the constituent units.

From the attempt to unite more explicitly these "moments," arise the different species of calculation or reckoning as Hegel shows (pp. 227-235). Addition is the taking together of unlike units, the summation of unlike sums. "*Anzahl*" and "*Einheit*" are not only different, but the constituent "sums" are different, for we use addition to discover the unity of unlike sums. If the sums to be added are alike, we use multiplication. $6 \times 7 = 42$. Here 6, the multiplier, is the "sum," and 7 is the constituent unit, and 42 is the resulting unity. Subtraction and division are merely negative operations, involving the reversal of addition and multiplication, but using the same processes. But involution or the raising of numbers to their powers is more interesting, because here sum and constituent unit become identical. The number is multiplied into itself to produce its power. Here we have quantity assuming the form of self-relation—its externality putting on the semblance of self-determination. This leads Hegel to fix his eyes on this phase of mathematical calculation,

and to look there for the transition out of quantity into some higher category. It suggests to him also the clue to the methods of the higher mathematical analysis.

Sum and unity are the elements of number or limited quantity (*Quantum*). Hegel investigates the nature of the determinateness by which pure quantity becomes limited quantity. The "limit" in the case of determinate being (*Daseyn*) is something beyond or outside of the "somewhat;" but in the limited quantity it is within the unity. One hundred is a limited quantity, and it is the one-hundredth unit that makes the limit. But any one or each one of the hundred units indifferently taken, is the hundredth and hence the limit. The unity contains the limit within it. The hundredth is not the limit outside of and opposed to the other ninety-nine. Nor is the sum opposed to the unity, but the unity consists of the manifold units.

But the limiting one gives to the number a distinction from another number — 100 is distinguished from 101, 102, etc., or from 99, 98, etc. This seems to make the limited quantity dependent on an outside quantity for its determinateness, just as somewhat is determined by an "other." But such is not the case. Each number is indifferent to every other. Indifference is the essential character of number; externality is its peculiarity. Relation to another is merely an accident and does not concern it. Moreover, since it is sum, it is a manifold of independent ones external to one an-

other, and hence it is within itself absolute externality. This, however, according to Hegel, involves a contradiction which will develop itself in the infinite progress.

EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE QUANTITY.

Extensive and intensive quantity are distinguished from one another through the limit. When the sum is the limit the quantity is extensive, the number conceived with an emphasis, so to speak, on the discreteness and exclusion of the constituent ones. But the ones are equal and identical, and continuous, and the number as unity is simple and continuous. "The limit of the quantum which as extensive has its determinate distinction in the sum of discrete units, passes over into simple determinateness. In this simple determination the limit is intensive quantity, and the limit or determinateness which is identical with the quantum is now posited as simple—namely, as degree" (p. 244).

"The sum," he says, "is only a moment of number." The other "moment" is unity, and if this is taken as the "limit" there is no emphasis on the discrete units within, but the comparison must be made with other numbers outside. This gives intensive quantity. "Degree is quantity but not internally manifold, it is more or less but not a greater or smaller manifoldness. Multiplicity has passed over into simple determination, determinate being into being-for-itself. Its determinateness must be expressed through a number, but

not as sum, not as a manifold of units, but as a degree" (p. 244).

"In number the quantum is posited in its perfect determinateness; but as intensive quantum it is posited in its being-for-itself, as it is in its ideal totality, or its innermost essential nature (*nach seinem Begriff.*)" "Degree does not have the externality within itself, like extensive quantity, but it has it outside it in another quantity, and relates to it as its own determinateness" (p. 245).

Indifference and externality characterize quantity and especially number. But in degree this externality and indifference is excluded from intensive quantity and the externality is turned against itself and made self-nugatory. Hence, the externality of degree is a return to the internality of quality. Degree is therefore determined by external quantities.

To recapitulate: sum (or manifoldness of units = *Anzahl*) and unity (or oneness in which the distinctness of the units is lost or ignored = *Einheit*) are the two "moments" of limited quantity or number. Of these, sum is the limit (*Grenze*) and the quantity is determinate through this: the sum at once furnishes the measure by which we compare one number with another and determine its value. But the limit is not, as it was in the case of quality, an external limit making the quantity dependent. The limit is internal, the multiplicity is within, and each one of the units is the limit, taken indifferently. It is this which makes extensive quantity—each unit indifferent to and

excluding the other so that externality is produced. But on the side of the unity quite a different and important consideration enters. For the excluding constituent units are after all identical with one another and hence continuity prevails and the quantity is one homogeneous whole. With the units as "ideal" and their continuity emphasized the "limit" is not so much the sum as the unity, and since this gives no determinateness by itself, the limit is rather to be found in other quantities. This determinate quantity which is determinate through others is degree, or intensive quantity.

Extensive quantity contains its own externality or the independence and exclusion of its constituent units. Intensive quantity excludes its externality and is itself external to its own externality, just as the category of "somewhat" excludes its otherness (*Anderseyn.*) But in quantity we have externality and independence as the basal idea. Hence, when quantity becomes related to external quantities, it contradicts its intrinsic externality—the external of the external is the internal, and we have taken up a qualitative element into quantity and thereby we have passed beyond and out of the category of quantity as such.

THE KEY TO THIS DIALECTIC.

This transition from extensive to intensive quantity, on the part of Hegel, will at first appear to be based on "external reflection," or what is worse, a verbal quibble. To appeal to

examples of intensive quantity, such as heat and cold, and to point out that changes of degree are accompanied by changes in extensive quantity, as for example the length of the column of mercury in the thermometer, or again, the number of vibrations of air and the intensity of the tone produced, or the brighter the colors (the more intense), the greater the extent of distance through which they are visible—to appeal to such examples is a mere reminder of the existence of an apparent connection between extensive and intensive quantity. But the question remains: what are they in themselves? How does extensive imply in itself, intensive quantity? Hegel's answer, as we have seen, starts with the fortunate discovery of the distinction between sum and unity. As unities all numbers are alike and there is no difference between them. But as sums they are individualized and distinguishable one from another. So far so good, we have the explanation of the differences of numbers. But this is not all. The difference in regard to extent is only the immediate or first phase of quantitative difference. It relates to dead results and not to process or activity by which the results originate. Consider sum as limit and the number gets its characterization only by and through this sum or manifoldness. But on observing that it is a manifold of constituent units of which we have taken no account, we see that another limit is to be found in those units. The sum is the numerator, as it were, but the constituent units are the denominator. The numera-

tor determines only one factor in the result, the denominator determines the other, and both are required to complete the determination. If sum as limit gives extensive quantity, the constituent unit by itself considered gives the other limit and we have degree or intensive quantity. For considering the constituent unit we see that each constituent unit maintains itself in its independent determinateness by means of its internal manifoldness—for each unit is a number just as much as the unity (*Einheit*) of the sum is a number. Each constituent unit is in fact a sum and unity, but with the “moment” of “sum” set aside and left out of sight. Each constituent unit is then already regarded as an intensive quantum. In comparing the numbers 6 and 7 we decide 7 to be larger than 6 only because we assume the constituent units of each to be identical. But if such is not the case, if each of the 6 units is twice the size of the units composing the seven, then the real ratio of the quantities is as 12 to 7. Our conclusion, therefore, is that all number and hence all determinate quantity is a ratio in which sum and constituent unit, the former (*Anzahl*) the manifoldness and extensive quantity, and the latter the repeated unit in the form of intensive quantity, both contribute to the complete determination of the quantity as found in their unity (*Einheit*.)

We have arrived, therefore, at the idea of ratio as the real truth of quantity. One simple number must be placed in relation to another, the one as

sum, the other as constituent unit, in order to fully express quantity. This gives quantitative ratio as the only adequate expression of determinate quantity. It at the same time gives us an insight into the progress of mathematics from simple arithmetic through general arithmetic (algebra) to the higher analytics, or the calculus. The mathematician gradually comes to see that quantitative ratio expresses the truth of all quantitative being.

But is this the thought of Hegel? If so, he has been unfortunately not explicit enough in his deduction of intensive quantity and has not expressed his own insight so fully as to possess others of it. Reading between the lines we can see that this must have been his insight—we shall, in fact, see indubitable evidence of it in reading his one hundred pages of “remarks” on the higher mathematics. But we look in vain for the adequate expression of the “dialectic” that should show us the defect of extensive quantity and the precise way in which it reveals its inadequacy by presupposing intensive quantity. The difficulty perhaps lies in the fact that his brilliant suggestion of “sum and unity” does not go far enough. It does not discriminate between the constituent unit and the unity of the sum of all the constituent units. The including unity has its units and their number or sum expressed explicitly, but the constituent units are not determined by an explicit statement of their manifoldness—they are only stated to be identical, the one to another. But as thus

indeterminate the whole number is left as uncertain as the value of a fraction is uncertain when only its numerator is given. The constituent units must therefore be likewise explicitly determined as sums in order to complete our quantitative determinateness. Hence the quantitative ratio is the final form of quantity. This we will discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXIV.

QUANTITATIVE RATIO AND THE HIGHER MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS.

IN the "small logic," the logic of the encyclopædia, which is a compend of the large logic, Hegel sets forth a slightly different view of quantity, from the view given in the large logic of which we are treating. In that work (the small logic) the divisions are (*a*) pure quantity, under which are treated also discrete and continuous quantity; (*b*) Quantum, or number; (*c*) Degree, under which are treated, also, extensive and intensive quantity, the quantitative infinite progression or series, and the quantitative ratio. In the large logic we have, first, pure quantity with the difference between continuous and discrete quanta and their mutual limitation whence arise determinate quanta. This is substantially the same as the first division in the small logic. In the second division we have quantum, under which falls the discussion of number, extensive and intensive quanta with degree and the quantitative infinite progress or series. This includes all that is found in the second and third divisions of the small logic except quantitative ratio. The third division is the quantitative infinite progression which forms a sub-topic under degree in the

small logic. This difference does not, however, amount to much, if we consider that the important thought is the development of the two categories of extensive quantity and degree or intensive quantity as the two essential moments of quantity in its ideal totality (*Begriff*) or complete definition. For intensive quantity presents one necessary phase of every number, and of every definite quantity, and extensive quantity presents the other necessary phase of the same. The real explicit expression of quantity in its totality is quantitative ratio, however, and not degree. Therefore the division given in the large logic may be preferred, on the whole. The second term should develop the elements of difference and limit, the elements of finitude, in short. The third term should unite these in a higher unity. Extensive and intensive quantity are opposed and limiting elements and hence intensive quantity or degree belongs to the second division, and in the large logic is properly placed.

Recalling the discussions of the last chapter : we found number to have three moments or phases : (*a*) constituent units, (*b*) the sum of these units, (*c*) the including unity whose measure or limit is the sum. But investigation discovered that the sum is not the only limit which determines the value of the quantity, but the constituent unit is also another limit, and that it takes both of these limits in combination to determine the value of the including unity.

The sum gives the number of the units, the

magnitude of the unit gives the intensity or the degree. The unit, not viewed as a manifold, but as mere unit, is an intensive magnitude whose measure is found in other quanta. Its extension lies outside itself. But if we take the including totality containing intensive quantity and its measure, then this extension is posited within it, and we have quantitative ratio and not mere "degree." Recalling the nature of the one of being-for-itself, it becomes evident that the constituent units whose internal multiplicity is not expressed, or even suggested are somewhat of the nature of qualitative ones or independent beings, such as we had in the "one and many." This is our intensive being or degree. We have the qualitative one with the additional idea barely sufficient to make it quantitative as well as qualitative—namely, the additional idea of a dependence on external quanta in order to define its own quantity. This gives us occasion to inquire—if we could go into the question here—whether Hegel would not have been justified had he adopted a different arrangement of topics in his discussion of quantity, namely: After being-for-itself with sub-topic of one and many, there should come quantity with its first sub-topic, intensive quantity or degree, as the transition from being-for-itself to extensive quantity. However this may be—whether degree is the first or second—there can be no doubt that quantitative ratio is the highest sub-category of quantity. Under this sub-category Hegel might have placed his notes on the quantitative infinitude and the higher mathe-

mathematical analysis because he solves the problems of these spheres by the use of the idea of ratio.

In his remark on the pure elements (*Begriff'sbestimmtheit*) of the mathematical infinite (pp. 272-315), he points out that the mathematical infinite is important because it uses the idea of the true infinite and therefore stands higher in this respect than the so-called metaphysical infinite. The latter namely opposes the infinite to the finite as a mere negative of the latter and thereby makes two finites, the former the void of the latter. Whereas the mathematical infinite expresses self-relation as its true form.

The so-called maxima and minima involve the contradiction that they are quantities and yet cannot be increased or diminished, for "quantity is that which can be increased or diminished." This subverts the ordinary definition of the quantitative infinitude—as "that beyond which there can be none greater." The fraction $\frac{2}{7}$ when reduced to a decimal is .285714 as a repetend or infinite progress. But as a ratio of 2 to 7 it is already completely expressed. It becomes an infinite progress only when an attempt is made to express it by a simple number. In $\frac{2}{7}$ the numerator and denominator have no longer immediate value; we may change 2 to 4, or 6, or 8, or to any other number whatever. But we must change 7 to a corresponding number so as to keep the value of the fraction always the same— $\frac{4}{14}$, $\frac{6}{21}$, $\frac{8}{28}$, etc. The numbers by which we represent the sides of a ratio are indifferent provided the quotient remains the same. In

the case of differentials, in which the sides of the ratio are represented as infinitely small quantities, the value of the terms or sides of the ratio has vanished and we have left the simple ratios dx divided by dy .

Hegel discusses at length the theory of the calculus of functions from this point of view, passing in review Newton's theory and comparing it with Carnot's, Lagrange's, and Euler's. He sides with Lagrange against Newton in one point.

In his second remark (pp. 315-352) he tries to show "the purpose of the differential calculus inferred from its application." Here he prefers Lagrange to Newton again.

In his third remark (pp. 352-366) he takes up other examples of qualitative magnitudes: the relation of the point, the line, the surface, and the solid to one another; the measurement of the circle, etc.

Under quantitative ratio (*das quantitative Verhältniss*) he treats first (*a*) the direct ratio in which quality is only a remote implication; this is the ordinary ratio in which an increase or decrease of one term implies a similar increase or decrease of the other term; (*b*) the inverse ratio, wherein a change in one term involves the opposite change in the other; (*c*) the ratio of powers (*Potenzverhältniss*) in which there is self-relation in such a manner that the same number is sum and unity. The square of 6 is 6x6 in which 6 is both sum and unity. In the ratio of powers, quantity returns to quality in such a way as to form a new category—

measure (*das Maass*). In order to grasp this category one must see quantity in all its phases as implying or presupposing self-relation. Underneath its externality and indifference there must be seen self-determination involving a qualitative side or phase as the object and end of the mechanical externality of the quantitative in such a manner that the change of quantity is also a change of quality, or in other words that a change of the determinateness which is indifferent to being, involves a change in the determinateness that is identical with being. The interrelation of the categories of extensive quantity and degree, and their alternation in the quantitative infinitude, and also their adequate expression in the quantitative ratio, bring to the surface the deep-buried presupposition of quantity—but only partially. Measure is a further and more adequate exposition of this presupposition, but the doctrine of essence and idea (*Begriff*) contains its full exposition.

CHAPTER XXV.

MEASURE (DAS MAASS.)

MEASURE is the union of quantity and quality in such a manner that the increase or decrease of quantity changes the quality or immediate being. There are two self-relations: first, the self-relation of quality which gives rise to indifference and externality and thereby produces quantity. The second self-relation is that of externality to externality: "As relation to itself it is at the same time cancelled externality and has developed a distinction from itself, namely: as externality, it is still quantitative, but as self-relation of externality it has acquired also a qualitative moment" (p. 383).

Measure, or the essential limit which quantity develops to itself, has three phases, described by Hegel as follows:

(a) "A determinate quantity (*Quantum*) which has a qualitative significance and is a measure. Its course of evolution unfolds the difference of its moments, and discriminates its qualitative and quantitative characteristics. These moments are further defined in the totality of measure and become to a degree independent of one another in it. But since they are essentially related their unity

appears in the following phase, [which is the second phase of measure]:

(b) “The ratio of *specific quantitas* as independent measures (*Maassen*). Their independence however, rests essentially on their quantitative ratio and difference in magnitude; hence their independence is a transition from one to the other. Measure, with this, passes over into the measureless and is lost altogether. This transcendence of measure is however only the negative phase which is implicit in it and hence it is only the indifference of measure [which is the third phase of the category of measure].

(c) “The indifference of the moments of the category of measure posited with the negativity contained within it becomes the inverse ratio of measures and the sides of this ratio as independent qualities depend essentially on their quantity and also on their negative relation to one another; and with this they prove themselves to be only the moments of a truly independent unity which is their reflection-into-self and the explicit realization of it, namely the category of essence.”

Three chapters are devoted to this subject, the contents of which are respectively as follows:

Chapter I. Specific quantity.

A. Specific quantum.

B. Specifying measure.

a. The rule.

b. Specifying measure.

Remark giving an illustration.

c. Ratio of the two sides as qualities.

Remark giving an illustration in the law of motion.

C. The being-for-itself of measure.

Chapter II. The real measure.

A. The ratio of independent measures.

a. The combination of two measures.

b. Measure as a series of measure-ratios.

c. Elective affinity.

Remark: Berthollet on elective affinity and Berzelius on the same subject.

B. Knotted-line of measure-ratios.

Remark: examples of such knotted lines: "There is no leap (*lacuna*) in nature."

C. The measureless.

Chapter III. The transition to essence.

A. The absolute indifference.

B. Indifference as inverse ratio of its factors.

Remark on centripetal and centrifugal forces.

C. Transition into essence.

The treatment of the above topics occupies only seventy pages of the large logic. This amounts to about two-elevenths of the space devoted to the doctrine of being. In the smaller logic only one-eleventh is devoted to it. Whether Hegel had come to think that much of the matter introduced at first under this topic belongs properly to a philosophy of nature and not to the logic of pure thought may be a question. But

it is clear that quantity when profoundly investigated shows its true nature as ratio—as externality related to externality and hence as return to internality ; or in other words, indifference of relation—being and determinateness indifferent to one another—becomes annulled and thus becomes dependence and hence qualitative identity of being and determinateness reappears. The qualitative determinateness, however, is mediated through quantity, and is not that sort of quality which we have already seen passing over into quantity.

We are in search in this logic of a category sufficiently comprehensive to hold truth ; a category which can be made universal and all-inclusive without self-contradiction. This search results for us in annulling or cancelling the inadequate categories. We have no more use for them after they have shown themselves to be mere phases of larger processes of self-determination. Taken by themselves they are untrue ; if we use them as lenses through which to see the truth, we distort it ; if we attempt to think the absolute by their aid, we obscure it.

This logic ascends and draws up the ladder after it. Plato likewise in the passage quoted from *The Republic* (VII., 14) as the motto of this volume where he describes the dialectic method, mentions this important characteristic that it annuls the categories with which it sets out—the “hypotheses,” as he calls them—and proceeds onward towards the first principle.

The logic does not lay down a first principle and

proceed to build on it. Pure being is not the basis of Hegel's system. The basis or first principle is found at the end of the logic and is the absolute Idea or God. Pure being is the first one of a long series of categories that are exploded and cast away as insufficient for the expression of first principles.

“But do we not find in nature applications of these ‘inadequate’ categories as you call them? Do we not find examples of measure, of elective affinity—of ratios of extension to intensity, and a series of measures, etc.?” Yes, precisely. Because nature is itself a “*processio*,” or a process of derivation beginning with chaos, or the utterly inadequate, and ascending to human history which goes on extending into the heaven of the “Invisible Church” whose spirit is the Holy Spirit—nature for this reason does furnish illustration of inadequate categories. But, note well, these inadequate categories as shown up in this logic by the dialectic, do not any one of them express so well what they are intended to express as the categories into which they pass over dialectically. There is nothing in quality which is not better expressed in quantity and measure and essence and idea; nothing in quantity which is not more fully expressed in measure, essence and idea; and nothing in measure that is not more profoundly understood in the categories of essence and idea. When we look upon one of the lower categories from the standpoint of a higher one we see it as a mere phase. We add to it in thought what it lacks in its definition

and see it with its implications. We consequently see it in its truth. So in the philosophy of nature the lower categories seem at first to have independent application and truth. But on investigation we discover that they are conditioned by negative processes which essentially limit them. On making our synthesis and ascending to the new category expressing relatively the entire process which the lower category expressed only partially, we now see the former object far more accurately.

On arriving at measure we have a unity of quality and quantity. All the determinations of quality here have a new explanation as based on quantitative ratios. So all the categories of measure will have higher explanations in the categories of essence and perfectly adequate ones in the categories of the absolute idea.

In our day we have seen a great naturalist, Darwin, revolutionize all sciences that deal with organic nature. The idea of life and its struggle to attain its aims—the struggle for survival—is introduced to explain the present peculiarities of plants and animals. Everything is to be explained by its history. Its history will reveal its purpose or self-aim for which it has been and is now struggling.

This very high category (life is a sub-category of the absolute idea) is gradually transforming scientific method. All nature is being inventoried anew in order to see it all from the standpoint of life. Everywhere the appearance of development through purpose or aim is sought. All variations

of species, even the species themselves, have become what they are through the struggle of life against its environment. The old view tried to explain everything by environment (the "other" of the "somewhat"). In the environment was to be found all the activity and in the plant or animal all the passivity. The Darwinian view has turned this method around, and now it is not the action of the environment so much as the reaction of the plant or animal against its environment which interests us. The living being is a self-active energy persisting under various environments and manifesting his power by modifying his environment and by modifying also his own organism to accomplish his work better. Every new step that he makes is transmitted to his progeny as so much inherited power. He builds himself in the process of modifying his environment and adapting it to himself.

It is true that the consequences of this Darwinian view are only partially apprehended by scientific students and for the most part we find men who are at work on the new line to discover development through self-activity, yet entirely unconscious of the significance of their new category as regards its refutation of the old category of mechanism. They still seem to think that mechanism is valid. They hold, for instance, with Herbert Spencer that there is no such thing as freedom possible. They hold the materialistic theory quite generally. Whereas if they took the new theory in its general aspects they would see that a uni-

verse in which evolution is the principle, is constantly proving the instability of matter and the substantiality of self-activity and mind. That abides which has power to adapt its environment to its own uses and which adapts itself to its environment. That abides which has most mind. Not matter, but mind is the substantial, says the evolution theory. Matter is only unstable and partial realization of what when fully realized is mind, or living, conscious energy.

In the quantitative ratio, each side is a limited quantity, but the ratio itself has qualitative aspects. This gives us the category of measure. But the sides of this ratio which produces measure become themselves measures when considered as factors of measure. The ladder to this is given in three steps of specification of quantity and measure. First it is a ratio of quantities that produce measure, or quality dependent on a quantity. Then, secondly, the limitation of the quantity is measured by an external standard, the quality is determined by rule—so much quantity produces such and such a quality, etc.—Bessemer steel is produced when the quantity of carbon has been diminished to a definite amount. But these quantities which are externally united in the rule (*Regel*) are each of them measures, and hence measure is a ratio of two measures and we have being-for-itself in measure (*Für-sich-seyn im Maasse*).

Hegel remarks that the mathematics of nature is necessarily a science of measures, a science for which much material has been collected, but

which has received little scientific or philosophic treatment as yet. He thinks that the mathematical principles of "the philosophy of nature" should receive a quite different handling from that which they receive in Newton's work under that title and, indeed, different from that which they are likely to get from the Baconian style of investigation (p. 401). "It is a great service to science to inventory the empirical mathematical elements of nature and discover the numerical ratios that exist, the distances of the planets, their periods of revolution, etc., but it is infinitely a greater service to cause these empirical data to disappear, and in their places to show the universal form of the quantitative elements involved elevated into the shape of laws or measures. It is an immortal service that Galileo performed in determining the law of falling bodies, and that Keppler performed in determining the law of planetary revolution. They have proved these laws by showing their correspondence to the actual phenomena. But there is a higher proof still demanded; namely, a deduction of the quantitative elements from the qualities or real beings which are involved—for example from the constitution of time and space themselves."

He thinks that Newton's discovery of the law of gravity was merely a piece of dexterous manipulation of the formula of Keppler who had stated the law of planetary revolution to be a ratio of the cube of distance passed over to the square of time elapsed. Newton, according to Hegel, simply sepa-

rated this formula into two factors, one of which is the space passed over divided by the square of the time elapsed and this is the law of falling bodies. To get the Keplerian law multiply this formula by the square of the space passed over, which is the omitted factor (p. 402).

In the being-for-itself of measure we have a ratio of measures, each side of the ratio being a measure. This brings us to real measure such as constitutes the intimate nature of space and time as well as the specific gravity of bodies, the chemical properties, the musical tones, etc.

But each measure as the side of a ratio becomes also in itself a ratio of measures and there develops a series of measures (*eine Reihe von Maassen*) in which Hegel thinks that he identifies the principle that explains affinity and elective affinity. "This indifferent manifold ratio becomes excluding being-for-itself, which is the so-called elective affinity."

The knotted-line of measure-ratios is a scale of changing ratios which move by degrees through the compass of one quality and suddenly pass over to a new quality at one leap. Water is liquid up to a certain degree of temperature though changing its capacity of solubility, but at 212° F. it suddenly becomes vapor; or at 32° it becomes solid. Birth and death are such a qualitative spring (*Sprung*). Hence nature has breaks in its continuity contrary to the old adage that denies this.

The excluding measure, therefore, develops for us the discontinuity of quality, and hence the negation of measure itself. This makes appear again

an absolute indifference of quantity to quality and we have arrived at a new and much deeper category—that of essence (*Wesen*).

The “indifference” here spoken of means the independence of quality as regards quantity. Its reappearance as a result of quantitative ratio and the category of measure seemed at first to ground quality entirely and finally on quantity. But the appearance of elective affinity and a knotted-line of changing quantity which results in a series of different qualities shows us that the connecting link between quantity and quality is deeper than measure. Measure is accordingly annulled as a supreme category. But with the annulment of measure we have arrived at the final annulment of all the possible categories of immediateness, and we must look for the true real in an essence which never fully reveals itself as quality or quantity, or measure.

It must be noted in what way the knotted-line of different qualities annuls measure. Quantity, it has been noticed, is possible only where the quality remains identical—we have seen that there can be no counting together of things except in the same class. But in quantitative ratio and still more in measure, quality makes its appearance again, and in the ratio of measures the qualities become dependent on each other through the underlying quantitative ratio. But in the knotted-line of measure ratios, the qualities become a series of different qualities and hence the quantitative measure has also to break down. Where the

quality breaks there can be no continuous measure of degrees of quality, of course. Hence the quantitative measure has to begin anew at the point where a new quality begins. Hence measure itself breaks down here and we have the category of the measureless (*das Maasslose*) (p. 436). Hence too we have arrived at the "absolute indifference" (p. 439) which is the becoming of, or transition into essence.

To the question that will have occurred to the reader, how it is that Hegel shows the internal necessity of the leap (*Sprung*) from one quality to another? The answer must call attention to the dialectical requirement for each side of an antithesis to develop on itself its other. When we find that any category presupposes another in order to make it possible as a thought or as a reality, we add that other category to it as a necessary part of it. Each side of the quantitative ratio becomes also a ratio and thus gives rise to measure. Each moment of measure being a ratio, itself develops into a measure and we consequently have a ratio of measures. But each measure is also a quality and at first the quality was a resultant of the ratio of two quantities; but in the ratio of measures we have now arrived at a ratio of two qualities and at this point our measure begins to break down within itself.

THE ENTIRE DIALECTIC OF BEING—A RÉSUMÉ.

The rule of the dialectic is that what develops in the whole and as a whole, develops next in the

moments, each one of which becomes a totality, and thereby we have arrived at a new category. For example *beginning* and *ceasing*, as two moments of the becoming, have arisen from the synthesis of the first two moments, *being* and *naught*. Next *beginning* and *ceasing* each absorb the other, and this "paralyzes" (p. 103) the *becoming*, and brings us to "*Daseyn*." In this new category the two moments are *reality* and *negation*, but each one proceeds to evolve its other out of itself and the result is *somewhat* and *other*. Each of these moments of *finitude* evolves the other and we have *infinitude*. For when the *somewhat* is its own *other* we have the *infinite*. But this makes each moment a totality or a *one*, a *unity*, and we have *being-for-itself*. But each of the moments becomes a *being-for-itself*, and we have indifference of *units* each one of which is a *multiple* in itself and we leave the category of *quality* and arrive at *quantity*. The indifference of one unit to another and at the same time its perfect identity with another develop *continuity* and *discreteness* and this gives the sub-category of *determinate quantity* or *number* where each moment has evolved its other so that *continuity* is inwardly composed of *discrete units* and *discrete units* are in *continuity*. The two moments thus become *unity* and *sum*, in the former the *continuity*, and in the latter the *discreteness* being accented. But this develops *extensive* and *intensive quantity* when each moment has become both *sum* and *unity*. Again each moment evolving its other gives *quantitative ratio* as the

truth in which *extensive* and *intensive quantity* are united. Now arises *quality* as the product of this *ratio* and the new category of *measure* emerges from *quantity* which has lost its indifference, and being and determinateness have once more become one. But in *measure* the two sides of the *ratio* have become two *ratios* as shown above and they next become two *measures*, and two *qualities in relation* result. The moments also develop each into different qualities and the quantitative thread that has furnished the limit or measure is now broken and loses all continuity. With this, measure itself has vanished, and all ratio and connection, and we have the measureless. The indifference of all immediateness that has come about is essence—a self-relation indifferent to quality and quantity and measure—indifferent to all that is immediate and positive. It is a negative self-relation which needs no longer any elements that retain a “reality” to sustain it, but it produces on itself these elements of “reality” as the result of its negative self-relation. In other words our result is that being is not the basis of reality, but the basis of reality is negative self-relation. This self-relation produces all the forms and shapes of being. We shall find such a negative self-relation recognized and named in the following book: (*Zweites Buch—Das Wesen*) under such categories as force, cause, etc.—ideas of a self-active energy which produces a manifestation of itself. All reality (or immediateness) is viewed as a product of the activity of such energy. The real is not

regarded as a final reality nor composed of ultimate realities. Matter is not a final reality, nor is it composed of atoms which are such final realities, but it is a show or manifestation—an *appearance* of force and energy which causes it. Not atoms, but energy is the ultimate reality. We must learn “to think an activity without a substrate” if we would think essence—this is what Schelling pronounces the first qualification of a philosopher. We must learn to think *things* as constituted out of *forces* rather than *forces* as constituted out of things. The first stage of thinking tries to explain forces as very fine and subtile species of matter—caloric fluids, or electricity, or a refined ether, etc. But this trick of the crude undeveloped thinking which deals with images, is seen now to be only a trick; it amounts to explaining visible things by smaller invisible things of the same kind—by atoms and molecules. Such explanation does not explain, but leaves things where it found them, because a small thing is no more intelligible than a large thing. But the idea of force, or energy is something radically different from the idea of things. The *dynamic* contains the *static* as a subordinate element or “moment” of it. The *static* can be explained through the *dynamic*, but not the latter through the former.

CHAPTER XXVI.

ESSENCE.

ESSENCE is the second of the three great categories of Pure Thought—Being, Essence and Idea.

Being is the category of immediateness, Essence that of pure and utter mediation, while Idea is the category of self-mediation or living energy, Absolute Mind or Personality.

Being includes all sub-categories which involve the element of direct existence—a real somewhat—as the basis. When we think a reality as unanalyzable into forces or energies but as composed of atoms or material substances we are using the category of being as an ultimate or absolutely final category. Being is a category that is supposed to hold truth in that case.

But when we rise to the thought of universal relativity and say that there is no existence possible which is not entirely and throughout relative or dependent, we have arrived at the thought of essence. But we must note what such universal relativity implies. It implies that the dependent somewhat does not depend on another somewhat, for all other somewhats are also dependent or relative, and cannot support one another. If we saw simply dependence on another somewhat we should

have only that partial insight into relativity which gives us the category of determinate being, of finitude. We have entire relativity here, and hence we have dependence not on being but on negation, or in other words, dependence on a process or activity. To be relative signifies to be negative. Relativity implies negation of being-in-itself. This relative somewhat is nothing in itself but what it is wholly through another; it is self-nugatory. But when we have universal relativity, we have universal negativity, and there is no longer any immediate reality as an ultimate basis on which our relation rests. If we can think of relation as existing only between two termini, each of which is an ultimate reality, we cannot think of essence or of relativity between existences which are themselves all relative. We cannot think of beings as phenomenal if we think them as containing indissoluble substrates of reality—real atoms for example, or material elements.

The category of phenomenon implies the arrival of the mind at the insight into universal relativity. For when one sees that not only are some things dependent on others, but that all things are in their very nature dependent on their environments and that their environments are likewise made up of relative and dependent things so that the termini of relation are in themselves relative and not final realities—when one sees this he sees that all seeming realities are phenomena or appearances or manifestations of hidden processes of force or energy. Force or energy now seems to be the source

of reality. Atoms or hard particles of matter do not any longer seem to be the ultimate reality but only the result or manifestation of force or energy.

But there is a third and higher category awaiting us, the category of Idea. When we see all force or energy to be necessarily self-determination in the form of life and mind, and see clearly that life and mind are primordial and not mere products of matter, we have arrived at this third great stage of thinking—that which uses the category of idea. It is the insight which Hegel must have reached before he wrote one line of his *Logic* or even one line of his *Phenomenology*. For in the latter work, the *Phenomenology*, he considers all objects of consciousness with a view to their possible acceptance as ultimate or final realities, and comes by degrees to the conclusion that self-conscious being is the only ultimate or final reality. He canvasses all nature and all human history for objects, and in theology discovers the ultimate doctrines that have summed up the insights of the race in regard to this ultimate or final reality. Fetichism, which looks upon an immediate thing as final reality, is the lowest or most immediate—least developed stage of thinking. It uses the category of being. But its contradiction lies in the fact that it makes all things except the fetich mere dependent beings or phenomena and not self-existences. Hence, too, it must partially be aware that the reality of the fetich (the reality of the reality, as it were) is something not immediate but an essence that manifests itself (or masque-

rades) in the various immediate existences of the world. The "religions of substance," as Hegel calls them, are religions which are conscious of this elevation above sensuous reality to a higher and more abstract reality, the reality of force or energy. The Brahm is pure being devoid of all attributes of existence, the same identity in all phenomena. This is also the category of essence. But why then have I in the same breath called this category "pure being" if it is the same as essence?

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ESSENCE AND PURE BEING.

Pure being is the abstraction from all attributes of whatever kind—utterly devoid of determinations; hence, of course, a void of all determinations of sensuous reality. But it is more than this, it is not a reference to such sensuous determinations and is a negation of such reference express or implicit. It is therefore not only a void of such sensuous determinations, but also (*nota bene*) a void of any determinations which posit or negate such sensuous determinations. Essence is, like pure being, also a void of the determinations of sensuous reality—so far as they are concerned it is the pure naught. But essence has an express relation to these determinations as their cause or creator, and their destroyer or the cause of their change and evanescence. Essence is thus, so to speak, responsible for what passes for reality in finite things—it is in fact its reality which they manifest; for they are phenomena or appearances

of its (essence's) energy. So things are but manifestations of the reality of forces—this is the doctrine of the correlation of forces. The force is the true reality—more real than the things in which it manifests itself because the things manifest only one of the two phases of its reality. (*a*) It is real as *positing* them and this reality the things affirm by their reality; (*b*) it (the force) is real as negating them and this the things show by changing or perishing and giving place to other things. Essence is a twofold reality therefore manifesting itself in the origination and evanescence of all things.

But the Indian Brahma may be regarded as the simple negation of all things, in which aspect it may be called either essence or pure being indifferently. Or, secondly, it may be regarded as the creator, preserver, and destroyer of all things, in which signification it is essence and not pure being. Thirdly, it may be taken as transcending all conceptions of creation, preservation and destruction, these latter being mere illusions in the consciousness of men. This consciousness (*Ahankara* or *Ego-ness*) is the disease which produces the dream of the world—or the *Maya*. Brahma does not produce this disease nor cure it; he does not produce the world nor destroy it. For there is no world produced nor destroyed, but only a dream of such generation and destruction which dream is also not produced by Brahma, but by consciousness. This concept is that of pure being as distinguished from essence.

Hence the East Indian religion posits in its substance-religion, as I have said, pure being or essence in so far as they are identical in negating the world, and the one or the other in so far as they differ. The Buddhist *Nidānas*, or twelve successive causes of finitude, contain also this doctrine. For the first one of these is ignorance of the true nature of external existences—they seem to be solid realities, whereas they are in fact only illusive semblances without any substantial basis. This ignorance which takes worldly things for true being is the source of the second of the *Nidānas*, or action. For seeing things as they are and noting their imperfection we naturally conceive a desire to change them by our wills and we act. Thence follows discrimination of self from the world—through recognizing our own actions we come to know ourselves, and this is the third of the *Nidānas*, etc.

These religions of substance look upon the absolute as essence related to the world as creator, preserver, and destroyer. The beings of nature and the personal units of mankind possess no substance over against Brahma.

Hegel in his *Phenomenology* accordingly comes thirdly to consider the religions of spiritual individuality culminating in Christianity, which he makes the completely adequate and final religion. Final because it recognizes completely the personality of the object. Subject in this religion returns into itself completely in its object and hence the atonement is perfected.

Having seen that the idea of personality is the *ultimatum* of the categories of thought and exhibited this in the first three divisions of the *Phenomenology*, through the stages of consciousness, perception, and understanding, arriving at the self-activity necessarily presupposed in the object, he next exhibited the logical steps through which the mind of the race had reached the same conclusion and enunciated it in religious dogmas.

Hence after our second category essence, we shall expect a third category idea or personality. This second book will be the unfolding and clearing up of the presuppositions of mediation.

In the logic of being we had three *stadia*—quality, quantity, and measure. In each of these there was a side of immediate reality presupposed. In quality we thought that we had the reality directly before us; in quantity we had instead of the direct reality, the direct reality and its direct negation as return-into-self; in short we had being-for-itself and self-determination in the place of direct reality. But in quantity we seize this immediateness as self-mediated, only as external independence. In measure we discover how quantity makes quality and wherein it fails to do this. The process of quantitative ratios deals with the so-called reality until we come to the process from one quality to another and to qualitative “leaps.” Then the continuity of quantity vanishes and with it all direct hold on reality. The reality proves not to be grounded on reality, but on some process that

transcends reality altogether. It is a process that gives rise to reality as a sort of manifestation or revelation of itself, but which needs something more than the real fully to reveal or manifest it and hence negates the reality besides positing it. Both of these sides are needed for the revelation of the substance or essence—first the positive side in the production of quality, quantity, and measure, secondly its negative side in the annulment of all these.

The three chief sub-categories of essence are (*a*) essence as reflection-into-itself (or abstract essence); (*b*) phenomenon; (*c*) actuality. These are subdivided into three sub-categories each, and underneath this second division there is sub-division and sub-division again.

We need to note here a slight difference between the arrangement given in the large logic and that of the small logic (of the *Encyclopædia*). In the large logic the secondary sub-divisions run as follows: Under (1) essence as reflection come (*a*) appearance (*Schein*) including its explanation through the three forms of reflection—positing external and determining reflection; (*b*) The determinations of reflection including identity, distinction, and contradiction; (*c*) Ground including distinctions of form and matter—explanations through ground and condition.

(2) Phenomenon has three subdivisions: (*a*) existence, including under it a discussion of thing and its properties. (*b*) The law of the phenomenon and the two worlds, the phenomenal world

of change and the noumenal (*an-sich-seyende*) world not subject to change. (c) Force and its correlation as implied in the doctrine of the totality and as itself leading up to the doctrine of external and internal.

(3) Actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) has also three subdivisions: (a) The absolute and its modes. (b) Actuality as necessity. (c) Substantiality, causality and reciprocal action.

The logic of the *Encyclopædia* differs in its arrangement from the above, first in placing existence and thing as the second and third topics respectively under the first general subdivision instead of the second. (2) It moreover makes thing a coördinate category to existence and not a sub-category under it. (3) It changes also the place of the category of form and content placing it under phenomenon in the second division, instead of under "ground" in the first division. But it leaves matter and form in the first division, not however under ground, but under thing.

These changes it will be seen are in part only the change of the dividing line between the first and second chief sub-categories. In the large logic he drew this line before existence and thing, in the *Encyclopædia* he drew it after these. The real change consists in placing the category of form under the category of thing instead of under the category of ground, and indeed of splitting this into two instead of three sub-categories and placing the first part under thing while the second part furnishes the first sub-category of Pheno-

menon. Thus in the large logic under ground stood (*a*) form and essence ; (*b*) form and matter ; (*c*) form and content. Then succeeded explanation by grounds and conditions. In the *Encyclopædia*, the whole first division of essence is called ground and under its third sub-topic, which is thing, comes a discussion of form and matter pending which we pass over to Phenomenon by reaching the idea of Form and Content. Accordingly form and content are taken up in the second division of essence (entitled phenomenon). But we have seen in treating the *Phenomenology* that “the phenomenal and supersensuous worlds” were arrived at through the idea of force as a totality. But in the large logic he has changed his exposition so as to bring this from thing and its composition out of matters. This view is substantially retained in the *Encyclopædia* except that it is presented as the first sub-heading under phenomenon.

We shall have further considerations to make when we come to the details of this book on essence. Meanwhile we must recall what was said in discussing the criticism of Trendelenburg in Chapter X. Hegel develops *à priori* the idea by determining more specifically the next preceding idea, as for example from becoming he derives the idea of determinate being, inasmuch as becoming when taken as a complete or absolute thought is found to be return-to-self, and this thought is that of being with determination. We find the thought first *à priori* and then its name by an empirical process of identification. We have to look about

among our concepts to discover what the new thought corresponds to and what that thought has been named. Thus there is as was explained (in that chapter) a thread of experience as well as a thread of *à priori* deduction in the dialectic method. We deduce a new thought and then identify it with some thought previously familiar to us and name it by the word already in use for that thought. It may be inquired: What would happen in case a new thought arose which could not be identified with any previous thought? The answer is that such new thought would certainly be a synthesis of some familiar thought with another—in other words, a modification of some already familiar thought. Hence it would be possible to state the new thought in terms of the old, and this is in fact the method actually adopted by the race when it makes new words for its new ideas. It forms its new word so as to suggest the familiar element identified in the new. Every new thought is and must be a modification of a previous thought, as is evident from the fact that all thought is some determination of the ego, and each thought must be distinguished from every other by difference in determination. It follows that the general possibility of thought is the common ground as the matter or stuff that is determined into particular thoughts.

Unquestionably Hegel deduced correctly the thoughts following the “determinations of reflection,” but he was puzzled to identify them with the categories of essence in current use in the Ger-

man language. This is the difficulty in any language for the reason that the words for these determinations have a sliding scale of use and are not always employed for the same thoughts. The stage of consciousness that thinks its thoughts on the standpoint of being and supposes itself to perceive true actuality sensuously will use all its categories of essence in the sense of categories of being. The whole matter of determining the true import of the words that are used for such categories is one of investigating the usage that they have had in the history of philosophy. Spinoza's use of the term substance is the clew to its philosophical significance in modern time, and Hegel does well to name the first sub-category of actuality by this word. But his use of words to name the ideas intermediate between the categories of reflection and those of actuality is evidently open to criticism and was felt to be so by him.

Even the important categories of force and thing are not placed with absolute certainty, as one sees by the variation between the two expositions as above shown. At the same time one must admit that these two categories do not belong by any possibility to either actuality or reflection. One would be inclined to say that they could not, either of them, belong to the first of the three parts of essence, but Hegel concluded to place thing under the first part when he wrote his *Encyclopædia*. The uncertainty culminates in the question of the sub-categories of form. Aristotle had originated the philosophical use of this word, or indeed he may be said to

borrow it from Plato, who uses the word *idea* ($\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$) in the sense of self-determining form. This is a very high place for the form-category and Hegel could not adopt it although he employed the Greek word *idea* in the sense that Plato indicated.

CHAPTER XXVII.

REFLECTION AS THE KEY TO HEGEL'S DIALECTIC.

ESSENCE in the first place is Reflection-into-itself. Just as return-into-self makes the "form of being," and being is self-relation, so essence is a return-to-self but a still deeper one than being. Quality and quantity and measure, all forms of immediateness are annulled in essence. Their determinations are not continuous but perish or change, and the deep bond that connects them as their originator and their destroyer is this reflection-into-itself of the negative—a process which we call essence (*Wesen*.)

This process of negative self-relation has been described before in this book when treating of the dialectic of the *Phenomenology* by which self-consciousness arises out of the understanding. "The repulsion of the homonymous and the attraction of the heteronymous" is the expression Hegel uses. We have called attention to the same in explaining the category of being-for-itself.

As is always his custom, since his method requires it, Hegel commences the subject of essence by adducing the shallowest examples of its application. He speaks of the "essential and unessential." These categories are used where two indifferent existences are spoken of, one of which

is and the other is not essential to something. These are not related to each other as essence and phenomenon. The one is as much a being as the other is. Here, therefore, we have not the thought of Reflection-into-itself out of all immediateness and consequently not essence in the sense demanded. The true meaning of essence is different; it is not a category which is opposed to another on a par with it, so to speak, but it (essence) should be a deeper reality, not on the same plane with that of which it is the essence. In contrast to its essence immediate reality is only an appearance or manifestation. The appearance is that which is not through itself but through another—not another appearance, but through a self-mediated being or essence.

Appearance (*Schein*—show or seeming) is therefore a more adequate concept of what is left of the categories of being than were said categories. All immediateness is appearance, or seeming, or manifestation of an essence which is a negative activity lying behind it. This is the second step in Hegel's treatment of this theme. He now examines appearance to find that it is reflection (*Reflexion*.) Immediateness as we found it in the categories of being was taken for self-existent entity; immediateness as it has proved itself to be on critical examination is only a determinateness or one-sided phase of the total activity which is essence. Its "dialectic" has brought us to essence. For when we placed the categories of being successively "under the form

of eternity," or assumed them to be complete and independent definitions of absolute reality—in other words, assumed quality and quantity, etc., to be independent beings—we found them self-contradictory; each one was found to imply other and different determinateness, not congruent with its first definition in order to make possible said first definition. The dialectic is the discovery of necessary or logical presuppositions. The dialectic is objective as well as subjective, because it is the discovery of what is logically presupposed by, or necessary to the objective existence of any description of being. In order that qualitative distinction shall exist or be real, it is requisite that there shall be other-being in relation to the somewhat; it is necessary that somewhat shall be its own other; it is necessary that all existence shall be finite or changeable—each somewhat shall be in a process of becoming its other; it is necessary, moreover, that these dependent and changeable somewhats shall exist in a total that is independent and self-related and infinite—a being-for-itself.

This is Hegel's dialectic—to discover all the logical implications or necessary presuppositions of a category. When thought in this way the category is "seen in its truth."

Seen in their truth all the categories of being—all the determinations of immediateness are seen to be phases produced and also annulled (*aufgehoben*) by the true reality which is seen to be a self-active process, or self-determination. The insight which sees self-determination is of course the insight into

the third and final great category—*Begriff* or *Idee*. This insight must, however, be in the possession of the student who would follow the “dialectic” of Hegel’s Logic—just as it was necessary for its author before he could write it, or any portion of it. But the human mind does not come to the insight into the categories of the absolute Idea before it comes to use the categories of essence. On the contrary it first makes the categories of essence absolute, and refers everything to Force and Matter, and Cause and Substance, before it sees that all these are impossible except through Personality, and that personality is the absolute.

When under the sway of the categories of essence the mind believes in formless substance and denies the immortality of the soul or, indeed, the permanent individuality of any form of existence. It sees all form to be accidental and transient.

The inherent necessity of such categories as are found in essence to presuppose other categories which are more complete and adequate will, however, lead the mind unconsciously to the discovery of new “moments” or phases which when synthetically united to the definitions already posited (or explicitly stated) in said categories will elevate the mind to new insights. First the mind will travel upward through an ascending series of sub-categories of essence. Then it will reach the category of Idea or self-activity (*Begriff*). Then it will ascend along the sub-categories of self-activity until it reaches the adequate idea of the absolute.

But in his large logic Hegel thought it necessary

to show up the internal nature of all these categories of essence in the first chapter of this second book. He accordingly does this under the head of Reflection, treating it under the sub-topics of positing reflection (*setzende Reflexion*), external reflection (*äussere Reflexion*), and determining reflection (*bestimmende Reflexion*),—determining reflection signifying that activity of return-into-self which creates distinctions or particularizes—in other words the activity by which the universal becomes particular individuals.

In the small logic (of the *Encyclopædia*) this elaborate discussion of Reflection is omitted, and we find only the “Determinations of Reflection” (*Die reinen Reflexionsbestimmungen*). These determinations of reflection are namely, (1) *identity*, (2) *distinction* (under which as sub-categories in the small logic, are *difference*, *antithesis of contraries*, and *contradiction*), and (3) *ground*. The large logic, does not, however, include ground among these categories of reflection, but makes them to be *identity*, *distinction* (including antithesis of contraries) and *contradiction*.

Now this deviation in the *Encyclopædia* from the arrangement in the large logic does not seem a serious one when we come to understand that the paragraphs on reflection in the large logic amount only to an explanation of the process by which the categories of reflection originate out of self-activity. Hence the whole discussion of reflection is a part of the exposition of the determinations of reflection, and necessary in fact for com-

prehending their origin and their deficiencies. The small logic does not attempt any such fundamental explanations, however. *Identity* rises from the self-relation of the negative; *distinction* in its three forms is produced by the negating or determining which this self-relation involves; *contradiction* is distinction seen in its completest form; *ground* is the total process of self-activity as underlying these phases (or "determinations of reflection").

It is very easy to defend either arrangement of these topics, but that of the small logic is Hegel's latest, and might on that ground seem preferable. Justifying it we may say, for example, that contradiction is the absolute distinction (*i. e.* self-related distinction, or distinction of the self from the self) and hence should fall under distinction as a sub-category (as in the *Encyclopædia*). Or, on the other hand, we may say that ground is not a determination of reflection, but rather the higher category which contains all of those determinations (identity and distinction)—as in the large logic. We may also say that contradiction, being self-distinction, contains both identity and distinction, and is therefore not a sub-category of distinction, and thus again we sustain the arrangement of the large logic. Taken thus *contradiction* is very nearly what *ground* is in the later arrangement. Likewise we may defend the classification of ground as a determination of reflection (*Encyclopædia*) by saying that the movement of reflection (return-into-self) produces (*a*) identity, (*b*) distinction or

difference, and (c) their unity in a ground or substrate.

Leaving these questions of classification we will now come to the essential matter in hand, the discussion of reflection as the key to the dialectic, and to the genesis of all thought and all being—in short, reflection or return-into-self as the explanation of everything.

REFLECTION OR RETURN-TO-SELF.

“In the evolution of the categories of being, the being of the determinateness lies at the basis; this is relation to other. But the movement of reflection now under consideration does not contain relation to other, but self-negation rather,—the self-relation of its negation gives it the form of being, and is all the being that it has” (II. p. 14). We have in the preceding chapters called attention often to this “form of being” = self-relation. A negation relating to itself takes the *form of being*. In fact there is no other being whatever than this “form of being,” which arises through the self-relation of the negative. “In other words,” says Hegel, “since this relation to itself is the negating of negation, we have [in this sphere of Essence] negation existent as negation—in short, as that whose only being is in its being-negated—this is the category of Appearance (*Schein*). The ‘other’ in the sphere of essence, is not an other being which limits or negates the somewhat, but it is negation with negation. But the immediate, or being, is only this identity of the negation with itself

—negated negation or absolute negativity. This identity with itself which constitutes immediateness, is therefore not a first immediate from which we start [as a fixed reality] and from which we pass over to another, namely to its negation; nor is it a substratum of existence which moves from the first to the other and returns [remaining identical under the movement], but the immediate is only this movement itself" (II. p. 15). That is to say, the relation of the negative to itself produces identity and immediateness because negative self-relation is the annulment of all mediation. Continuing our translation and paraphrase: "The becoming in the sphere of essence, its reflecting [bending-back = return] movement is therefore the movement from nothing to nothing, and hence a return to itself. Transition or becoming in this sense [since it does not pass over or become other] annuls its transition or becoming. [To become the self-same is not to become but to abide.] The 'other' which originates in this transition is not the not-being of a being, but the nothing of a nothing, and this negation of the nothing constitutes being. Being [in this sphere] is only the movement of nothing to nothing, and this is essence itself. Essence does not *have* this movement *within* it, but it *is* this movement,—it is the absolute appearance itself, the pure negativity which has nothing outside of itself that it negates, but which negates only its negative self and *is* only in this negation" (II. p. 15).

The Positing Reflection.

Being, as has been stated, is the product of self-relation, and not a substrate lying at the basis of self-relation and relation-to-others. But how then do we come to look upon it as a substrate? What is the law of the mind by which we are naturally inclined or prompted to look for being as the basis of relation instead of relation as the basis of being? The answer to this question is found in the discussion of reflection here entered upon by Hegel. No other philosopher in the entire range of the history of thought ever penetrated so far as Hegel into the genesis of these "determinations of reflection," these categories of the understanding or "plain common sense" of mankind. The dicta founded on these categories seem incontrovertible; the understanding seems to see ultimate reality. And yet the poetic sense of mankind contradicts this "common-sense." So too, and more emphatically does the religious sense and that higher philosophical sense which endows the mystics. For the finest quality of philosophical insight, such for example as Plato, Bonaventura, Schelling or Von Baader possessed, sees the limitations of the categories of reflection, and discerns their inadequacy to express ultimate truth. Not any one of them will serve as predicates for the Absolute First Principle. And yet the mystics have never been able to disentangle their philosophical expositions from the meshes formed by these categories. They have been obliged to use the terms essence and phenome-

non, identity and difference, form and content, power and manifestation, substance and attributes, cause and effect. Nay, more, *we* shall be obliged to use them, and Hegel has been obliged to use them. But Hegel is the first thinker who has analyzed the entire movement of reflection and shown up its every phase. Indeed, this may be called Hegel's one merit, including all his other discoveries as consequences flowing from this insight. There were suggestions in Plato's *Parmenides*, in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, in Nicolas of Cusa's *Docta Ignorantia*; and more especially in Kant's *Amphibolie der Reflexions-Begriffe* and Fichte's *Science of Knowledge*—these being the inspirers of Hegel's investigation. But the treatment of this subject in this second volume of the large logic is after all an entirely new and complete exposition of what is necessary for an insight into the workings of the "mere human intellect," so-called. After the mastery of this exposition one does not turn away from the reasonings of the logical mind nor appeal in desperation to a higher intuition, a direct insight into ultimate truth, nor scout demonstration or proof, but one sees the dialectic underlying the operations of the understanding and is able to point out its self-contradictions. He is able, indeed, to show the true view as a necessary presupposition of the skeptical position of the understanding.

Using these categories of reflection the understanding is obliged to assume a skeptical attitude toward all spiritual doctrines of man and nature.

But its own substructure is spiritual, and its negative deliverances can be refuted by an appeal to their pre-suppositions—as in the case of the third antinomy of Kant (discussed in another chapter).

This kept in view, the reader of Hegel's discussion of reflection will find matter of the highest interest.

The chief point to be seized is the difference between positing (*setzende*) reflection and pre-supposing (*voraussetzende*) reflection.

The answer to our question asked above—how do we come to look upon being as a substrate of all relation and activity?—is found in the nature of reflection. “The relation of the negative to itself is, therefore, its return into itself; it is immediateness as the annulment of the negation; but immediateness is nothing but this relation (to the negative), or return from a negative, and hence an immediateness that cancels itself. This is *posited being*” (II. p. 16).

Quality, quantity, and measure have been proved to be appearance (*Schein*) and not substrates. The substrate is a negative activity and this negative activity is what we are considering. It is a self-related, or absolute negation. The first phase of it is its self-relation which gives us immediateness. A relation which does not go out to another does not arrive at mediation, but remains immediate. So too a self-relation which does go out and relates to another, but which relates to itself as its own other, is an immediate, or results in an immediate. The mind, for exam-

ple, is a self-related negative activity. It is self-relation that produces immediateness or being, namely personal identity or individuality—selfhood.

“Reflection is positing in so far as it is immediateness as return; there is indeed no other from which it returns or to which it returns” (II. p. 17). It is only the negative relating to itself which posits this immediateness. But the negative in relating to itself must negate itself and annul itself; it must determine itself, for every negation is also determination. Hence the immediateness is not only *posited* by this return to relation-to-self, but it is also annuled or cancelled. This new phase is *presupposition*. For it annuls or determines its own immediateness as if it found it already extant and not as if it posited it in the very act of negating it.

Positing and presupposing reflection are therefore the two aspects of reflection. As self-relation it is a positing of immediateness; as self-negating it is a presupposing of being as a substrate. Let one of these phases be unconscious and the other a conscious one and we have the stage of insight known as the understanding which presupposes being as a substrate and not as a self-relation or positing activity.

“Immediateness is as a return only the negative of itself, only the self-negation of immediateness. But reflection is the annulment of the negative of itself—it is going-together with itself—(or self-identification-in-another); it therefore annuls its

positing in the very act of positing and is presupposing [pre-positing]." (II. p. 17.)

Return to self is as negative also a procedure outwards into non-identity or difference, a going of the one into the many. The positing phase of reflection produces identity and the presupposing phase produces difference. "The return of essence is consequently its repulsion from itself" (II. p. 17.)

Looking again at it as a total movement we see that the production of immediateness through self-relation is an annulment of the negative activity which constitutes the return or reflection. Hence in arriving at identity it arrives at the opposite of itself—hence at non-identity or difference instead of identity. But to arrive at non-identity or pure difference is to arrive at self-negativity which is the very same thing as the reflection itself, hence in arriving at difference it arrives at identity. This thought of self-negativity is therefore a perfect "counter-impulse-in-itself" (see *Phenomenology*, p. 122). By this we can follow Hegel when he says, "It is by annulling its self-identity that essence first arrives at identity; it presupposes itself and by annulling this presupposition it is itself; and conversely the annulment of this presupposition is the act of presupposition itself" (II. p. 17.) For in negating itself it presupposes an immediate or self-identity which it negates. But by such act of negation it comes into self-relation and thus posits identity and immediateness. But this is the production of what is differ-

ent from the negative activity itself. It is, so to speak, a living activity resulting in a dead result and thereby contradicting itself. But this very act of contradiction is the arrival of the differentiating activity again and hence a new identity arises. Thus we have alternation of identity and difference each one immediately the generator of its opposite. This is what Hegel means by *Begriff* and it is the explanation of the categories of reflection as already stated.

EXTERNAL REFLECTION.

With the first phase of this discussion Hegel has discovered two phases, positing and presupposing. Each extends into the other and is productive of the other. Within the total activity of reflection, the former, the positing phase, results in the annulment of the return movement, for it is the production of immediateness, which is no return. But as an annulment of the return movement it is the production of difference and this is a contradiction of the return movement or the presupposing phase of reflection. Taking these two phases as independent of each other we have what Hegel calls "external reflection." External reflection always presupposes a being as a substrate. It negates and determines some already existent, immediate being.

The "plain common sense" in thinking of cause and effect, force and manifestation, identity and difference, etc., always makes these to be relations existing between independent entities. The cause

is one existence and the effect is another. The force acts on something else and its manifestation is a joint product of the two. Identity is taken as dead sameness, and difference is never to be regarded as self-difference, but as difference of two utterly independent beings, and hence difference is only a subjective product of our reflection instead of being a product of objective reflection or the movement of the essence of things.

“ In the first place external reflection in presupposing immediateness or identity [*i. e.*, being as a substrate] presupposes itself as annulled ” (II. p. 19). For being or immediateness is the annulment of reflection through self-relation. But external reflection determines [or defines or limits] this presupposed being—that is to say it annuls it, and thereby asserts its sway over it. External reflection, as understanding, first presupposes things as independent of each other and then it asserts interaction and mutual influence, or the determining of one through another objectively. Hence external reflection sets up two extremes—the immediate and the reflection into itself. The middle between these extremes is the determined immediate containing both these extremes as moments or phases—the result containing, of course, the two factors that have produced it (II. pp. 19, 20).

Hegel has only to exhibit the steps by which this unconscious procedure becomes conscious of the union of these two phases in one activity to elevate us out of this stage of external reflection into “ determining reflection.”

DETERMINING REFLECTION.

External reflection at first presupposes independent, immediate being. But it proceeds to determine it or modify it by external, negative influences. Hence it implicitly denies this immediateness or self-identity, and makes it dependent on others or exposed to alien influences—in other words it makes it to be an appearance (*Schein*) and not an ultimate reality. But appearance is a return (*i. e.*, that which refers us to another for its essence—hence that which points out for us its origin in another; but that which points to its origin is a return movement, according to Hegel). Thus external reflection annuls its presupposed beings and turns them into reflection-movements or positings. For it is the self-relation of the negative that is shown in the category of *appearance*. It points back to its origin and this is a relating of its negation to itself. Appearance therefore is the manifestation of essence.

Therefore Hegel's analysis of external reflection discovers all the phases of absolute reflection, but not synthetically united. It begins with the presupposing reflection and then proceeds to substitute the positing reflection for it, and returns to the presupposing reflection again in the result: first, two independent beings; second, one of them acts as cause on the other; third, the effect is the result, now independent again.

External reflection coming to consider carefully the extremes, finds each to involve the entire movement of reflection. For being or reflection-

into-itself involves negative relation which differentiates. The presupposing activity which is that of differentiation results again in self-identity.

Here we have the determination of reflection—the category which “contains within itself its relation to its other” (II. p. 25). *Cause* contains within its own definition an express relation to *effect*; *effect* likewise its essential relation to cause. So, too, force contains express reference to manifestation; identity to difference; positive to negative; essence to phenomenon.

Reflection in other words contains, first, posited-being or dependence—the negativity which relates to itself by self-annulment or appearance. Secondly, it contains self-relation as immediateness or self-identity. The phase of posited being is the side of phenomenal appearance—of effect or manifestation—express dependence on an independent. The side of self-relation as immediateness or independence is the essence or force or cause—the correlative of phenomenon and that which expresses the original and independent source.

RÉSUMÉ OF REFLECTION.

1. Immediate objects or beings of the world pass away or change.

2. The objects aforesaid are therefore processes in which the negative is active. All that is immediate is negative or perishing and self-annuling.

3. Hence we have the self-related negative as the outcome of our investigation of being.

4. The negative as self-relative is self-identical, for relation to self is the production of identity.

5. Self-relation or self-identity is immediateness because the same is related to the same without mediation of a different.

6. But it is the self-relation of the negative and hence a self-negative, or a difference-producing process; hence this reflection-into-itself is also a repulsion from itself, a movement into opposition to itself.

7. Hence the identity and immediateness is destroyed.

8. The self-relation resulting in identity or immediateness is the phase of reflection called "positing;" this positing activity is annulled by self-negation, or the difference-producing activity.

9. The positing activity is also annulled by producing the immediateness, or identity, for the latter is the denial of reflection, or of any mediating movement whatever.

10. The production of immediateness as the annulment of the positing activity becomes in consequence a presupposing activity. For if the immediate being is underived it is an original, independent being and consequently presupposed.

11. Hence the reflection-into-itself becomes a reflection out-of-itself—a bending back to the point of view of the categories of being. It is the phase of self-repulsion contained in reflection. Its reflection into itself is accompanied with the production of an "other."

12. Hence reflection produces difference.

13. But the production of difference is the restoration of the movement of reflection—or the activity of negation—and hence again an arrival at self-identity and immediateness. Its “other” or the immediate identity stops the activity of the negative and annuls it. But this is a negation of the reflection and therefore the production of difference again.

14. But this production of difference is the return of the negative to itself and hence a new identity or immediateness, etc.

15. Thus the identity and difference alternates as the eternal rhythm of self-activity. Reflection as negation related to itself produces identity and then immediateness ; and positing becomes presupposing, and thus turns identity into difference and annuls immediateness and thus undermines itself as essence and becomes phenomenon again, and so *ad infinitum*.

THE DIALECTIC ONLY REFLECTION.

This analysis of reflection unveils for us the dialectic movement which we have seen in glimpses hitherto. The arrival at a new category has been attended with the unfolding of the subordinate “moments” into their opposition. Each however in order to sustain itself has been shown to imply, or presuppose the other moment in its own activity. Hence, a synthesis of the two sides has resulted and we have arrived at a new category—say determinate being from becoming—whose moments

(beginning and ceasing) have each added the other to itself. The new category (determinate being or *Daseyn*) arising from the identity of its moments now develops a difference of a higher order through its moments (determinate being develops beginning and ceasing into "somewhat" with a limit and ceasing and beginning into "other"), each moment contains the entire distinction divided between the moments of the previous category, but unfolds a new distinction not so empty as the previous one. Thus we have reflection-into-itself producing identity in a new category, but at the same time as negative relation to itself repelling into difference (the determinateness of the being in *Daseyn* develops opposition to being and we have finitude).

Thus reflection is the key to the Hegelian method.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE CATEGORY OF CAUSALITY.

THIS second book of the logic starts with the idea of appearance (*Schein*), which is the outcome of being as shown in the first book, and ascends to the idea of cause as the most concrete category of essence.

Having devoted much space to the consideration of reflection as the clew to the dialectic and especially to these categories of essence, we may treat in a more summary manner what follows.

THE DETERMINATIONS OF REFLECTION.

These "determinations" or categories are identity, difference (or distinction), and contradiction (*Widerspruch*). Each may be taken according to the shallow or abstract method first. According to this, identity means simple sameness without difference. It is formulated in a principle. We say: "A rose is a rose" or "wisdom is wisdom," or A is A.

This is empty tautology and yet the principle which we apply in these cases is fundamental. Hegel however hastens away from this tautology to the deeper thought involved in identity which we have already expounded in the previous chapter,

the identity which rests on the self-relation of the negative. This is concrete identity because it is the only real identity—an identity which produces and annuls difference.

In a remark Hegel calls attention to the reason why these categories of reflection take on so readily the form of propositions. The negative self-relation has, as we have seen, the two forms of positing and presupposing, the former the production of identity, the latter the production of difference. Self-relation is the form of reflection and it underlies the form of the proposition and suggests it.

Since identity is the return-to-itself of the negative, it is inseparable from distinction or difference. It is self-distinction. But the shallow view notes only the first form of distinction which is variety or abstract difference (*Verschiedenheit*). This is not essential difference, but difference without essential relation. The difference between a pencil and a lamp-post or between a whale and the binomial theorem is of this character. But all difference when analyzed comes down to essential difference or opposition—antithesis. The two objects differ because they have opposite properties. The lamp-post is long and the pencil is short, the former heavy, the latter light, etc.

The self-relation of the negative produces more than mere difference, it produces opposition (*Gegensatz*). But this is not all; opposition or contrariety rests on contradiction. For opposition implies unity or common ground, and origination in

self-relation; and self-opposition is contradiction. These are the three steps of the category of distinction: abstract difference (indifferent difference), contrariety, and contradiction. Self-relation of the negative gives rise to all of these. But contradiction is the full form of difference—the basis, so to speak. With contradiction we have arrived at a more fundamental category, namely ground. For the self-relation of the negative produces identity as much as difference, and the unity of difference and identity is ground.


By reason of the point of view which shows contradiction as underlying contrariety, Hegel comes to speak in a confusing manner of the latter and seems to confound contradiction with opposition, a very grave mistake in the minds of those who have adopted with all logicians the old Aristotelian distinction of contraries (*ἐναντία*) from the opposition of affirmative and negative in the form of contradiction (*ἀντιφασίς*). The universal negative is opposed to the universal affirmative as its contrary. But the universal affirmative is contradicted by its particular negative, or the universal negative by its particular affirmative.

Schelling's polar opposites and not the judgments of formal logic are in Hegel's mind. The contrary implies identity as forming the basis of the opposition, but contradiction as self-negation or self-determination explicitly states the identity as the basis of the contrast. For it is the self which negates and is negated. Hence the contradiction is the highest form of difference and at the

same time the dialectical transition to the idea of ground.

“Distinction is always contradiction at least implicitly (*ansich*), for it is the unity of moments which are only in so far as they are not one, and it is the separation of moments which are sundered only as being terms of the same relation” (II. p. 56.) Contradiction, taken abstractly, is a reduction to zero. But secondly since it is only the immediate existence or phenomenal being that is annulled, the true positive result is a self-identity realized through the negation of the dependent and changeable phase. “The excluding activity of reflection which belongs to contraries in their independence reduces them to negative and merely posited (dependent) somewhats . . . since dependence thereby returns to dependence and to unity with itself, it is now the category of essence which is named ‘ground’ (*Grund*)” (II. p. 59).

Hegel's discussion of the principle of excluded middle at this point is of a character to exasperate the student of formal logic, because his argument turns wholly on the assumption that contraries and not contradictories are referred to. Without taking his own point of view and seeing the self-relation of the negative as the key to the categories of identity and distinction, all that Hegel says on this subject is nonsense. But with an insight into the doctrine of reflection, it is all true and very suggestive.

GROUND OR SUBSTRATE. 

In the category of ground or substrate, says Hegel, "the simple identity of essence is in immediate unity with its absolute negativity" (II. p. 71). That is to say: Reflection posits identity and non-identity by relating to itself; its return is a self-repulsion. This sounds strange enough; but it is only a correct analysis of the idea of substrate or ground underlying change, form and matter, thing and properties, and such categories. We never hesitate to suppose a matter that remains identical under all changes of form; nor a substrate that is identical under all the different properties of a thing.

The category of ground is taken by Hegel as the general rubric for the form distinctions. He has first, essence and form; secondly, form and matter; and thirdly, form and content. For the shallow-abstract view which takes immediateness to be the truth, uses this distinction of ground without penetrating its meaning. Indeed it uses all distinctions with this same lack of penetration. Its "form and essence" imagines the form to be an entirely external disposition and arrangement of parts; the essence is entirely indifferent to the form which is given it. In the "form and matter" distinction reflection admits some importance to the form. It refers the differences of all things to the arrangement of the component parts, while said component parts are simple and identical. Composition explains everything. But on this account the simple identity called "matter" is not an object

of perception or observation, but only of reflection. It is a figment of the mind, an hypothesis feigned to solve the contradiction of multiplicity in unity.

The third phase of thinking sees the true explanation in self-relation of negation, and comprehends how the self-relation produces identity or ground as matter while it produces difference as form. But here the matter is created by the form, and it should properly be called Content. The content of a work of art should determine the form in which it is to be treated, and the form of the work of art determine the content which it may have. Content and form are therefore identical in the sense that content possesses form produced by it and form makes its own content.

— This leads us to the second phase of the category of ground, wherein it is stated more explicitly how the content determines its form, and how the form generates its own content. There are three ways in which this happens: (a) the formal ground, (b) the real ground, (c) the perfect ground. We might translate *Grund* here by the word explanation. The formal ground is the shallow-abstract way of explaining anything by identifying it with some other form of the same thing. Hegel calls it the tautological mode of explanation. "The ground is wet because it has rained," *i. e.*, the water on the ground is the same as the water in the rain that fell from the sky. The real ground, on the other hand, seeks out the differences, and endeavors to avoid the tautology. The stone falls because of gravity. But the house stands because of grav-

ity. The same reason produces diverse results and the "real ground" attempts to explain how the like produces the different. This explanation is through the "conditioning mediation" (*bedingende Vermittelung*) which is the perfect ground (*vollständige Grund*). The perfect explanation of a thing shows all stages of its history, and exhibits its action and reaction or reciprocal conditioning.

The third phase of the ground category is discussed under the head of "Condition;" (a) the relatively unconditioned, (b) the absolutely unconditioned, and (c) how a thing comes into existence. The conditioning limit (*Bedingung*) is explained by Hegel (II. p. 104) as follows: "The ground is immediate, but that which is grounded is mediated. But since the ground is positing reflection it reduces itself to posited being, and is presupposing reflection: through this it comes to relate to itself as annulled—it relates to an immediate through which it itself is mediated." The category of condition is by this explained in terms of reflection. The ground in the first place is the immediate because it is the original or primitive source from whence the grounded proceeds. The grounded, on the other hand, is not immediate and original, but derivative from the ground. In the second place, the ground is conceived as acting to produce a grounded—or as supporting something else; its activity is correlated to a passivity—it in fact produces that passivity or dependence (*Gesetzteseyn*) by its positing activity. It therefore "reduces itself to posited-being," to borrow Hegel's

expression. But the grounded as dependent and posited through another presupposes the ground that posits it, and through its relation to the positing ground relates back to itself as the product of the activity of the ground ; hence Hegel says that "it relates to itself as annulled," for the original is the annulment of the derivative in the sense that independent contains the dependent as a cancelled moment of itself.

But the category of Condition is something more than this category of Ground ; indeed it is the totality of ground and grounded, for both are conditions or "occasions" necessarily present in order that there shall be any ground-relation whatever. Each is necessary to the other, and the unity of the two, therefore, is demonstrated. This unity is the category of Condition (*Bedingung*) now under consideration.

Hegel treats this category under three heads : (a) the relatively unconditioned, (b) the absolutely unconditioned, and (c) the emergence of the thing (*Sache*) into existence.

Just as the relation of the category of difference to identity is expounded in the doctrine of reflection, so here the relation of the category of conditioning limitation to that of ground or reason is expounded at length and with great subtlety. The student who wishes to master thoroughly the categories of essence will by all means follow out the windings of this discussion. For us, however, in this place it is forbidden, and we must hasten on to the chief category of Essence, namely, Causality.

The category of condition is the third or completing category of ground, according to Hegel's larger logic. The logic of the *Encyclopædia* as before mentioned, makes for the first subdivision of essence, "Essence as ground of Existence" with sub-topics—1. Categories of reflection (*a*) identity, (*b*) difference, (*c*) ground; 2. Existence; 3. Thing. He makes no account of condition (*Bedingung*) as connected with ground in the small logic, but transfers this category (*Bedingung*) to that of Substantiality in the third part of *Essence*. In fact, in writing the large logic, Hegel must have found that the category of condition (*Bedingung*) had a deeper meaning than he was able to give it as a phase of the category of ground, and accordingly he used it again later when expounding the ideas of "whole and parts" and force. His matured view, it would seem, placed this category under substantiality.

This however does not invalidate the discussion of "condition" as a sub-category of ground in the larger logic. For the thought is there, although not named by the same words that he would finally have us name it. It is above all things necessary in this logic as in all philosophy worthy of the name, to be able to recognize the thought by the way in which words are used, *i. e.*, by the functions predicated, rather than the definitions ascribed to them by custom or by the dictionary. In fact, many philosophical writers unconsciously contradict their own definitions of terms by ascribing functions to them which imply a wider or a nar-

rower scope. We must look behind the conscious meaning to the actual meaning which possessed the author's mind, though he was not able to utter it adequately. In order to form a critical estimate of Hegel's thought, therefore, it is necessary to study this exposition, in the large logic, of the ground categories with especial reference to the inner significance of form and content. Because Hegel uses these distinctions form and content, form and matter, etc., frequently throughout his works in a subtle and mysterious manner.

PHENOMENON.

The second part of the treatment of essence comes under the general heading *Phenomenon* (*Erscheinung*). We must understand by this not appearance or show (*Schein*) in the sense of an unreality, but rather the appearance as containing the positive action of the essence—appearance therefore as revealing all that there is of the essence—its entire negative self-relation. Phenomenon is hence the totality of appearance—its entire sphere.

How have we arrived at Phenomenon as complete sphere of appearance? The ground categories explained that identity and difference are phases of one and the same negative self-relation. Such negative self-relation is ground and grounded; condition and conditioned. And inasmuch as it is the totality of conditions it is the unconditioned also. Essence as this negative self-relation which includes identity or immediateness, and difference

or mediation, includes for the same reason both dependence and independence. For the mediation, the presupposing reflection, the positing of difference, is the manifestation of dependence (*Gesetzt-seyn*). It is the reflection-out-of-itself.

On the other hand the immediateness, the positing of identity, is the manifestation of independence. It is the reflection-into-itself.

Both of these are in one movement of self-relation of the negative. Hence Hegel (*Encyclopædia* I. § 123) defines existence as “the immediate unity of the reflection-into-itself and the reflection-into-another.” Essence is existence or existing thing because it has the form of identity or independent stability and yet it has relation to others and dependence, and is the appearance of an underlying reality.

THING.

Thing contains these contradictory characteristics of dependence and independence. We express them by the terms thing and its properties (*Eigenschaften*).

The dialectic of this is given quite fully in the second division of the chapter on Perception in the *Phenomenology*. In Chapter IV. of this volume we have outlined the argument, and it is unnecessary to repeat it here. Suffice it to say that the concept of *thing* undertakes to grasp together and reconcile the contradictory elements of unity and multiplicity, (of reflection-into-itself and reflection-into-another) by the static notion of a quiescent

thing-in-itself and sphere of relativity raying out as a multiplicity of properties. The conception is not a tenable one and hence the mind takes a forward step to the dynamic basis and explains in a more adequate manner this unity of incompatible ideas by the concept of force. Force is the explicit unity of being-in-itself and being-for-others, just as thing is the implicit unity of these opposed ideas.

In the same chapter (above referred to—Chapter IV. of this volume) we have already given a summary of Hegel's dialectic treatment of force, which renders it unnecessary to analyze the discussion in the large logic, as may be seen by inspection. But there is a discrepancy between the exposition in the *Phenomenology* and that in the large logic in respect to the category of law. In the logic it is placed before the concept of force, in the *Phenomenology*, after it. Here again it is a question of words and of the history of their use. If we take law in the sense that it brings together in one concept the system of forces and their incitements or occasions of activity, we may make it stand for a higher concept than force—for a thought closely allied to the thought of self-activity as mind. But if we consider the unconscious way in which the expression *law* is used—as a mere formula or rule of action, entirely omitting the idea of energy—we should place it below the dynamic idea and next to the category of thing as is done in the large logic.

The small logic, it should be noted, inserts the

category of content and form in this place where in the large logic occur the categories of "law" and "phenomenal and noumenal worlds." Thus Hegel made these a transition from thing to force. His justification lies in the fact that the naïve, unconscious use of these terms does take them in a semi-static, semi-dynamic sense; while a thoughtful use of them may just as well take them as involving the pure dynamic and its annulment. Form and content may also be taken as a ground category, as we have seen.

"The relation of the internal to the external" is placed again after the discussion of force, as it is in the *Phenomenology*, but not in connection with the category of law.

Force, we saw, (Chapters IV. and V. of present volume) contains the idea of original and independent energy and also the contradictory idea of dependence on an external incitement as necessary for its action—the force never acts except when an occasion comes to it from without and "solicits" it to action. This led to the concept of a total system of forces in which the energy is self-active—not merely original source of force, but also its own incitement.

There are three ideas or categories that form the transition to the explicit idea of self-activity (*Begriff*), namely, substantiality, causality, and reciprocal action. These are categories in which the idea of self-activity is more explicit than in the category of force and law, and yet not explicit enough to answer for the expression of any form of

self-activity. These three categories form the third part of essence as the union of "essence as reflection into itself" and "phenomenon." The reader of Hegel need not be reminded that such a union means a new thought which contains explicitly both of the former ideas. The general rubric of this third part is actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) and it contains reflection-into-itself and is at the same time phenomenal. It is that which manifests or reveals its entire internality.

ACTUALITY.

Actuality as just now mentioned contains the three sub-categories of substance, cause and reciprocal-action. It is in the first place absolute. The idea of the absolute is according to Hegel the union of the idea of internality with that of externality. The absolute is that whose internal is also external—and substance and cause must be such absolutes.

How did we get to this idea? We saw in the discussion of force that the system of forces radiated from a self-repelling energy which was its own incitement to act. Its internal immediately repelled itself from itself as external and its external immediately attracted its opposite and became internal.

All duality has disappeared in the sense of dependence on some outside incitement to act. Hence we have the absolute or the independent. If the internal were not also external, there would be an essence which was not manifested, and

hence, an essence that was not fully essential. For the essence proves itself to be essence in its phenomenon.

Now the absolute is independent existence or true reality—called here Actuality (*Wirklichkeit*). Actuality is discussed by Hegel under the three aspects of contingency, relative necessity, and absolute necessity. Contingency may be called “formal actuality,” and relative necessity may be called “real actuality,” as Hegel calls them here, or Kant’s expressions may be used: (*a*) possibility, (*Möglichkeit*), (*b*) existence (*Daseyn*), (*c*) necessity. Necessity is the unity of real and formal actuality (Hegel) or the union of possibility and existence (Kant). That is to say, when all of the possible phases are real or in existence at once, the form assumed is necessary and cannot change any farther because there are no potentialities into which it may change.

This important idea of the necessary form of the Absolute will attract our attention, and we pause over these two chapters before proceeding to the final chapter of Essence—that devoted to the three sub-categories of actuality.

But the question may reasonably be asked of Hegel why he did not treat of the absolute and its true form of necessity as the first part of the third volume—that on *Begriff*. For it is evident that no absolute or true necessity or adequate actuality can be found within the sphere of essence. On the other hand, Hegel can reply: Very good; the concept of “absolute” and “necessary” is reached

before the concept of the only true being which can be subsumed under it, namely, the Mind. But it is used nevertheless, and used to found the doctrine of fatalism and pantheism. I am, therefore, justified (he would say), in treating the idea here by itself. Especially too because a widely extended adoption of the philosophy of Spinoza has fixed this standpoint outside that of self-activity. "Substance as opposed to subject" is a good characterization of the two standpoints of essence and idea.

Substance is independent being, but conceived as static rather than active, and hence it is a thought which does not permit any adequate justification of it as the true actuality. It is pure being which is pure naught.

Activity must be its principle. The attributes of the substance cannot be unless they are modes of its activity. The true substance must be self-active.

This leads us to the idea of Cause—to that which is self-active. But "Cause" does not name adequately the self-active, it is in fact only the first or immediate form of seizing the thought.

CAUSALITY.

The cause can originate movement. The ordinary common-sense presupposes this nucleus of self-activity in its idea of cause, and especially when it speaks of the Great First Cause as it does when talking religiously. But in analytic thinking it struggles to avoid this thought of original source of energy by making all manifestations of

causality relative. This is an effect of that; that is an effect of something else; *et cetera, et cetera*, in infinite series. Since Kant published his *Critique of Pure Reason*, exhibiting the antinomy of causality, it has been customary to suppose that the proof of a First Cause is fallacious. This proof had come down from Plato and Aristotle (*Laws*, Book X.; *Metaphysics*, XI., 7) and had formed the vital nerve of all pure theology. Hence the disaster to speculative thought, if it could really be shown that causality does not presuppose an original cause.

It is clear too that Hegel's system would have no basis whatever to stand upon if causality does not presuppose *causa sui*, as we have shown in Chapter XII. of this volume and elsewhere.

Referring the reader to Chapters XII. and XIII., let us briefly restate the analysis of the idea of causality which refutes the Kantian critique and re-establishes the Aristotelian and Christian interpretation.

THE ESSENCE OF THE CAUSAL-RELATION.

The cause is conceived as active and only as active. Its action produces an effect on something else. It sends a stream of influence to an effect. This involves the idea of self-separation. For the cause separates this influence and transmits it of its own energy, and not because impelled to do this by some alien energy or cause. That alien energy which impelled the transmission would in that case be the true cause. But the true cause would still

be that which separated from itself and transmitted to another some influence which worked a modification in that other and thus "caused an effect." The cause by itself in the act of self-separation is and must be a self-activity—that which determines itself. Hence *causa sui* is the nucleus of each and every causal act.

The antinomy arises through the supposed necessity of separating the cause from the effect and of always conceiving the same as two independent things. The cause which produces this effect is itself an effect of a cause lying beyond it in something else; that cause in something-else is also an effect of still another, and so on to infinity.

This is a statement of the antinomy. But the law of causality would itself break down altogether unless it were asserted in the first place that this effect before us has a real cause existing. Without a real cause it is no real effect, but only a supposed effect. But if its cause is real it must exist either directly in another or somewhere else in the series which is set up by the antinomy, or finally beyond and transcending the series. One of these three hypotheses must be true or else the supposed effect is no effect.

Hence we see that the infinite series invented to postpone indefinitely our arrival at a true cause, collapses entirely. For the Kantian must be forced to discriminate between efficient cause and its transmitting links. If he says that the cause of this phenomenon is itself only an effect of another cause, he must admit that it is not a cause, but

only a transmitting link, and hence itself a part of the totality of the effect. So his whole series becomes one transmitting chain which is a part of the total effect and not in any sense an original cause. Hence if there is not a first or adequate cause there is none whatever, and the effect is not an effect, nor is the chain a transmitter, for it does not receive anything to transmit.

Once admit, therefore, that there is an effect, we are forced to admit that there is a true cause, which is *causa sui* or self-active and self-determining.

A true cause is subject and object of itself—subject as determiner, and object as determined.

NECESSITY OR FATE.

The standpoint of fatalism involved in substantiality may be refuted summarily, and the category of causality demonstrated, and through this the category of *causa sui* or self-activity, as follows : (a) All things are necessitated to be what they are by the totality of conditions. (b) The changes in things, however, thus necessitated, imply that the totality of conditions has had corresponding changes within itself. For if a given state of things implies a given state of the totality of conditions necessitating it to be what it is, another state of things (the state preceding the present one) presupposes a different totality of conditions which necessitated that. (c) Hence the doctrine of necessity presupposes a change in the totality of conditions, which cannot have been necessitated by any being beyond it, for the precise reason that

it is the totality. Hence the change in the totality of conditions is spontaneous or self-determined and not necessitated.

This "dialectic" of necessity proves that substantiality presupposes self-activity as a superior and including category. Freedom contains necessity, but necessity does not contain freedom.

Causality presupposes self-separation, self-activity. Its defect is that the category is used without seeing its implication—cause is not an explicit category of self-activity, but is rather what presupposes it. This presupposition we have now arrived at as the content of the third and last volume of the logic.

Reciprocal action as a transition from causality to idea explains in another manner the dialectical evolution of self-determination from determination through another.

Let A be the cause of some effect, namely B.

Let B react on A, or in other words, be the occasion of the activity of the cause A.

Then A determines B and B determines A again. Thus there is reciprocal action, and A determines B to determine A again, or in short, A determines itself through B, and B determines itself through A. (See "Introduction to Philosophy"—*Jour. Spec. Phil.*, Vol. II., page 52. II. 2, (b)—where I gave my own deduction of this in 1868).

Reciprocal action is therefore the last form of duality by which the thinking of the understanding is able to postpone the adoption of the form of thinking of the reason which sees self-activity as the ultimate presupposition of all.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE FORMAL LOGIC—NOTION AND JUDGMENT.

IN the third volume of this logic, Hegel gives his theory of the syllogism, making it the form of reason itself, and therefore the fundamental form of real being in the world. It is the form of true being—that is to say, of self-determined being or self-activity, which we have found to be the ultimate presupposition of all the categories of being and essence.

As I have pointed out in another connection (Chap. V.) the use of the expression *Begriff*, ordinarily translated notion or concept, is unfortunate and misleading. If he had called this third part person or personality, the student would have seen the drift of the entire system on his first approach to it.

We saw (Chaps. IV.—V.) in his “Voyage of Discovery” that he arrived at the thought of spontaneous self-opposition as the presupposed origin of force. He identified this with the Ego, and named the result self-consciousness, because consciousness or the first stage of knowing, in its effort to understand the objective world before it, had found that sense-impressions gave us only properties or accidents, which we must unite into objects under the concept of *things*; next the con-

tradiction of oneness and multiplicity involved in *thing* had to be explained by bringing in the idea of force; finally force was found to presuppose self-activity or "self-opposition of the homonymous and the self-attraction of the heteronymous." Consciousness had recognized this self-activity as precisely its own form—the form of the ego. Inasmuch as the ultimate truth of the objective is thus proved to be the *Ego*, consciousness recognizes itself in the object and becomes self-consciousness.

The form of self-activity, being that of self-opposition and of identification in the opposite, is essentially that of *Begriff*, or logical conception, and hence Hegel gives this name to true being. But ordinary common sense sharply discriminates the act of forming concepts from real being. It regards the concept as merely subjective and without objective validity. But Hegel means by *Begriff* or notion not some particular general notion—for example, animal, man, horse or ship—but the one mental activity involved in all special acts of conception. The notion means accordingly the form of self-activity itself and not any special product of such action. For *Begriff* substitute *Ich* or *Ego* or *Me*, and we avoid the misapprehension that is so common in construing this system of thought.

To quote our author himself (III. 13) and show that he explicitly states this identity of *Begriff* with *Ego*: "The notion (*Begriff*) in so far as it exists in its own form purely (*insofern er zu einer solcher Existenz gediehen ist welche selbst frei ist*)

[i. e., not imprisoned in lower forms of nature, rocks, trees and animals, but in its own free form], is nothing else than an *ego* or pure self-consciousness. We have, to be sure, notions (*Begriffe*), that is to say, particular concepts (*bestimmte Begriffe*), but the *ego* is the pure *Begriff* itself, that which has come to reality as *Begriff* [as an activity of thinking concepts].”

This activity of thinking or concept-making constitutes the nature of the *Ego*. It has, in the first place, three phases—universality, particularity and individuality. The pure *Ego*, with its negative power of abstracting from any and all special thoughts in such a manner as to empty itself of all contents, gives us first the category of *Universality*—the possibility of all, but the reality of none. This category is the pure self-identity expressed in the formula, Λ is Λ , or *ego* is the *ego*.

But the form of self-activity is, as Hegel calls it, “negative self-relation,” or self-opposition, and this is determination and *Particularity*. Its negativity appears in the forms of limitation, otherness, difference, contrast, contradiction. But the total realm of this expression of difference is only the exhaustive revelation of the negative activity which by itself is universality. Hence, the two are identical. Moreover, the negative manifestation in all the limits and differences is the act of the one individual immanent in the particular, and thus forming a system. *Individuality* is the identity of particularity and universality. If

we see the truth of particularity, we see the immanence of the universal, we see *Individuality*.

According to the method of this logic we must expect first, some immediate forms of *Begriff* (or notion) which are imperfect and lead us on by the dialectic towards higher forms. Accordingly we have first an unfolding of the subjective nature or the constitution of the Ego in the forms of the judgment and syllogism.

JUDGMENTS.

Since the notion is self-activity or self-determination it is subject as determining and object as determined. There is this primordial diremption within it which Hegel identifies as the judgment (*Urtheil*, signifying, etymologically, primitive division). As subject, we have seen, it is universal, or the possibility of all determinations, while the result of the self-determining (*i. e.*, the self as determined) is the particular. This combination of two phases, which is the primitive distinction within self-activity, is therefore universal and particular. But since the combination is an act of identification (for the self determines the self) it is a twofold act involving subsumption and specification. First, as the universal is determined and made particular by the act, the subject is made specific by the predicate—the self is limited or determined. Secondly, as the limitation or specification is derived from the universal and developed out of it by its act, it is identified with the universal. Hence, there is both limitation and the ne-

gation of limitation involved in the judgment. The subject is limited by the predicate and the predicate is universalized, so to speak, by the subject. For the affirmation of the predicate identifies it with that which is unlimited possibility of predicates, namely, the self.

When this fundamental form of true being is used by the immature consciousness, immature because only partially conscious, it attributes the form of true being to mere shreds or scraps of true being. This misuse of the form of the judgment furnishes Hegel a graded series of forms of judgment, commencing with the shallowest use of it, and ending with the concretest and deepest. There are four of these:

(1) The judgment of determinate being (*Daseyn*); (2) the judgment of reflection; (3) the judgment of necessity; (4) the judgment of the notion (*Begriff*).

1. The judgment of determinate being (*Daseyn*) does not accomplish the work for which the judgment is intended. "In the subjective judgment we wish to see one and the same object in a twofold manner; first as an individual actuality, and secondly in its essential identity, or in its notion, *i. e.*, the individual elevated into its universality, or, what is the same thing, the universal individualized in its actuality. The judgment that performs this is truth, because it is the harmony of the notion and reality" (III, 73). But the first form of judgment, that of determinate being, or the judgment of inherence, deals with

immediate terms as if they were independent, and fails to express the mediation that constitutes the truth of the actuality. This judgment of inherence has three forms: (*a*) The positive judgment asserts, first, that the individual is universal (I is U)—the rose is red. This asserts that the entire rose is identical with one of its properties, and that, too, an accidental property. But where the universal and individual are seized abstractly they cannot be truly united in a judgment, and, consequently, what is meant is different from what is said. If we say *the rose is red*, we mean that this rose under consideration is a red rose of the precise degree of redness that we behold. This gives us the second form—the individual is the individual, or the universal is the universal. But such judgments would be tautological. In fact, this form of judgment cannot express positively the truth. Negatively, it may do better.

(*b*) The negative judgment denies identity between the subject and a particular quality: *the rose is not red*. The immediateness is denied, and this is in so far correct, but it is inadequate, because it does not state the true mediation.

(*c*) The infinite (indeterminate) judgment states or implies the incompatibility of the judgment of inherence with truth. The rose is not a whale; (nor is it any other kind of fish). Neither is any individual identical with any kind of immediateness. The defect remaining in the infinite judgment is that it does not state the mediation.

2. The mediation is partially expressed in the judgment of reflection which uses such predicates as useful, mortal, perishable, happy, and such as imply an inference from a variety of grounds. To say "this object is useful," implies a consideration of its nature and its adaptation to the exigencies of some other being—a quite complex procedure. The immediate is annulled, and becomes a mere "moment" of such a predicate. Judgments of reflection, according to Hegel, use such predicates as imply dependence of the immediate. Hence they state the truth of quality (*i. e.*, its dependence) with some degree of adequacy as compared with judgments of inherence.

Judgments of reflection are divided into three kinds: (*a*) The singular judgment "asserts that the individual is an essential universal; but this particular individual cannot be an essential universal, and hence the positive form of this judgment must be exchanged for the negative. . . . The negation appertains rather to the subject than to the predicate." The singular has, therefore, its truth in (*b*) The particular judgment. This asserts that *some* particular individuals are an essentially universal. But the essential cannot be quite expressed by the particular, though "some" is better than a single one. Hence we have (*c*) The universal judgment in which "All" is the subject. The totality not only can, but must, adequately express essential universality. "But since what appertains to all individuals of a species belongs through its nature to the species itself . . . it forms the

basis of a new variety of the judgment which is more adequate than the judgment of reflection. This is the judgment of necessity."

3. The judgment of necessity asserts what is substantially universal and appertaining to the nature of the entire process to which an individual belongs. There are three varieties of this form—categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. (*a*) The categorical asserts a class of an individual—"the rose is a plant." All the properties that belong to the nature of plant in general will necessarily belong to rose by virtue of this predication. The judgment of inherence asserts an accidental quality of its individual—some predicate derived from immediate sense-perception, like red, sour, loud, fragrant, etc. The judgment of reflection asserts an essential predicate of its subject, expressing the subject's mediation or essential dependence on some other being. But still this is a single property or quality, although a synthesis of many immediate qualities and resting not on sense-perception but on inference. Useful, perishable, healthful, preferable, and such adjectives denote this subordination of sense-immediateness to ends outside of it; but they in no wise exhaust the subject of the judgment. Under a different relation the same subject may be useless or permanent, or hurtful or objectionable. Hence the superiority of the judgment of necessity in its capacity of stating true being. The predicate being a class-name expresses a synthesis of all the essential qualities which experience has discovered to be-

long to the individual wherever it is found. But in the categorical judgment the reality of the single individual subject is assumed. It is something contingent, and hence incongruous in a judgment that expresses necessity. Consequently it should be corrected by an explicit statement of its dependence through hypothesis. (b) The hypothetic judgment therefore has its place dialectically following the categorical. It says, "If A is, it is necessarily B." "If this is a rose, it is necessarily a plant." Here we have necessity better stated. But the self-limitation of the notion is not a vague indefinite one; it exhausts itself in a definite number of possibilities. Hence the hypothetic statement is not so adequate as the disjunctive.

(c) The disjunctive judgment states all the possible forms of the universal. A is either B, C, or D. It only needs a negative mark to decide necessarily the class of the object before us. This individual is not A nor B nor C; hence it is D.

The idea of the totality of determinateness is of the highest importance. It leads directly to the nature of the notion itself.

4. The judgment of the notion expresses insight into self-determination and uses such predicates as good, true, beautiful, just, and such others as are founded on conformity to an ideal. This highest class of judgments has the following varieties:

(a) Assertorical judgments assume the reality and assert its conformity or non-conformity with

the ideal—*this house is ugly ; this act is right*. But there is a condition to be fulfilled and the further statement of this condition changes the assertoric into the problematic. (b) “This act is right if it conforms to the law of justice” is a problematic judgment.

Hegel points out that in this statement of the nature of the notion and of the requirements to be complied with by the real individual, the fundamental division of the notion into its moments of universality and particularity appears—it is its primitive self-determination. Hence the apodictic judgment now appears as the highest form of adequacy.

(c) “The apodictic judgment has in the first place an expression of the universal (the house, thus and so built, is good ; the act, thus and so performed, is just and right); the universal expresses the ideal (*was es seyn soll*); in the second place it states the actual characteristics (*Beschaffenheit*) of the subject ; this contains the reason why a predicate of the notion belongs or does not belong to the entire subject—whether the subject corresponds to its notion or not [*i. e.* whether the subject is self-active or not]” (III. p. 112).

If the above delineation of Hegel's exposition of the judgment is successful, the reader may see in what the dialectic that leads from one class of judgments to the next consists and how the subclasses arise. Each one develops some special defect that requires to be corrected by the characteristic feature of the next higher class. The whole

proceeds from the most inadequate judgment to the most adequate, from the one that uses the form of the judgment with the least consciousness of its significance to the one that uses it with a complete sense of its high meaning. Only the notion as true self-active being—as conscious *Ego*, as concept-making being, in short—has the form of judgment or can bear that form without annihilation. Hence when naïve, immature consciousness applies this form to all things in the world it produces nugatory judgments.

Rosenkranz (*Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*, Königsberg, 1859, Bd. I. SS. 70-133) while following Hegel in his theory of these dialectic transitions has named the several classes more suggestively, adopting the hints of Kant.

I. Inherence of quality; (*a*) the positive; (*b*) the negative; (*c*) the limitative judgment.

II. Subsumption of quantity; (*a*) the singular; (*b*) the particular; (*c*) the universal judgment.

III. Immanence of relation; (*a*) the categorical; (*b*) the hypothetical; (*c*) the disjunctive judgment.

IV. The modal judgment as the dissolution of the form of judgment and the transition into the syllogistic form; (*a*) the assertorical; (*b*) the problematic; (*c*) the apodictic judgment.

Inasmuch as we are arrived at a form of judgment—that of the notion—which states the universal and its mediation in the individual, we need now the syllogism with its three terms to express this more explicitly.

CHAPTER XXX.

FORMAL LOGIC, CONTINUED—THE SYLLOGISM.

“THE syllogism is the restoration of the notion in the judgment and consequently the unity and truth of the two. The notion as such contains its moments in a state of annulment [suppression, or undeveloped germinal condition]; in the judgment on the other hand this unity is something internal, or what is equivalent, external, and the moments are developed into independent extremes though ostensibly standing in relation to one another. But in the syllogism not only separate moments are posited like the extremes of the judgment, but the unity is posited quite as explicitly” (III. p. 115).

The syllogism has the tension of opposites in it and also the unity that comes from perfect identity. It is therefore the adequate realization of the form of self-activity as subject. “The syllogism is rational (*vernünftige*) and everything rational is a syllogism.”

An inventory of its actual realizations will of course begin with the most inadequate specimens, mere caricatures, so to speak, and proceed dialectically by pointing out the corrections necessary to the perfect realization of the syllogistic ideal. Hegel accordingly classifies his syllogisms in the

same manner and on the same ground as he classified judgments into (a) those of determinate being; (b) those of reflection; (c) those of necessity.

Deduction of the Syllogistic Figures.

The first figure alone according to Aristotle is perfect because, "it requires nothing else beyond the premises for the necessary consequence to appear:"

All men are animals.

Socrates is a man.

Hence Socrates is an animal.

First there is the major extreme, the term *animals*, which is the universal. Then there is the minor extreme *man*, which is in relation to animal a particular, for it includes only *some* animals, and not *all*. Then there is the individual *Socrates*, who is in the class *man* and consequently in the including class *animal*. Aristotle enumerates, besides this perfect syllogism, two other figures which are imperfect because "they require one or more things which are necessary through the terms supposed, but which (necessary things) have not been expressly stated in the premises as given." The second figure is of this sort:

Major premise: All men are animals.

Minor premise: No trees are animals.

Conclusion: No trees are men.

In the first figure the middle term *man* is subject in the major premise and predicate in the minor. In the second figure the middle is predicate in both premises.

There is another "imperfect" figure, the third, in which the middle term is subject in both premisses :

Major : Men are animals.

Minor : Men are rational.

Conclusion : Some rational beings are animals ; or some animals are rational beings.

These are the three Aristotelian figures. A fourth has been added (attributed to Galen, 200 A. D.) which amounts to an inversion of the first figure. In it the middle term is predicate of the major and subject of the minor.

The significance of these figures as primordial forms of internality or subjectivity cannot but have the highest interest. In what way do they function in the several forms of self-activity, plants, animals, and men ? We should expect to find each figure playing an essential rôle in some one or more provinces of self-activity and especially in that of mind. The figures ought to be the clew to the most important distinctions of psychology. But the history of logic does not mention any thinker who has made this observation before Hegel.

Hegel's treatment of formal logic must not be criticised from the standpoint of Aristotle and the logic of the schools. To appreciate it we must concentrate our attention on the differences of these figures and their mutually supplementary character. The first figure demands the second to prove its minor premise and the third to prove its major. "Socrates is a man." This is proved by

the second figure which identifies or recognizes. We concentrate our attention on some attribute of the object, Socrates, before us and this attribute suggests to us the class *man*, inasmuch as it is a predicate of that class.

Major: This Socrates is talkative and rational.

Minor: Men are talkative and rational.

Conclusion: Hence Socrates is a man.

We can see that this is only a probable conclusion, its degree of probability rising towards certainty in proportion as the middle term contains all the characteristics of humanity and in particular those not shared by other beings. If *talkative-rational* belongs to man alone of all beings the conclusion is necessarily true, though its form is not valid. It should say:

1. Men are the only beings that are talkative and rational.
2. Socrates is a talkative and rational being.
3. Hence Socrates is a man.

(All valid modes of the second figure draw negative conclusions, the above specimen of an affirmative is made so by quantification of the predicate, the word *only* making the major premise equivalent to "all *talkative-rational* beings are men," and thus reducing the second figure to the first figure).

The major premise, "all men are animals," requires the third figure to prove it. There must be induction of all individual men and the recognition in them of the characteristic traits of the class

animal. In the example of the well-known syllogism, "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; hence Socrates is mortal;" we have in the major premise a statement of general experience. Its proof is an appeal to experience. The middle term of the syllogism of experience is the individual object and hence it is the third figure.

1. These individuals, a, b, c, and so on to the end of our observation, are men.

2. All these individuals enumerated are mortal.

3. Hence all men (as enumerated) are mortal.

Inasmuch as the major premise of the first figure is proved by the third figure, Hegel changes the order of the figures and makes this Aristotelian third his own second figure and the Aristotelian second his third.

The three terms of every syllogism—universal, particular and singular—are ascertained by asking the questions:

1. Which is the most inclusive, which subsumes both the others? (The answer to this gives us the universal or major term).

2. Which is subsumed under both the others? (The answer gives us the individual).

The particular is that which contains *some* (but not all) of the universal.

These terms are symbolized as U, P, I, or universal, particular, individual. Hegel uses the letters A (*Allgemeine*, universal), B (*Besondere*, particular), E (*Einzelne*, individual or singular).

1. *Syllogism of determinate being or quality.*

This, like the judgment of the same name, deals only with immediateness and is defective on that account. It does not express the essential mediation of its terms. Some accidental property is taken as the middle term, or if some essential characteristic, this is taken in its shallow aspect.

On this feature of the imperfection of the syllogism of immediateness Hegel bases its dialectic.

The defect of the first figure taken immediately, is that the middle term as an immediate is independent and needs a new mediation with each of the extremes as much as they need with one another. Moreover, the singular is any possible immediate object and the particular is any one of its properties or relations, the universal being another property or relation that is more general. Hence different conclusions may be drawn *ad infinitum* by using different middle terms.

Predicates derived from sense-perception do not permit a syllogism of the genuine type because their content is not that of self-activity or self-mediation. Inasmuch as the premises do not contain self-mediation, they stand in need of it, and hence the first figure needs to have both its premises proved. As above stated the first figure requires the third Aristotelian figure to prove its major premise, which asserts that all of the middle term is or is not the universal (all P is U).

The individual is the bond that connects the particular and general and is the middle term as subject in both premises in the third figure so-

called. This figure makes a mediation for its individuals and thereby produces general classes; or rather it makes genera and species by subdividing more general classes.

The first figure mediates or exhibits the relation of I to U (individual and universal) by means of P (particular). By the second figure the mediation is made between P and U by means of I. The mediation left to be made is that between I and P, and this is the function of the second figure.

The middle term must be predicate in both premises of the second figure because it is the universal, and subsumes both of the other terms (I and P). In the third figure it had to be the subject in both premises because it is subsumed by the other two terms (P and U). The dialectic that leads to this second figure from the third is the circumstance that the latter annuls immediateness by showing its dependence and unity with others. The total contains the elements as annulled and hence as indifferent and hence in their universality.

The dialectic by which the first figure led to the third, is the circumstance that the individual is affirmed in the minor premise as the particular and in the conclusion as the universal. Hence as comprehending both it is the middle or connection that needs positing expressly in a new figure that makes I instead of P, its middle term.

In the second figure both of its premises (I—U and P—U) have been proved (the former in the first and the latter in the second figure). Its

function is to mediate I with P and this being done all the essential relations of the syllogism have been exhibited. Each term has been mediated with the others.

Hegel points out (III. 134) that in the second figure, since its major premise must be converted ($P-U$ must be changed to $U-P$), and this can be done only negatively, it does not make any difference which of the two premises is taken for the minor or which for the major. Hence a new figure of the syllogism is reached dialectically, the fourth, in which is expressed the empty indifference of all the terms. They may be all $U-U-U$ or $I-I-I$. This is the mathematical syllogism in which there is no subsumption but only quantitative equality. Two quantities equal to a third are therefore equal to each other. The conventional fourth figure (Galen's) is not to be taken as an equivalent of Hegel's fourth. In fact Hegel speaks of it with contempt.

But this fourth figure reached by the dialectic is rather the demonstration of the exhaustiveness of the three figures. Their self-mediation leads to the indifference—each term has been mediated and become a totality. Hegel therefore proceeds to consider a higher order of syllogisms, the syllogisms of reflection wherein both premises express mediation.

2. *The Syllogisms of Reflection.*

In the syllogisms of reflection we have the quantitative aspect accentuated as *all*, *some*, and *one*.

In the syllogisms of determinate being or quality the accent was laid on the inherence or mediation. Here it is laid upon the quantity, as showing explicitly how much mediation has already been accomplished; the object of the syllogism is to show what necessary inferences can be made.

First there is the syllogism of all-ness (*Allheit*) in which there is stated the results of previous induction—"All men are mortal," etc. Then next comes the explicit statement of the process of arriving at this "all-ness." Hence, secondly, there is the syllogism of induction, wherein the middle term is I and the form of the whole is $U-i+i+i+etc.,-P$, or the universal is divided into subclasses through inventorying the individuals composing it, and classifying them by a new characteristic. For example, we take the universal term *eagle* and inventory its individuals as either white-headed or otherwise.

But inasmuch as the universals derived from actual inventory are not pure but limited universals, and true only so far as observation has extended, they have their truth in the principle of analogy.

The syllogism of analogy is accordingly the third species under this head of reflection. On the ground of what is already known it is inferred that the unknown is likely to be of the same character. But analogy strictly speaking takes the individual in two senses—as individual and as universal. The earth is inhabited, the moon being an earth is likely to be inhabited also. The earth is

taken as the actually inhabited earth that we know, and also as the general type of all planets. This general sense is the basis of the inference. Its form is I—U—P. But the ambiguity of the middle term (which however Hegel defends against the charge of *quaternio terminorum*) leads to the demand for an explicit universal as the basis for the necessary conclusions which the syllogism ought to mediate.

3. *The Syllogisms of Necessity.*

The syllogism of analogy has its truth in the syllogisms of necessity. The first of these is the categorical syllogism which should have its premises assert objective universality. But since the assertion of this implies the categories of substantiality and causality, a more explicit form of the syllogism is found in the hypothetical, which is the second form. The hypothetical asserts the necessary dependence of its minor premise on the major. There being given some contingent existence, it follows by presupposition that there is a causal process to account for it. This principle of presupposition is the key to the method of speculative philosophy. Instead of investigating and inventorying contingent existences it proceeds to infer the general grounds and conditions of such existence as it finds. But the hypothetical is defective on account of the accidental character of its assumed realities. This can be corrected by making an exhaustive inventory of the field of the contingent. Then we may have the disjunctive syllogism.

The highest form of all syllogisms is therefore the disjunctive, which in its major premise recites the concrete totality of the parts or divisions of the universal (U is a, or b, or c, or d, etc.), and in the minor premise asserts the actual limitation of possibility (U is a, or U is not b, c, or d, etc.), and draws its necessary conclusion.

With this we have a syllogism of which the terms U, I, and P are no longer abstract and mutually excluding, but each is completely unfolded so that each is a mediation of itself through all the others and a syllogism of syllogisms is the result. The three great divisions of syllogisms have typical forms of which I—P—U is that of quality or inherence—the particular being the prevailing middle term and deduction the chief process; U—I—P is that of reflection (or subsumption of quantity)—the individual being the middle term, and induction the prevailing process; I—U—P is that of necessity—the universal in its concrete self-unfolding being the middle term and derivation of the individual specimen from the general process being the chief operation.

The insight of the disjunctive syllogism is that of the necessary objectification of the self-active being—it sees how the self-active is universal, particular and singular, all at once, and a living process of mind and will.

Hegel therefore considers himself to have arrived by the dialectic of subjectivity at objectivity. In other words, he sees that an adequate conception of the *Begriff* or self-activity brings us to un-

derstand how the totality of the subject must be also the totality as object. In the next chapter we shall take up this objectivity, first in its simplest form as mechanism, and follow Hegel as he traces it upward to complete subject-objectivity in the absolute personal idea, the ultimate conclusion of this logic.

HEGEL'S SYLLOGISM AND PSYCHOLOGY.

The suggestiveness of Hegel's study of formal logic is inexhaustible, but his actual exposition is only an epitome of the views that opened before him.

Having followed out through a number of years the study of the significance of the three figures in sense-perception, taking my hint from his discussion above outlined, I offer the following as a sketch of my results.

Hegel starts with the first figure and then proceeds to the third and from the third to the second. I find that sense-perception begins with the second figure, and next uses the first, and finally the third. It performs first an act of identification or recognition of its object—if it be no more than the act of recognizing that it has an object—or an appearance of an object. It identifies feature after feature in its object and by these features as predicates classifies it, descending from vague and general classes to sub-classes more and more specific. The moment that the object is classified it is placed in connection with all the stored-up previous experience in regard to it and

this gives occasion for a re-enforced action of perception to verify various deductions made from the class in regard to the individual specimen before it. If it is classified as a bird by some one characteristic, we look now for the other characteristics that it ought to have because it is a bird.

Next after the use of the first figure, develops the use of the third figure unfolding new specific differences from the classes identified, and ending with the production of new sub-classes. For having the general class of the object and deducing all its characteristics we note others that do not belong to the definition of the class already predicated. By these we sub-divide the class and arrive at the definition of new possible varieties. For every individual taken as a type contains the marks of infinite possible sub-classes.

Hegel has not indicated this psychological application of his doctrine of the figures, but his discussion suggests it.

If it is objected that the phases of identification, verification and specification which I have described as using respectively the second, first and third figures of the syllogism are all forms of the first figure and that there is no proof that we use any figure except the first, I would point out that Aristotle, and after him all logicians, have enumerated these three figures as actually in use even in conscious reasoning. I would suggest too that the fact that the imperfect syllogisms (the second and third figures) are all reducible to the first does not

prove that they are not used. They are used and used in sense-perception, though the consciousness of the form of inference is much more obscure than in the higher phases of mental activity. Perception has usually been regarded as immediate and not capable of further analysis. This is the capital error of psychology as it exists.

Hegel pays no attention to the subject of the moods of the syllogism, but uses only the typical forms without discriminating the valid from the invalid moods. This he did doubtless for the purpose of keeping the attention fixed upon the function which the figures perform in realizing the content of the syllogism.*

* There are four valid moods in the first figure—four moods in which a conclusion may be deduced with absolute certainty from the premises given. That is to say, if the premises are true in these four moods, the conclusion must be true. Letting S stand for the subject and P for the predicate of the conclusion, and M for the middle term, these are as follows :

1. (a) All M are P ; (b) all S are M ; (c) hence all S are P. Illustrating this symbolism: (a) all men are mortal (all M are P, or all of the middle term, men, are mortal, mortal being the predicate of the conclusion); (b) all Indians are men (all S are M, or all of the subject of the conclusion, Indians, are men, the middle term); (c) hence all Indians are mortal (all S are P, all of the subject, Indians, are mortal, the predicate.) This mood is called *Barbara*.

2. (a) No M are P; (b) all S are M; (c) hence no S are P. This mood is called *Celarent*.

3. (a) All M are P; (b) some S are M; (c) hence some S are P. This is called *Darii*.

4. (a) No M are P; (b) some S are M; (c) hence some S are not P. This is called *Ferio*.

There are sixty-four moods possible in each figure, as one may see by calculating the permutations possible in three terms, each one of which has four possible forms. Each term, S, M, P, may be universal affirmative—*all are* (indicated in logic by the letter a); universal negation—*none are* (indicated by the letter e); particular affirmative—*some are* (indicated by the letter i); particular negative

—*some are not* (indicated by the letter o). But of the sixty-four possible moods in each figure only a few are valid or draw necessary conclusions. There are as seen above only four valid moods in the first figure; the same in the second figure; and six valid moods in the third figure. The following are the four valid moods of the second figure:

1. *Cesare* (a) No P is M; (b) all S is M; (c) hence no S is P.
2. *Camertres* (a) All P is M; (b) no S is M; (c) hence no S is P.
3. *Festino* (a) No P is M; (b) some S is M; (c) and hence some S is not P.
4. *Baroco* (a) All P is M; (b) some S is not M; (c) hence some S is not P.

There are six valid moods in the third figure, named respectively:

1. *Darapti*—All M is P; all M is S; hence some S is P.
2. *Disamis*—Some M is P; all M is S; hence some S is P.
3. *Datisi*—All M is P; some M is S; hence some S is P.
4. *Felapton*—No M is P; all M is S; hence some S is not P.
5. *Bocardo*—Some M is not P; all M is S; hence some S is not P.
6. *Ferison*—No M is P; some M is S; hence some S is not P.

I add the following quotations from a discussion of the subject published by me elsewhere, in order to elucidate further the brief presentation made in the text.

1. "Let us examine sense-perception and see what logical forms make themselves manifest. Take the most ordinary act of seeing; what is the operation involved there? Is it not the recognition of something? We make out the object first as something in space before us; then as something limited in space; then as something colored; then as something of a definite shape; and thus on until we recognize in it a definite object of a kind familiar to us. The perception of an object is thus a series of recognitions—a series of acts of predication or judgment: 'This is an object before me in space; it is colored gray; it looms through the fog like a tree; no, it is pointed like a steeple; I see what looks like a belfry; I make out the cross on the top of the spire; I recognize it to be a church spire.' Or, again: 'Something appears in the distance; it is moving; it moves its limbs; it is not a quadruped; it is a biped; it is a boy walking this way; he has a basket on his arm; it is James.'

"Notice what logical forms we have used. First, the act of recognition uses the second figure of the syllogism. The second figure says S is M; P is M; hence S is P; or, in the case of sense-perception (a) this object (the logical subject) has a cross on the summit of its spire—or is a cross-crowned spire; (b) church spires are cross-crowned; (c) hence this object is a church spire.

"All sense-perception is a recognition of this sort: Something (an object before me) is something (an attribute or class which I

have known before). But this recognition takes place through some common mark or property that belongs to the object and to the well-known class—this mark or property being the middle term. Hence the judgment is grounded on other judgments, and the whole act of sense-perception is a syllogism. The mind acts in the form of a syllogism, but is dimly conscious (or even quite unconscious) of the form in which it acts when it is engaged in sense-perception. I perceive that this is a church steeple. But I do not reflect on the form of mental activity by which I have recognized it. If asked 'How do you know that it is a church steeple?' then I elevate into consciousness some of the steps of the process and say: 'Because I saw its cross-crowned pinnacle.' This implies a syllogism of the second figure: (*a*) Church spires have cross-crowned pinnacles; (*b*) this object has a cross-crowned pinnacle; (*c*) hence it is a church spire. But this is not a necessary conclusion—it is not a 'valid mode' of the second figure. The mind knows this, but is not conscious of it at the time. An objection may be raised which will at once draw into consciousness a valid mode. Let it be objected: 'The object that you see is a monument in the cemetery.' The reply is: 'Monuments do not have belfries, but this object has a belfry.' Here sense-perception has noted a further attribute—the belfry. Its conclusion is simply negative. 'It is not a monument, because it has a belfry,' and it concludes this in a valid mode of the second figure. (*a*) No monuments have belfries; (*b*) this object has a belfry; (*c*) hence it is not a monument. If the premises (*a* and *b*) are correct, the conclusion necessarily follows."

∴. "No sooner have I recognized and classified the object by one of its marks than I begin to look after the other marks which I have learned in my previous experience to belong to objects of its class. I recognize the object to be a church steeple by its cross crowned pinnacle, and begin at once to look for other characteristics of a church steeple, such as a belfry, for example. I also look for the well-known outlines of a spire, for the roof of the church to which it is united, and so on.

"If the first step of the process of sense-perception is in the form of the second figure, the second step is in the form of the first figure. By the second figure I have identified the object as a church spire. To classify is to refer the new object to what is well known. It is possible now to re-enforce the present perception by bringing to it all the stored-up treasures of experience. I begin at once to draw out of the treasure house of the general class a series of inferences: If it is a church spire it is likely to have a belfry—possibly a clock, a steep slope above, shingled with slate or wood, joined below to the body of the church at the ridge of the roof, or else at the corner of the edifice, etc., etc. Hence I look again and again, being now helped by my previous experience I collect much infor-

mation in a very short interval of time. The form of this second activity in the first figure is (a) M is P; (b) S is M; (c) S is P."

3. "The activity of the second figure gives occasion to that of the first figure. The stored up experience leads to a number of anticipations of perception, which are verified or tested. But, by what process do classes, species, genera, and all the universals which furnish the major premise of the first figure arise? The answer to this brings us to the third figure.

"The third figure necessarily comes into activity after the second and first figures. This will be obvious when we consider its nature. Its schema is: M is P, M is S, hence S is P; man is a biped, man is rational; hence (some) rational being is a biped. Here man is the middle term, and it is the subject in both premises.

"The third figure follows the first and second figures, and cannot precede their activity because each of its premises presupposes the action of identifying. The object M is S (S is recognized in the object). The object M is P (P is now recognized). Thus there are two identifications, one for each premise (both using the second figure of the syllogism), before the third figure can begin to function.

"Now it acts and connects the two phases of the object (S + P) making a new predication which may serve for a new major premise of the first figure. Hereafter we may say: Such objects as those (M) are S + P and when we see one of this kind we may recognize it in the second figure at once.

"Let us suppose that our object before had been a well-known object—a black eagle. In a new object we recognize eagle and white-head by two acts of the second figure; white-head (bald-headed) eagle makes a new class derived by the third figure. Hereafter, an object may be recognized as a white-headed (or bald-headed) eagle, by the second figure, and all its other peculiarities stored up in observation deduced by the first figure."

4. "The ultimate consequences of this principle in psychology are important as touching the doctrine of the categories of the mind. Sense-perception uses these categories unconsciously. Reflection subsequently discovers their existence and finally their genesis. The fundamental act of mind, as self-determining, discriminates self from the special modification in which the self finds itself. The self is the general capacity for feeling, willing, knowing; but it is at a given moment determined as one of these, if not exclusively, at least predominantly. Every act of perception begins with identification (second figure). This is an act of removal of the special limitation from the object—a dissolving of it in the general self as a capacity for any and all sensation, volition, or thought. It is this first act that gives rise to the category of *being*, and the category of *negation* born with it, is next perceived. All other cate-

gories arise from division of this most general of categories (*sum-
mum genus*). The third figure shows how these arise by progressive
definition. The categories, in so far as they do not imply in their
definition any properties derived from sense-perception, are called
categories of pure thought or logic."

CHAPTER XXXI.

OBJECTIVITY.

IT has been pointed out already in this volume (Chaps. I., VIII.) that the point of difficulty in all philosophy is the explanation of the derivation of the imperfect from the All-Perfect. The philosophy whose principle is a method (see Chap. IX.)—that is to say, whose principle is self-activity, which develops itself—explains the rise of the finite by the essential action of its principle. The contemplation of the principle is a contemplation of an activity of creation. This is the meaning of that mysterious utterance that principle and method are one in this philosophy; also that thought and being are one. To consider the nature of a creative being is to consider its inward springs of creative action. Hence, Platonic thought had no sooner seen the necessity of intelligence and goodness in the divine first principle than it came at once upon the idea of a Logos eternally begotten, who in some way through his goodness was responsible for creating imperfect beings that have independent self-action.

Christian thinking, in the process of formulating the orthodox creed, especially in the writings of St. Athanasius and St. Hilary (and I think, too, with some defects in statement even in those of Arius

and Eusebius of Nicomedia), arrived at a quite adequate insight into the ground of creation in the self-knowledge of the Logos. Knowledge being an objectifying, His self-knowledge is the objectification of himself. His knowledge of himself as He is, namely, as perfect, is the origin of a third perfect being, the Holy Spirit, but the knowledge of His eternally past begottenness makes objective His own derivation as a *Processio*, which is our world in time and space.

That derivation of the Logos has been complete from all eternity, but it is, nevertheless, his logical presupposition, for he is related to the First only by this timeless act of derivation (or "generation"). Hence, the contemplation of His derivation is the contemplation of the goodness of the first principle, the unbegotten Father. The first principle in knowing Himself generates the Logos from all eternity. The Logos, in knowing his derivation, recognizes his origin in the self-knowing of the first. But the first, too, recognizes the recognition of the second, and this mutual recognition is described in religious language as the mutual love which causes the Holy Spirit to proceed eternally. In philosophical language it is mutual recognition, the knowledge of one's self in another. But the *Processio* is to be distinguished from the perfect being that proceeds, for the *Processio* is an evolution or becoming from that which is not to that which is and is perfect. Hence, it eternally contains all degrees of imperfection in it at all times. The *Processio* is, in fact, creation, and not God nor a person of the Trinity. But it

has, as creation, unique relations to each of the divine Persons. To the First, it is the recognition of his own process of generating through goodness or altruistic action; to the Second, it is the recognition of another's goodness and altruism—namely, that of the First; to the Third, it is a recognition of his own double procession through the altruism of First and Second. The creation in time and space is a process with one sole final purpose, the evolution of rational immortal souls, and their perfection in institutions (whose aggregate is the invisible church). The world is not divine, but it has a divine function to perform, because it is the *Processio* of the Holy Spirit.*

*The reader of Dante will recall the opening of the tenth canto of the *Paradiso*, wherein he makes the mutual love of the First and Second the origin of the world—"The master who within himself loves the world (or stellar system) so that he never withdraws his gaze from it." (X. 11, 12).

"The first and ineffable Power, looking upon his Son with the love that is eternally breathed forth from both, created whatever moves before the mind and the eye [*i. e.* before the inward and the outward eyes] with such order [*ordine i. e.* marks of ordering intelligence] that whoever beholds this cannot avoid tasting that love [cannot avoid recognizing divine Reason in the world]." X, 1-6.

St. Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.* P I., Qu. xlv. Art. 6,) says:

"The divine processions are the cause of the procession of things. Hence to create is an attribute of the divine Person. . . . But the divine Persons have causality in respect to the creation of things according to the nature (*rationam*) of their procession. . . . Whence God made creation by His word which is the Son; and by His love which is the Holy Spirit."

(xlv. 6-1) Processiones divinarum personarum sunt causa processionis rerum; et sic creare est proprium personæ. (xlv. 6-3). Sed tamen divinæ personæ secundum rationem suæ processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. . . . Unde et Deus Pater operatus est creaturam per suum Verbum, quod est Filius; et per suum amorem, qui est Spiritus sanctus.

The reader will note that Catholic theology connects creation with the Procession.

I have often before alluded to this distinction of the *Processio* from the Second Divine Person, as the important thing neglected by Hegel—a neglect that in some measure justifies the censure of pantheism that has been so freely cast upon him. It is not, however, with Hegel precisely as the charge has made it to be. Hegel does not in any wise fail in the proper characterization of the Third Person, nor in the doctrine of the invisible church and the “communion of saints.” Freedom and immortality in the most concrete sense are held by Hegel. The defect pertains to the conception of the nature of the Second Person. The *Processio* is taken for the Logos. Hence there is an implication that the First in knowing himself perceives in himself finitude originating and passing over into perfection. Recognizing this in himself he at the same time creates it; for his knowing is creating. “In God knowing and willing are one.” But such recognition of the origin of finitude in himself implies a consciousness of a derivation (a begottenness) and this shows at once that Hegel has conceived the First as the Second. He has attributed to the Father the consciousness that belongs to the Logos.

On this plane, too, the reader of this book must approach the topic of objectivity which is the dialectical outcome of subjectivity as exhibited in the exposition of the syllogism. The subject makes itself its own object. The syllogistic constitution of the *Ego* opposes itself in its completeness and independence to itself as object. This is

the nature of mind in itself; it is the nature of the divine mind to do this: "*creare est proprium personæ*," says St. Thomas.

That Hegel has this in view here I will show by a quotation from the first page of his discussion of objectivity :

"Self-activity (*Begriff*) determines itself as objectivity. It is manifest that this new feature of its self-determination is the same thing that used to be called in the old metaphysic the 'syllogism of the *Begriff*,' namely, the ontological proof of the existence of God, which inferred his existence from the conception (*Begriff*) of him. It is well known that the sublimest thought of Descartes, namely, that God is that whose idea includes necessary being, has been laid aside since Kant," etc. (III. 167).

He presents in detail his refutation of the Kantian objections to the Cartesian proof. With him the necessary presupposition (as we have seen) of all things, is self-activity in the form of *Begriff*, or subject-objectivity. Hence, God is precisely that necessary being presupposed by all, whose very nature implies objectivity. St. Anselm, who originated the argument, said, in effect, that we could not avoid the thought of a totality—"the thought of that than which there can be none greater." For if we speak of ourselves as known and the objective universe as unknown, still we think a totality under the me and the not-me—the me and the not-me is necessarily all. The totality is the unity that underlies all thinking. It is the independent that

includes the dependent as one of its moments. The *Begriff* is, then, Hegel's expression for the independent being that everything presupposes as necessary. Its nature is to make itself an object of itself in the manner that we have seen in the discussion of the judgment and syllogism. To Hegel, therefore, the old proof of God from his idea or concept is full of deep meaning.

“God as living God, and still more as absolute Spirit, is recognized only in his deed. . . . The scientific knowing comprehends him in his activity, *i. e.*, in himself, and knows the concept of God in his being and his being in his concept (*Begriff*)” (III. 169).

“On the standpoint that we have now reached, objectivity has the meaning of the in and for itself being of *Begriff*—*i. e.*, of the *Begriff* (notion) that has cancelled its mediation, posited through its self-determination and reached immediate self-relation” (III. 173). This objectivity has, as we should expect, three forms, the *first* being objectivity undeveloped and devoid of subjectivity—namely, mechanism; *secondly*, as objectivity in which subjectivity appears—law and ratio, and measure of differences—chemism; *thirdly*, objectivity in which subjectivity manifests itself as dependence on a purpose or aim—teleology.

This brings us to the idea which may be defined as explicit subject-objectivity in the forms of life, intellect and will.

1. *Mechanism.*

The judgment, when perfected, posits its entire form in each of its terms ; the subject is the complete notion and the predicate is the complete notion, and their connection, the copula, also becomes a judgment. With this the judgment has developed into the syllogism.

The syllogism, again, when perfected, posits its mediation in each of its terms, and each becomes a total. Each of the three figures performs its function in proving some premise of another, and the result is a syllogism of syllogisms.

The whole dialectic progress from being and naught to the syllogism has been of this character. The perfection of the whole develops itself in the parts, and the parts or moments grow to totalities, and this develops the form of the whole to a new and higher perfection. This is the principle of the Notion, and it is, as we have seen, also the dialectic method. With the development of the dependent moments into totalities there is, of course, the development of independence ; each moment becoming a reflection of the whole and containing all, it needs nothing.

The independence of the perfected moments of quality produced quantity, each moment became a one and indifferent to others. Dependence of somewhat on another gave place to independence and indifference, because of completeness.

So, too, actuality posited its perfection as causal activity. But at first its truth was sundered into partial terms, the cause having its effect on some-

thing else, and the effect being void of causal activity, except so far as receiving it from others. Then each moment became total; the cause also its own effect, and the effect its own cause. The category of *causa sui* thus arose, and this is the Notion. The notion is especially that form of being in which each of its moments is an independent and perfect totality, but at the same time each one is perfectly interpenetrated by all the others, and this constitutes personality. But its imperfect realizations as found in the judgments and syllogisms of immediateness and reflection do not display the notion adequately. The tension of subjectivity, opposed to objectivity, has to be overcome by the developing of each of the moments into an independent totality, as in the syllogism of syllogisms, and then we have a subject that is its own object, and an object that is its own subject. This is the idea.

But if we take this independence and indifference of the moments abstractly, we have mere *mechanism*, and this is the first and lowest possible sub-category under objectivity.

In mechanism each part is indifferent to every other. "This constitutes the character of mechanism that every relation of the parts combined is something foreign to them, which does not arise from their own nature; the unity of the parts is only a seeming one, nothing more than an aggregation, a mixing, a heap, a collection, or the like. Whether material or spiritual, a mechanism is all the same. A mechanical memory, a mechanical

imagination, a mechanical habit, a mechanical act, all lack the presence and interpenetration of the mind." The elements have no inner connection.

If we admit that true being is subject and object of itself, and attempt to think it in its immediateness, we shall think subject as undeveloped and object as undeveloped, but their opposition as fully developed, the one over against the other. This thought contains the moments subject and object as unreal, but their separation as real. The undeveloped subject is a point, the undeveloped object is a point, but their separation is real—every point is outside of every other point. This gives us the idea of space, which is the idea of pure mechanism, carried one step further. For it is the thought which the absolute idea thinks of itself when it thinks of its own immediateness abstractly. But such abstract thought, of itself, cannot be explained except by the Platonic conception of the Logos and the Christian conception of the recognition of the First Principle by the Logos. The Logos thinks its own derivation from the first, and in doing this it is obliged to think a stage of pure immediateness as the point from which its procession commences. For derivation contains all stages of perfection in it, from the germ to the entelechy.

This thought of space is the best clew to the idea of mechanism. The empty consciousness, with empty subject and empty object, but with real antithesis, is the separation and antithesis of empty points, the very conception of space.

Take one step further, and the idea of time arises, and this is the clew to Hegel's next step in objectivity after mechanism—namely, chemism.

The act of consciousness begins with the antithesis of empty subject to empty object—a point opposed to a point—and proceeds from this (the space concept) to the identification or recognition of the object by the subject (the time-concept). For the act of recognition or identification annuls the separation or antithesis, and thus the points all become one, and a real one. The separation becomes unreal—a cancelled separation. Time has one reality—the now, a single point of time ; all separation or extension is cancelled and unreal—a past or a future that exists not now. This is the dialectic connection of time and space in the *Processio*.

Now, in mechanism we can see independence, or separation and antithesis, conjoined with emptiness and indifference of distinctions. Hegel finds the dialectic of mechanism to begin in the contradiction between the perfect indifference of each part to every other and this perfect identity of properties and qualities. This, according to him, should produce the “mechanical process”—as a unity of mutually excluding objects. (a) Through action and reaction in the *formal process*, “a result arises that was not contained in the process at first ; the product is some external arrangement or order of the parts.” (b) The second step, the *real process*, contains the dynamic side of the process, that of the influence of the

stronger on the weaker. (c) There results a *centre of movement* as the product. This brings us to "absolute mechanism," with (a) its center, and (b) its law. To be related to a center is to have an ideal. Gravitation is the ideal that each separate body possesses of the totality of matter. Each body feels, so to speak, ideally all the other bodies, in proportion to their magnitudes and distances. With centrality, or the ideal presence of the mechanical whole in each mechanical part, we have transcended the sphere of mechanism and come to the specification of objectivity—the stage that Hegel calls *chemism*.

2. *Chemism.*

"The expression Chemism (*Chemismus*) for the mutual relation (*Verhältniss*) of contrasted elements (*Differenz*) in objectivity must not be taken here exclusively in its application to chemical elements, so called. The meteorological process, the sexual relation of plants and animals, the spiritual relations of love and friendship, have for their formal ground this relation" (III. 196). The affinity seeks its own, and a process arises which is that of the ideal whole manifesting itself as the guiding principle in the process. Conformity to purpose or end—teleology—is a more explicit and fully realized form than this blind affinity.

3. *Teleology.*

"Teleology is the truth of mechanism." The three phases of the category are: (a) the subjective aim, (b) the means, (c) the realized aim. The aim

or purpose may be external or internal : as internal, it is life. Self-activity is manifested by internal aims and purposes. A being that moves or acts with a purpose shows that it has ideals, and hence that it is a synthesis of its self and its not-self ; this synthesis takes the form of appetite or desire in animals.

Hence, through the category of teleology, we return out of mere objectivity into subjectivity again, and now have subject-objectivity expressly before us—this is the realm of the idea proper.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE IDEA AS PERSONALITY.

REAL objective existence that is also subjective—for example life, intellect and will—belongs to the stage of the idea, as Hegel conceives it. The immediate and most inadequate form of the idea is life. Intellect by itself is inadequate, and so is will by itself. The true concrete idea is the unity of life, intellect and will in such a manner that each of these is both the others. The Scholastics, as we have seen, defined God as the being in whom intellect and will are one. Such a definition is not easily understood. The philosophical student is apt to suppose that a being which is living *and* thinking *and* willing is meant. But this is not a correct apprehension. It is a being whose knowing is creating and whose willing is knowing. As we have often enough declared in this book, the essential thought here is that absolute reason knowing itself makes an object of itself and is, in so doing, both knowing itself and willing itself to be objective, in one and the same act. Man in knowing himself makes of himself an object, but not a *real* object—only a *quasi* object. But the absolute in knowing itself makes itself a real object. If to know is to create the object known, then the intellect and will are one and the

No.

same act, for creating is an exercise of the will.

The absolute idea therefore is a living which is both intellect and will—and a thinking which is both life and will ; finally, a willing that is also life and knowledge.

Hegel expounds the doctrine of the idea under the following heads :

Chapter I.

1. Life :

- (a) The living individual.
- (b) The life-process.
- (c) The generic (*Gattung*).

2. Intelligence (*Erkennen*):

- (a) The true.
 - (1) Analytic knowing.
 - (2) Synthetic knowing.
 - (i) Definition.
 - (ii) Classification.
 - (iii) Theorem.
- (b) The good.

Chapter II.

The absolute idea :

- (a) Method.
- (b) Dialectic.
- (c) System.

In his treatment of the *idea* Hegel again makes an occasion for misunderstanding as to the nature of the first principle to which he has arrived as the final result of his logic. Glancing at the discus-

sions under absolute idea, one might naturally suppose that we had arrived only at correct formal views about method and the dialectic treatment of the topics of a science. We have learned perhaps how to compose a work on philosophy! For the sub-topics "method, dialectic progress, and system" seem to relate to form of exposition rather than absolute truth itself. Be this as it may, Hegel has bent his followers in this formal direction and thus well-nigh ruined the influence of his philosophic school for a time.

Looking closely at his treatment of idea, however, we discover plain evidence sufficient to convince us that he has in his thoughts always a personal first principle as the necessary result of his system. We see well enough that his talk about method and dialectic treatment is meant merely for a statement of the nature of this highest personal self-activity.

First he treats of the forms of the idea in the world arising from nature: life, intellect and will. Life has the power of self-determination—the living being can react against its environment and modify it. It can assimilate portions of its environment, stripping off such determinations as it finds already present and imposing its own determinations in their place. The living being, if an animal, transmutes its food into cellular tissue of its own so that it can use it as instrument of feeling, thought and will. Even a plant transmutes its food into vegetable cells which will, like seeds, reproduce the entire plant in its exact type of individuality.

The self in self-activity does not get very fully realized in plant life. Every plant is a family of selves rather than a single self. But in the animal this single self gets realized in the form of feeling.

In feeling, the self-activity commences an ideal reproduction of its environment. It determines itself in imitation of the determination of the environment and thereby makes what would be external limitation an inner limitation and for itself—it feels its environment. Desire is feeling accompanied with the additional sense of self-hood—the self extends ideally beyond its limit. The self should be a synthesis of its real organism and its environment, and desire expresses this.

Knowledge is possible only when the self is realized as *Ego*. The pure generality of the *Ego* (self-determining as opposed to the self-determined) admits a process of ideal determinations that defines the environment and yet can be distinguished from it. The infinite variety of nature can be all reproduced by definition of universals. Hence the memory, mother of the muses, arises through a higher realization of self-determination than occurs in simple feeling. From the exercise of the power to recall comes a consciousness of this general power to reproduce or represent, and general ideas are now born.

Hegel makes the generic, as it appears in life and reproduction, the transition from plant life (as mere self-preservation by aid of assimilation of nourishment) to the higher realization of the idea

in intelligence. That which is generic or the reproducer of the species in the lower forms becomes the *Ego* in the higher forms.

The theoretical activity of the mind seeks to know the true, the practical activity seeks to realize the good through the will. Hegel shows how opposite these activities are while yet both are forms of the same self-realization of the idea. The cognitive faculty seeks the true as objectively existent in the world. The conative faculty (as Hamilton calls the will) seeks to make the true exist in the world where it is not yet extant.

The analytic cognition selects out of the world of experience the universal or general—separating the abiding from the perishing. The synthetic cognition reproduces the particular determination, defining what is general by adding determinations to it.

(1) “Definition contains the three moments of the notion: The universal as the *genus proximum*, the particular as the determinateness of the species (*qualitas specifica*) and the individual as the object defined” (*Encyclopaedia*, § 229, *Zusatz*).

(2) Classification is a synthetic operation in which is expressed the necessary relation of all the determinations of the universal. The contents are exhibited exhaustively. This is a higher realization of the notion than the definition.

(3) The theorem, however, realizes the notion still more completely as it “exhibits the object in the conditions and forms of its real extant being.”

With the completion of the theoretical cognition

the mind arrives at the knowledge of the ideal—the notion is being as it ought to be. Hence arises the idea of the good and the will to realize it.

Self-determination that imposes its own forms on the objective is the will. The crude immediate will delights to feel its power by destroying whatever it finds and imposing its own forms on actuality. While theoretic intelligence probes underneath objective appearance and does not rest until it finds the absolute, the will power on the other hand pronounces against all reality as imperfect and in need of reformation.

But the dialectic of will-power leads it upward to the ethical and the recognition of the ethical in the world-process. Providence rules events for good. With this insight into the good the finite realizations of the idea arrive at a recognition of the absolute idea whose theoretical and practical activities are one—whose thinking is willing, in short.

THE ABSOLUTE IDEA.

“The absolute idea as rational notion which finds in reality its actualization is, on account of this immediateness of its objective identity, a return to the category of life” (III. 317). That is to say: The reality of this identity of intellect and will which defines the perfect realization of the notion is an individual being. “But,” he continues, “it holds this form of immediateness cancelled and forms within itself the highest tension of opposites. The notion is not only soul, but free subjective notion which exists for itself and there-

fore possesses personality—the will-power (*der Praktische*) which determines itself objectively and as person is an impenetrable atomic subjectivity. But this is not merely excluding individuality, but also for itself existing universality and intelligence, and it sees in its objective environment its own self, made objective. All else is error, confusion, opinion, strife, caprice and perishableness; but the absolute idea is being, immortal life, self-knowing truth, and all truth” (III. 317-318).

“The absolute idea is the only object and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness in itself and its nature *is to return into itself through its self-determination or specialization*, it has many forms of activity and it is the business of philosophy to recognize them, as its forms. Nature and spirit [*i. e.*, human history] are the two opposite modes in which this realization takes place. Art and religion are varieties of its method of seizing itself and giving itself appropriate realization; philosophy has the same content and the same aim as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute idea because its method is the highest, namely, that of the notion itself” (III. 318).

How the method of the idea determines the logic of pure thought which is its highest activity, and how it finds its beginning in the immediate and progresses through the dialectic and forms a totality as a system, Hegel discusses in detail in this closing chapter of his logic and almost justifies, as we have said, the criticism that his system ends

with a prescription for the investigation and exposition of truth rather than with the presentation of truth itself. He emerges however, from this discussion of scientific form and returns to his result. "Every new stage of the onward progress [of this system of philosophical investigation of pure thought] arrives at what is more determined and definite—it is a return to itself rather than a going outward, and the greater the extension the greater the intension. The richest is therefore the concretest and most subjective, and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth is the mightiest and most comprehensive. The highest and sharpest point of the summit is pure personality which alone through its absolute dialectic, its essential activity, holds all things within itself and at the same time frees itself from complication with them (*sich zum Freisten macht*) and holds itself in absolute simplicity which is first immediateness and universality" (III. 339).

"According to this method every step forward is a step in further determination and in further removal from the indeterminate beginning; this is also a return—a process of finding the grounds of the thought with which we began" (III. 339). We go from what is given us to its presuppositions. The ultimate presupposition is absolute reason.

NATURE.

In the idea of the good as pointed out, the mind first arrives at the truly divine, the absolute. The transition from logic to the philosophy of nature is

found in the unity of the notion and its realization, as he tells us: "Since the idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure notion and its reality, and consequently assumes the form of immediate being, it is, as the totality of this form, nature" (III. 342). This statement is not a very adequate one because it sounds like the former dialectical statements which led us on to a new and higher category. In that case we should not have arrived at the conclusion of the logic of pure thought, for nature would be a higher step. Hegel is aware of this and therefore adds at once: "But this is not a becoming or a transition as above, when we took the step from the totality of the subjective notion [syllogism of syllogisms] to objectivity, or when we passed over from *subjective aim* (*Zweck*) to life. The pure idea into which the reality of the notion is elevated is rather an absolute emancipation (*Befreiung*) [*i. e.*, emancipation from undeveloped possibilities which impel it on to further growth]. There is no further immediate determination for it that is not at the same time posited as the total notion. In this freedom [from lower, undeveloped forms] it is not subject any more to transitions; its simplicity is perfectly transparent and has the form of the abiding notion. The transition to nature here therefore means that the idea emits itself with freedom (*sich selbst frei entlässt*) in the form of nature, but at the same time abiding secure in its own repose within itself. [Here take note that Hegel does not hold that idea loses itself in nature, but transcends it.] And

on account of this freedom the form of determinateness in nature takes on the same freedom [or independent existence] and appears as externality in the forms of time and space existing devoid of subjectivity. In so far as this is looked upon as abstract immediateness of being it is seen by consciousness as mere objectivity and external life; but, in so far as seen from the idea, nature is the totality of the notion and the science of the divine cognition of nature. This first resolve (*Entschluss*) of the pure idea to determine itself as external idea results however only in positing the mediation out of which the notion lifts itself into freedom again—into existence returned into itself out of externality—and perfects this emancipation through the science of spirit [the self-consciousness of the invisible church] and finds the highest notion of itself in the logical science of pure thought as the self-comprehending notion" (III. 342-343). With this remark Hegel closes his large logic. In the *Encyclopædia* at the close, he speaks of the idea, in a form existing for sense-perception (*anschauende Idee*), as nature. "The absolute freedom of the idea, however, is not a mere freedom from the lower forms of life and finite cognition, but its freedom in its absolute truth, in which it resolves to emit itself entire as a reflection of itself (*Wiederschein*) in the form of immediate idea, *i. e.*, in the moment of particularity or of first determination and other-being"* (*Encyclopædia*, § 244).

*Rothe, in his ethics, conceives the absolute as resolving of his own free choice, to turn his pure not-me into a reflection of his me,

This does not quite admit of interpretation as the creation of nature through the Logos, for it makes nature to be the Logos direct. The only and sufficient objection to this is that it makes it necessary that the absolute in knowing himself shall know finitude direct, recognizing it in himself, or that he shall himself pass through stages of imperfect knowing. It does not explain fully the emancipation (*Befreiung*) from finite determinations because it does not explain how they arose through the resolve to make new ones, although the context makes it probable that altruism—divine goodness—prompts this divine gift of the idea to externality. But under it all it is clear that Hegel retains the thought that the finite limitations from which we have escaped by aid of the dialectic—the categories of being and essence—are in some way so connected with the absolute idea that it generates them out of itself as well as frees itself from them. Were this not so, how could this dialectical logic, whose sole function is to widen these imperfect notions into the true notion—how could this logic be spoken of as the form in which the idea returns out of its externality in time and space? No doubt nature “comes to its truth” in rational conscious beings; these rational beings again reach a knowledge of God in pure thought which apprehends him as absolute person with will

i. e., into a process of development and progressive realization of the divine self. Without this creative act, the not-me would forever remain a mere possibility without actuality either of good or of evil. Hegel it will be observed makes the creative act to be a free one though not an accidental or arbitrary one.

and intellect identical. In this sense Hegel could say that the idea finds its highest notion of itself in the logic of pure thought. But on the other hand the logic of pure thought is only the dialectical process by which *man* (not God) purifies himself from his lower categories and rises to the only true and adequate one, namely the absolute idea. The logic is then a sort of phenomenology—a voyage of discovery to find the one true pure thought.

The idea being once comprehended as the higher unity of intellect and will (in this Hegel and Aquinas agree), it follows that it is perfect subject and perfect object and complete personality in each. The First knows himself in the Second; this is not nature even as totality. But the Second knowing himself as derived creates a world of becoming and derivative being which rises from space and time through matter up to organic beings and finally to man. Man has his forms of emancipation from externality and these culminate in philosophy and theology in an insight into the nature of God (“The vision of God”).

If Hegel had not found his logical forms of being and essence mere defective categories he could not have treated them dialectically. He leaves the logic at the end without explaining how the absolute idea generates them. For the absolute idea resolves to create nature and does not generate these abstract and inadequate categories of being and essence until they rise in the minds of his rational creatures on their way from savagery towards divine knowledge.

In his treatment of the method, dialectic progress and syllogism, however, Hegel seems for a moment to suppose that he finds those categories of being and essence directly through the absolute idea. But it is only a seeming, for he proves only that the application of the notion as method necessitates the testing of each concept through its universality. If a category can be by itself, and does not presuppose any other one to make it possible, then it is the highest and final category. This of course will direct us to the beginning with pure immediateness or pure being. But this is formal and relates to the exposition and not to the absolute truth which one reaches at the end of the exposition—nor to the absolute truth that precedes the finite and imperfect as its presupposition.

The dialectic is no infinite progress, but it brings us to a final category when a further continuation simply repeats the idea already reached—when further progress is simply going-together-with-itself, that is to say when itself is its own other and this explicitly—not implicitly as has been found in the case of the categories of being and essence. This thought is seized by Hegel in its fulness and if we criticise him for his view of nature we must not misunderstand his attitude and attribute ordinary pantheism to him as though he teaches that nature is a necessary moment of God instead of being a free creation. It is a great mistake to say that Hegel holds God to be a becoming. If by becoming one means the process of life or the

process of consciousness, of course he may say even of the orthodox view that it holds God to be a becoming. But Hegel makes out the absolute to be a person—intellect and will in their highest potence. There is no fatalism in connection with such a theory. But there is certainty in regard to the actions of a perfect being, nevertheless. A reasonable being will act reasonably because it is free, while a being under fate will act because impelled from without.

The method of the idea, its mode of action, is to descend into the depths of non-being and mere possibility in order to create and bring up beings into its own perfection. It condescends through grace to impart its being unceasingly to new individuals which although they begin to be, yet enter on immortal careers.

FINIS.

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